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ABSTRACT

SUPERVENIENCE RELATIONS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
FEBRUARY 1994

RICHARD CRANSTON PAULL, B.A., LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker

Supervenience is the impossibility of independent
variation.

A crude statement of supervenience would be the

claim that things cannot differ in some respect without

differing in some other respect.

For example, to say that

the mental supervenes on the physical is to say that there

cannot be mental differences without physical differences.
The basic idea behind supervenience can be developed
My dissertation contains a detailed

in a number of ways.

study of the different supervenience relations found in the
literature.

I

consider their logical relations to one

another and their relative strengths and weaknesses.

I

then develop new, more useful supervenience relations.
In general,

supervenience is supposed to be a
A primary goal of my

nonreductive dependence relation.

dissertation is to determine the nature and philosophical
significance of the dependence relation provided by
supervenience.

So,

for example,

I

attempt to determine

whether materialism is adequately formulated as
supervenience thesis.

a

Recently, many have claimed that it
V

is not.

They claim that the mental could supervene on the

physical without being asymmetrically dependent on the

physical in the way that materialism requires.

I

respond

by agreeing that supervenience is not sufficient for the

relevant sort of dependence, but

I

contend that the

supervenience of the mental on the physical is a nontrivial necessary condition on materialism.

So the

question of the supervenience of the mental on the physical
is significant,
is false.

Thus,

for if it fails to hold, then materialism
I

defend the importance of supervenience

to philosophy while acknowledging that some of the recent

criticisms of supervenience are sound.

VI
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

A.

Supervenience and its Applications

A supervenience thesis is a denial of the possibility
of independent variation.

For example, the claim that the

mental supervenes on the physical means (roughly) that

there can be no mental differences without physical
differences: anyone exactly like me in all intrinsic and

extrinsic physical respects must be like me in all mental
respects.

Although supervenience has only become an object

of study in the latter half of this century, the history of

philosophy contains many supervenience theses:

Leibniz

held that worlds cannot differ regarding the truths about

corporeal objects without differing regarding the truths
about monadic perceptions.

Descartes, Locke, and others

held that objects cannot differ in their secondary

qualities without differing in the primary qualities of, or
relations between, their parts.

While the denial of the possibility of independent

variation is the core idea of supervenience, other ideas
are closely associated with it: specifically,

dependence (or determination) and

(ii)

(i)

reducibility

.

Much

its
of the recent interest in supervenience derives from

1

reputed capacity to capture the claim that one family of

properties depends on (or is determined by) another family
of properties without implying that scientific theories of

the dependent realm are reducible to those of independent

We can understand this better by examining the

realm.

history of philosophical uses of supervenience
The leading expert on supervenience, Jaegwon Kim,

traces the current interest in supervenience to this

passage in
Value"

G.

E.

Moore's "The Conception of Intrinsic

:

if a given thing possesses any kind of
intrinsic value in a certain degree,

then. .. anything exactly like it, must under
all circumstances, possess it in exactly the
Or to put it in the
same degree.
corresponding negative form: It is
impossible that of two exactly similar
things one should possess it and the other
not, or that one should possess it in one
I
degree, and the other in a different one.
saying
conveyed
by
naturally
think this... is
that the kind of value in question depends
solely on the intrinsic nature of what

possesses it.^

Moore combined this view about the dependence of values on
facts with his rejection of the "naturalistic fallacy"

according to which normative predicates are definable in
terms of descriptive predicates.

Thus, Moore provides a

precedent for viewing supervenience (the impossibility of

''Moore

(1922)

pp.

261-262.
2

independent variation) as a dependence (or determination^)

relation free of certain kinds of reductive implications.
Others followed Moore in using the supervenience of

values on descriptive traits to capture the "primacy" of

descriptive characteristics of things while denying that
supervenience entails that values are reducible to (because

definable in terms of) descriptive properties.

Consider,

for example, these comments of R. M. Hare which are

generally cited as the first use of "supervenience" in its
technical sense.

First, let us take that characteristic of
'good' which has been called its
supervenience.
Suppose that we say 'St.
Francis was a good man.
It is logically
impossible to say this and to maintain at
the same time that there might have been
another man placed exactly in the same
circumstances as St. Francis, and who
behaved in exactly the same way, but who
differed from St. Francis in this respect
Next, the
only, that he was not a good man.
explanation of this logical impossibility
does not lie in any form of naturalism; it
is not the case that there is any
conjunction C of descriptive characteristics
such that to say that a man has C entails
that he is morally good. .Nevertheless, the
judgment that a man is morally good is not
logically independent of the judgement that
he has certain good-making characteristics;
there is a relation between them, although
'

.

^The claim that A depends solely on B seems to be
equivalent to the claim that B determines A.

^Apparently, Leibniz sometimes used the Latin term
"supervenire" to express his doctrine of the dependence of
relations on the intrinsic properties of things. See Kim
(1990)

p.

5.
3

it is not one of entailment or identity of

meaning/

While supervenience still plays a large role in metaethical discussions/ recently it has been most freguently

applied in the philosophy of mind as (part of) a solution
to the mind/body problem.

In the late 1960 's, behaviorism

had run its course and Putnam's arguments for the multiple

realizability of mental states had put the reductive typetype identity theory under siege.

In this climate,

it is

not surprising that those who still wanted to uphold the

primacy of the physical but had come to distrust

reductionist versions of materialism would appropriate the
notion of supervenience from ethics.

With its credentials

as a nonreductive dependence relation, supervenience seemed

to be the perfect way to preserve the primacy of the

physical while denying the reducibility of the mental.
Donald Davidson was among the first to use the notion
of supervenience in the philosophy of mind.

Although the position I describe denies that
there are psychophysical laws, it is
consistent with the view that mental
characteristics are in some sense dependent,
or supervenient, on physical
Such supervenience might
characteristics.
there cannot be two
that
mean
to
be taken
respects but
physical
all
in
events alike
^Hare (1952) p.

145.

^See Brink (1989),

and DePaul (1987).
4

differing in some mental respect, or that an
object cannot alter in some mental respect
without altering in some physical respect.
Dependence or supervenience of this kind
does not entail reducibility through law or
definition: if it did, we could reduce moral
properties to descriptive, and this there is
good reason to believe cannot be done.^

Jaegwon Kim, John Haugeland, Terence Horgan, Geoffrey
Heilman, Frank Thompson, Paul Teller, and David Lewis are

among the many philosophers who have subsequently used

supervenience to characterize materialism.

Lewis speaks

for many when he claims that "the bare minimum that is

common to all materialist theories ... is a supervenience
thesis: no difference without a physical difference."^

Philosophers of mind have put supervenience to other
uses as well.

It is often used to discuss the issue of

methodological solipsism and the related issue of whether
beliefs and other propositional attitudes have "wide" or
"narrow" content.

Even dualists could make use of

supervenience in this context because it is a live issue
for dualists whether Putnam and Burge's thought experiments

refute the supervenience thesis according to which minds
cannot have different thoughts without differing

intrinsically in some way.

^Davidson (1970) p. 88.
^Lewis (1988) p. 507.
5

Discussions of supervenience are not confined to
ethics and the philosophy of mind.

It is used to

characterize the relationship between biological traits
like fitness and "the physical, behavioral and ecological

properties of organisms that are subjects of lower level
theories in the life sciences"®.

It is also used to

characterize the relationship between the aesthetic and the
non-aesthetic^, the semantic and the non-semantic^°, and

the social and the individual

Most generally, it is

.

used to formulate the thesis that everything is dependent
on the microphysical^^
As supervenience came to play a role in so many areas
of philosophy,

interest in the logic and philosophical

significance of the notion has increased dramatically.

The

main issue at stake in discussions of its philosophical

significance is its adequacy as
relation.
VI.

a

nonreductive dependence

This is a major focus of chapters III, IV, and

As to its logic, a basic point of contention has been

the entailment relations among the various versions of

supervenience that have been proposed.

To get some feel

®Rosenberg (1978) p. 368.
^See Currie

(1991).

^®See

Bonevac (1991).

^^See

Currie (1984).

^^See

Kim (1978), Horgan (1982), and Lewis (1983) and

(1986a)
6

for the admissible alternatives, let us make the basic

supervenience schema explicit:

(Sch)

There can be no difference of the supervenient
sort (e.g., the mental) without a difference of

the subvenient or base sort (e.g., the physical).

There are many dimensions along which this schema can
be made precise, thereby yielding different supervenience

relations.

First, what sorts of entities are supposed to

be incapable of differing in the supervenient way without

differing in the subvenient way?

In the literature the two

most common answers to this claim are

(i)

localized objects

or events and (ii) entire possible worlds or models.

One

can categorize supervenience relations depending on their

answer to this guestion.

Call relations that imply the

first answer "local" supervenience relations, and ones that

imply the second, "global" supervenience relations.

Another question is how should occurrences of 'the
mental',

'the physical',

and 'the moral' be understood in

standard statements of supervenience?

Usually, such

expressions are taken to denote sets of properties: when
one claims that the mental supervenes on the physical one
is saying that the set of all mental properties supervenes

on the set of all physical properties.

There is also a

linguistic variant on this proposal according to which such
7

expressions are taken to denote sets of predicates.

Yet

another possibility is that they denote sets of truths.
Once again, there is a linguistic version of this proposal
that essentially involves the notion of truths in a

language and analyzes the supervenience thesis in terms of

what holds in some set of models of the language (s) in
question, and a non-linguistic (or metaphysical) version of

this proposal which divorces truth from any particular

language and analyzes the supervenience thesis in terms of
what is true (simpliciter) in some class of possible

worlds
There is also the question of the proper

interpretation of the modality involved in supervenience
theses.

Many options exist here, and some will be

discussed below.
To summarize:

I

have distinguished four dimensions

along which the supervenience schema can be made more
precise.

First, there is the local/global distinction:

sometimes the denial of independent variation is intended
to apply to proper parts (or inhabitants) of possible

worlds; other times it is meant to apply to entire possible

worlds (or models)

.

Second, there is the question whether

it is sets of properties and relations

(or predicates)

on

the one hand or propositions (or sentences) that stand in
the supervenience relation.

Third, supervenience relations

can be understood in a more or less linguistic fashion.
8

Both local and global supervenience can be (and have been)

understood as relations between sets of linguistic items,
either predicates or truths in a language

.

Fourth,

questions arise concerning the proper interpretation of the
modal expressions involved in supervenience claims.
In this dissertation

supervenience relations.

I

consider both local and global

In chapters II,

III,

and IV,

I

investigate the logical relations between, and

philosophical controversies concerning, local and global

supervenience relations as they are formulated in the
literature.
I

In these chapters,

following Kim (and others)

formulate supervenience as a relation between sets if

properties.

This way of understanding supervenience is

preferable to taking the relata to be sets of propositions
because it is plausible that propositions just are a
certain kind of property (properties instantiated only by

possible worlds) but properties are not readily subsumable

under propositions.

It is also preferable to taking the

relata to be sets of linguistic objects because

supervenience is often used to characterize relations that

would hold even if there never were language users (e.g.,
the dependence of chemical features on microphysical
ones).^^

Finally, in chapters V and VI,

I

extend Kim's

treatment of supervenience by introducing new versions of

^^For details,

see the beginning of chapter V.
9

local and global supervenience that hold between sets of

properties and relations.
There are two main goals of this dissertation.
I

want to consider the status of supervenience as

First

a

nonreductive dependence relation: particularly its
significance as a dependence relation.

Jaegwon Kim has

often argued that any supervenience relation strong enough
to express the dependence of the mental on the physical

that is characteristic of materialism is too strong to be
nonreductive.^^

More recently, Kim has joined Thomas

Grimes and others in arguing that no version of

supervenience is strong enough to be a dependence relation

worthy of materialism after all.

Some of the criticisms

illustrate limitations of supervenience we should be aware
of.

But none of them,

in my opinion,

succeeds in

undermining the status of at least some varieties of
supervenience as philosophically significant nonreductive

dependence/determination relations
The other central task of my dissertation is to

investigate the logical relations between, and strengths
and weaknesses of, extant varieties of supervenience, and

then to introduce new supervenience relations that are

formulated more precisely and more widely applicable than
those prevalent in the literature.

For example, while

supervenience is usually formulated as a relation between
^^Kim

(1988).

Also see Oddie (1991).
10

sets of properties, it is more useful if the relate are

taken to be sets of properties and relations.

After all,

the claim that the mental supervenes on the physical is

naturally interpreted as applicable to mental relations
such as belief and desire as well as mental properties.
Likewise, physicalists will surely want to include

spatiotemporal relations, the part/whole relation, and

perhaps causal relations in the base set.

But standard

formulations of supervenience do not allow relations in

either the base set or the supervenient set.
and VI,

I

In chapters V

introduce new versions of supervenience that

accommodate relations.
Since supervenience is

of properties (and relations)

discussion
notions.

I

modal relation between sets

a
,

in the course of the

make significant use of many metaphysical

Consequently,

I

owe the reader some account of my

understanding of properties, relations, possible worlds and
This is provided below.

possible objects.

B.

1.

Background Assumptions

Possible Worlds
I

agree with David Lewis that

Supervenience means that there could be no
difference of one sort without difference of
Clearly, this 'could'
the other sort.
11

indicates modality. Without the modality we
have nothing of interest.

Not surprisingly, supervenience theses are often formulated
in the language of modal logic, and discussed in the

possible worlds idiom.

Lewis has criticized the former

portion of this practice.

He believes that translating

supervenience theses into the language of boxes and

diamonds is an unnecessary intermediate step that actually
distorts the intended meaning of supervenience theses.

He

advocates quantifying over possible objects and possible

worlds directly instead.
To see why Lewis's advice should be followed, consider

the folowing statement of local psycho-physical

supervenience: "no two objects can differ mentally without

differing physically".

If one treats

'can'

as a modal

operator, translates this into the language of modal logic,

and then applies modal negation, the resulting thesis reads

roughly as follows: "necessarily, any two things that are

physically indiscernible (instantiate the same members of
the class of physical properties) are mentally

indiscernible too".

On the standard actualist semantics

for modal logic, this is the claim that any (accessible)

possible world is such that any physically indiscernible
inhabitants of it are mentally indiscernible.

^^Lewis

(1986a)

p.

15.
12

This version

of local supervenience is usually referred to as "weak

supervenience"

,

and for good reason: prima facia, it is

compatible with the possibility of there being someone

physically identical to the way

mentally different from me.

I

actually am who is vastly

As long as all physically

indiscernible worldmates are mentally indiscernible, the

modal-operator rendition of our local supervenience thesis
is satisfied.

The determination relation we tried to

capture in the original supervenience thesis appears to
have slipped away.
Lewis thinks that the translation into the language of

modal logic is to blame.

He claims that by treating 'can'

and other modal expressions as modal operators, we distort
the meaning of the local supervenience thesis:

the thesis we want says that there could be
no mental difference between two people
without there being some physical
difference, whether intrinsic or extrinsic,
between them. Reading the 'could' as a
diamond, the thesis becomes this: there is
no world (or, none within a certain
restriction) wherein two people differ
mentally without there being some physical
difference, intrinsic or extrinsic, between
That is not quite right. We have
them.
gratuitously limited our attention to
physical differences between two people in
.So what we have said is
the same world.
not quite what we meant to say, but rather
this: there could be no differences without
some physical differences of the sort that
could arise between people in the same
The italicized part is a gratuitous
world
[I]nsistence on reading the
addition
.

.

.

13

'could' as a diamond has distorted the
intended meaning.

Kim acknowledges that the original determination

thesis has been lost in the modal-operator translation

which results in weak supervenience

.

He tries to

capture the strength of the original idea with a new

version of local supervenience:

Let A and B be families of properties closed
under Boolean operations ... A strongly
supervenes on B just in case, necessarily,
for each x and each property F in A, if x
has F, then there exists a property G in B

^*^Lewis
^^As

(1986a)

p.

16.

Kim says in "Concepts of Supervenience":

although the definition of "weak
supervenience" follows very closely the
bench-mark explanations of supervenience in
the literature, as witness the quotations
from Hare and Davidson, the relation it
defines is considerably weaker than one might
have expected - indeed, too weak for some of
its typical intended applications ... The
particular associations between [supervening]
properties and [base] properties in a given
world cannot be counted on to carry over into
other worlds.
Thus, weak supervenience falls short of
the following condition: fixing the base
properties of an object fixes its
supervenient properties. This condition
expresses a presumptive desideratum on the
explication of supervenience: base properties
must determine supervenient properties in the
sense that once the former are fixed for an
object, there is no freedom to vary the
latter for that very object (Kim (1984a) pp.
159-160)
14

such that X has G. and necessarily if any y
has G, it has F.

Although this formulation has some virtues,

perspicuity is not among them.

The local supervenience

schema states that there can be no supervenient differences

between individuals without subvenient differences between
them.

The following is a more natural rendition of this

idea

Where A and B are any sets of properties, A strongly
supervenes on B iff any possible individuals that are

B-indiscernible are A-indiscernible as well.

The inclination to treat modal expressions as modal

operators (instead of possibilist quantifiers) apparently

contributed to both the misinterpretation of the basic idea
behind local supervenience (as weak supervenience) and to
the unnecessarily complicated formulation of strong

supervenience.

In contrast, Lewis's modal realism provides

the requisite metaphysical background for quantifying

directly over possible individuals and their properties,
and making the trans-world comparisons that supervenience

requires.

’^Kim

Consequently, modal realism (or some version of

(1984a)

pp.

164-165.
15

possibilism)
and

2

.

is invaluable to the supervenience theorist,

will make use of it throughout

I

Possible Individuals
I

follow Lewis in assuming that possible individuals

are worldbound: they are literally parts of the

spatiotemporally isolated possible individuals that are

possible worlds.

also adopt an unrestricted principle of

I

mereological composition for possible individuals which are
worldmates.

Thus,

I

accept the existence of temporally and

spatially discontinuous possible individuals.
Because
worldbound,

I
I

conceive of possible individuals as
need not qualify my attributions of

properties to possible individuals with the possible world
at which they have said attributes.
a

Of course, when

I

say

possible individual is part of a world, non-Lewisians can

understand me to be saying that it exists a^ or according
to the world.

I

will sometimes use this terminology (which

reguires reference to the world in which the individual

possesses the property) when

I

discuss the views of those

who accept Kripkean assumptions about trans-world identity.

I aro
would much prefer paradise on the cheap.
according
view
(1990)
Pargetter's
sympathetic to Bigelow and
universals.
structural
complex
to which possible worlds are
modal
But this is a dissertation on supervenience not
various
of
discussion
realism, so I will avoid a detailed
substitutes for Lewis's possibilia.

16

Finally, since

I

conceive of possible individuals as

having both temporal and spatial parts,

I

need not take

explicit account of existence at a time in my formulations.
Since non-instantaneous possible individuals are not
"wholly present" at each moment of time at which they
exist,

I

avoid the difficulty of temporary intrinsic

properties

(I

am not pushed to consider properties to be

relations between individuals and times)

3.

Properties and Relations
Lewis diagnoses a number of "rifts" in the standard

accounts of properties and relations.

One is between the

abundant conception and the sparse conception.

According

to the abundant conception of properties, for any set of

possible individuals, there is at least one property

possessed by all and only the members of that set.

On this

conception being grue is a property, and being grue or an

undetached rabbit part is another.

There is no limit to

the gruesome disjunctiveness of such properties.

Likewise,

on the abundant conception of relations, there is an n-

place relation for every set of n-tuples of possible
objects.

On the sparse conception, however, only a select

minority of sets of possible individuals (or sets of nsome
tuples) have the distinction of being the extension of

property (or relation)
a theory.

.

D.

M.

Armstrong has put forth such

He claims that only perfectly determinate
17

properties and relations that figure in the laws of nature
or account for the objective resemblances^^ of things

really exist.

Armstrong calls such properties and

relations, "universals"

.

The set of universals is not

closed under either complementation or disjunction.
Lewis suggests that instead of choosing between the
two conceptions, we should accept both.

More precisely, we

should accept an abundance of properties and relations

while admitting that there is

a

distinguished minority that

play the theoretical roles emphasized on the sparse
conception.

I

will take his advice.

In Lewis's ontology,

sets of possible individuals and sets of n-tuples of

possible individuals are abundant properties and relations
respectively.

So

I

commit myself to the existence of

entities suited to play (approximately) the role played in
Lewis's theory by sets of possible individuals and sets of

n-tuples of possible individuals.

Since

I

have already

adopted other aspects of Lewis's modal realism, for the
sake of overall coherence

I

follow him in identifying

abundant properties (and relations) with sets of (n-tuples
^^The notion of objective resemblance is very hard to
specify precisely. But the intuition is that grueness, for
example, is not an objective respect of similarity, while
greenness (of some determinate shade) is. The difference,
according to Armstrong, is that entities that are both grue
need not share any universal (or certainly no color

while entities that are the same shade of green
universal)
Universals are postulated to accoun
do share a universal.
of
for the intuitive distinction between real respectsCambridge
merely
and
resemblance (or objective similarity)
respects of resemblance.
,

,
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of)

possible individuals.^^

I

shall be assuming that

properties and relations are necessary existents, although
many are only contingently exemplified.

According to Lewis, a small minority of the abundant
properties and relations play the role that properties and
relations are supposed to play on the sparse conception.
Lewis calls them the natural properties and relations.

If

we accept Armstrong's theory of universals we can analyze

the distinction between natural properties and the others
thus: a set of possible objects is a perfectly natural

property iff there exists some universal, U, such that all
and only possible objects which instantiate U are members
of the set.

Lewis remains agnostic on the proper account

of the distinction because he is agnostic on the question

whether universals (of the sort Armstrong speaks) exist.
But he is committed to the existence of the distinction

even to the point of claiming that we should take it as

primitive if need be, and he makes extensive use of it.
The four essential features of naturalness are, first,
any natural property or relation is essentially natural;
second, natural properties and relations are supposed to be

respects of objective resemblance; third, the perfectly
^^Although I do not have a fully developed ontological
system, I would prefer taking properties and relations
(sparsely conceived) as my primitives and constructing
possible worlds and possible individuals in terms of them.
The goal would be to come up with an ersatz theory of
possibilia that is (more or less) isomorphic to Lewis's
modal realism.
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natural properties and relations are supposed to compose

a

set of properties that is a minimal supervenience base for
all qualitative properties and relations, and,

naturalness comes in degrees.

fourth,

An example of a somewhat

natural property might be the conjunction of two perfectly
natural properties.

It is somewhat natural in virtue of

being a respect in which things are objectively similar,
but, assuming that its conjuncts are perfectly natural

it

,

is not part of any minimal supervenience base for all

respects of qualitative difference that also contains its
conjuncts, and therefore it is not perfectly natural.

There is another important distinction between
properties: the one between intrinsic and extrinsic
properties.

This distinction can be made in terms of the

intuitive notion of a perfect duplicate.

pong balls from the same package.

Think of ping

Ignoring their different

relational properties (e.g., one has the property of being

under a workbench, the other has the property of being on
the table)

,

they are qualitatively indistinguishable (to

the naked eye)

.

Of course, the balls are not really

duplicates, they are only approximate duplicates.

example of perfect duplicates, consider electrons.

For an
As

I

understand it, they are supposed to be perfect duplicates
of one another.

With this notion we can delineate the

intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.

Intrinsic properties are

those that must be shared by duplicates.
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A property,

P,

is

intrinsic iff there is no pair of possible objects x and
y
such that X and y are duplicates and x has P but
y lacks P.
So a property is extrinsic iff it is not intrinsic

- or is

it?

There is a difficulty.

Extrinsic properties are

usually equated with relational properties, while intrinsic
properties are supposed to be entirely non-relational.
now consider haecceities (or thisnesses)

.

But

They are non-

relational, but they do differ between duplicates.

Thus,

if we assume that the intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy is

exhaustive, our characterization in terms of duplicates

implies that haecceities are extrinsic.

One way to deal

with this problem is to claim that there are two different
kinds of properties, qualitative and non-qualitative
properties.

If we could make independent sense of this

distinction, we could then make our conclusion that

haecceities are extrinsic more palatable by addinq that all
extrinsic qualitative properties are relational after all.
We need, therefore, to distinquish between qualitative

and non-qualitative properties.

As a first approximation

we can say that non-qualitative properties are properties

whose extensions across loqical space can only be specified
in terms that make essential reference to particular

individuals or their haecceities.

For example, compare the

extrinsic property of being less than a mile from my

computer with the extrinsic property of being less than
21

a

mile from anything that satisfies condition,

C,

where C

happens to be the conjunction of properties possessed by my

computer and all its (possible) duplicates.

The latter

property is qualitative on my characterization, because
while it can be denoted by a description that makes

reference to my computer, it (the very same property) can
also be denoted by a description that makes reference to
any duplicate of my computer.

The property of being less

than a mile from my computer, however, is

a

property that

my clock has, but a duplicate of my clock less than a mile
from a duplicate of my computer only possesses that

property if it is also less than a mile from mY computer,
the one

I

am composing this sentence on.

A complete account of the distinctions between natural

and nonnatural, intrinsic and extrinsic, qualitative and

non-qualitative properties, and their relations to the
notion of a duplicate are beyond the scope of this
dissertation.

I

hope

I

have said enough about these

distinctions to be able to make use of them.^^

^^Strictly speaking, either intrinsicality or
duplication can be defined in terms of the other. Lewis
attempts to define duplication in terms of naturalness, and
intrinsicality in terms of duplication. Since I find the
notion of a duplicate clearer than the notion of a natural
property, I refrain from defining it in terms of naturalness
So for me,
and take it as a second basic notion.
duplication (like naturalness) is primitive, intrinsic
properties are those that cannot differ between duplicates,
and the rest are extrinsic.
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Finally,

relations.

I

need to introduce some distinctions among

Intrinsic relations are relations such that any

duplicate of the composite of the relata of the relation

must also have parts which stand in that relation to one
another.
I

For example, distance relations are intrinsic: if

am ten feet from my stereo, the duplicate of the

composite of me and my stereo (in our present positions)

must also have parts (namely duplicates of me and of my
stereo) that are ten feet apart.

On the other hand, the

relation of having the same owner is extrinsic.
Lewis divides intrinsic relations into internal

relations and external relations.

As he says,

"an internal

relation is one that supervenes on the intrinsic natures of
its relata"^^, while an external relation is one that

"does not supervene on the natures of the relata taken

separately, but it does supervene on the nature of the
For example, similarity is an

relata taken together.

internal (intrinsic) relation and distance relations are

external (intrinsic) relations.

The difference is that if

X is similar to y then x is similar to any duplicate of y,

but it is not the case that if x is ten feet from y then x
is ten feet from any duplicate of y.

Instead,

if x is ten

have heard David Lewis make this distinction
between relations. He makes it in a preliminary way in
Lewis (1983) footnote 16.
^^I

^^Lewis

(1986a)

p.

62.

^^Lewis

(1986a)

p.

62.
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feet from y then any duplicate of the composite of x and
y
(x and y "taken together") will contain duplicates of
x and
y which are ten feet from one another.

In conclusion, there are internal relations

(similarity)

,

external relations (distance)

relations (having the same owner)

.

,

and extrinsic

All of them are to be

conceived of as sets of n-tuples of possible individuals,
and,

4.

like properties, they come in degrees of naturalness.

Formal and Metaphysical Equivalence

There is a lot of discussion of the equivalence

relations and entailment relations between different
formulations of supervenience

.

Unfortunately, however,

there is little mention of the different sorts of

equivalence (and entailment) that might be at issue.
Clarity demands that we consider the issue of equivalence
before we go any further.

My remarks will generalize to

entailment in an obvious way.

According to one standard definition, where P and Q
are propositions,

(El)

P is equivalent to Q

D(P

^^Hughes and Cresswell (1968) p. 28.
strict equivalence’
relation so defined,
'
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Q)

is true.^^

They call the
.

This is a

f oriniilation

of th©

old.

idoa that two piropositions

are equivalent iff it is impossible for them to differ in

truth value.

(El)

is best thought of as a schema, where

is replaced by specific necessity operators as

appropriate.

The interpretation of

relevant to our

purposes is the one where it is taken to express

metaphysical necessity (i.e., truth at all possible
worlds)
(El),

.

We will call the kind of equivalence defined in

thus interpreted, "metaphysical equivalence".

So,

given our appropriation of Lewis's metaphysical framework,
to say that two propositions are metaphysically equivalent
is to say that there is no possible world (simpliciter)

at

which one is true and the other is false.
There is a different sort of definition that one is
likely to find in mathematical logic texts.

For example,

according to Boolos and Jeffrey, where L is a logic (or
formal language) and S and T are sentences in

L,

for all
(E2) S is equivalent to T [in L]
[interpretations] I [satisfying the axioms of L]
is an interpretation of S and of T, then I(S) =

,

if

I

I (T)

I

will call this sort of equivalence, "formal equivalence".

Note that two formulas (e.g., OA and DOA) can be formally

equivalent in one logic (e.g., S5)

but fail to be formally

They call the
2^Boo1os and Jeffrey (1989) p. 107.
equivalence’
logical
relation so defined,
'

.
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equivalent in another (e.g.

T)

,

.

That is why formal

equivalence must be relativised to particular formal
systems

These two kinds of equivalence are clearly distinct.
Two formulas can express metaphysically equivalent

propositions even though they fail to be formally
equivalent in any appropriate logic.

Consider, for

example, the following sentences and their natural

translations into predicate logic:

(B)

All Bachelors are male; Vx(Bx ^ Mx)

(M)

All unmarried males are male; Vx((Ux

&

Mx)

->

Mx)

.

These sentences express metaphysically equivalent
propositions: both are true at all possible worlds.

But

there are perfectly legitimate models of the predicate

calculus which assign a different set to

intersection of
'Vx(Bx ^ Mx)

'

'U'

and

'M'

.

'B'

than to the

If there were no such models,

would be a theorem of the predicate calculus,

which it is not.

'Vx((Ux

&

Mx)

Mx)

'

,

is a theorem of the predicate calculus.

on the other hand,

But the sentences

they translate do, in fact, express metaphysically

equivalent propositions.
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For another example of this difference, consider the

following sentences and their translations into modal

predicate logic:

(1)

Necessarily, all objects are spatiotemporally

related to one another;

(2)

DVxVySxy.

Necessarily, all tigers are cats; C]Vx(Tx ^ Cx)

.

Assuming that Lewis's modal realism affords the correct
interpretation of the modal operators (as guantifiers over
"buzzing, blooming" possible worlds) and that possible

individuals are worldmates iff they are related by some

spatiotemporal relation, it follows that
fact,

it follows that

(1)

is true.

(1)

is necessarily true.

In

Likewise,

suppose, for the sake of argument, that Kripke's views on

natural kind terms are correct and that

necessarily true.

is also

(2)

More precisely, suppose that the

proposition we would express if we uttered
all possible worlds.

(2)

It follows, then, that

are metaphysically equivalent.

is true at

(1)

and

(2)

But they are not formally

equivalent in any standard modal logic.

After all, the

axioms of (even) the correct modal logic are validated by

models which clearly do not afford a literal interpretation
of modal discourse.

We can take the domain of "world-

indices" to be pieces of paper, doughnuts or whatever.
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As

long as all the doughnuts are appropriately related to one

another (e.g. for S5, being made by the same baker would
do

)

,

and the valuation function follows the standard

rules, the axioms of the logic will be true in the model.

But clearly, many such interpretations of modal logic are

misinterpretations.^^

Formulas, and the propositions they

are used to express, are not true or false at doughnuts,

pieces of paper, or other entities that can serve as

members of the domain for metalogical purposes.

Many

incorrect interpretations validate the axioms of the

correct modal logic.
interpretations,

(1)

But on some of these incorrect

and

(2)

may well have different truth

values at some indices in the domain.

There is nothing

about their "form" which rules this out, and that is all
that is required for them to fail to be formally equivalent
even on the correct modal logic.
On the other hand, only the correct interpretation of

the correct modal logic (for metaphysical necessity and

possibility)

,

the model that accurately models what Lewis

^®This assumes that every doughnut has a unique baker.
^^As

Lewis says.
If modal operators were quantifiers over
towns restricted by the relation of being
connected by rail, that would validate some
system or other of modal logic. - So what,
since modal operators are nothing of the
sort? What good is it to know which
misinterpretations would validate a system?
(Lewis (1986a) p. 19)
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calls,

'logical space',

is relevant to questions of

rnetaphysical equivalence.

I

follow Lewis in adopting

possible worlds as the indices and in assuming that all
worlds are (metaphysically) accessible to all other worlds.
Given our assumptions, it follows, then, that
are metaphysically equivalent.

(1)

and

(2)

Generally, two formulas can

fail to be formally equivalent in a particular modal logic

despite expressing necessarily equivalent propositions if
the formulas have divergent truth values at some index in
one of the incorrect models of that logic.

that

and

(1)

(2)

It is plausible

are examples of this.

To sum up: two modal claims are metaphysically

equivalent iff they have the same truth value at every

world-index on the correct model of the correct modal
logic.

But they are formally equivalent (in a logic)

iff

they have the same truth value at every world-index on all

models of that logic, including the necessarily inaccurate
Clearly, then, metaphysical and formal equivelence

ones.

are fundamentally different notions of equivalence.

I

will

do my best to distinguish them throughout the dissertation,

particularly in the next chapter.

5.

Final Preliminaries
I

will keep the discussion as nontechnical as

possible.

In general,

the argument will proceed in English

with informal use of variables ranging over possible
29

worlds, possible individuals, properties, sets of

properties and even propositions.

Most of the discussion

be carried on at a inetaphysical level, as it were.

For instance, even issues regarding the formal eguivalence
or lack thereof of two supervenience theses in a particular

modal logic (e.g., S4) will usually be considered by

investigating the respective truth values of these theses
at accessible possible worlds while making appropriate

assumptions about the accessibility relation (e.g., that it
is transitive,

reflexive, but not symmetric)

Also, although

I

formulate supervenience as a relation

between sets (of properties or relations)

,

this use of sets

is to be treated as an expository convenience,

substantive philosophical position.

not as a

When the

convenience vanishes, as is the case when the relata of
supervenience relations are unit sets, so will the
practice.

For example,

if the unit set of being in pain

supervenes on some set of physical properties,

I

will

abbreviate this by saying simply that the property being in
pain supervenes on that set of physical properties.

^°For example, there might be advantages to formulating
supervenience as a relation between the properties and
relations themselves using the resources of plural
quantification. And since I do not discuss this issue, I do
not want to be interpreted as having any philosophical
objections to it. Rather, this is one place where I have
chosen to follow the path of least resistance because it is
familiar and I don't think the choice has much impact on the
issues I want to discuss.
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Once again, the main goals of this dissertation are
to investigate the promise of supervenience as a

(i)

nonreductive dependence relation, and

(ii)

to develop more

useful versions of supervenience in light of

a

detailed

study of the strengths and weaknesses of extant versions.
In chapters II,

III,

and IV,

I

am solely concerned

with supervenience relations formulated in the literature
and the controversies involving them, while in chapters V,
and VII,

VI,

I

introduce and explore new local and global

supervenience relations.

In chapter II,

I

consider the

logical relations between the two main varieties of local

supervenience, weak and strong supervenience, in their many

different (often nonequivalent) formulations.
III,

I

In chapter

consider the status of strong supervenience as

nonreductive dependence relation.

In chapter IV,

I

a

begin

my discussion of global supervenience by defending it from
some influential criticisms according to which it is too

weak a functional determination relation to be a
significant necessary condition on materialism.
V,

In chapter

develop two new, more precise, global supervenience

I

relations that allow for the supervenience of relations,
and

I

investigate their relative strengths and weaknesses.

In chapter VI,

I

formulate new local supervenience

relations that are analogous to the new global relations.
I

then consider the status of my new supervenience

relations as nonreductive dependence relations.
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I

conclude

in chapter VII with a defense of the significance of

supervenience, including an illustration of why global

psychophysical supervenience is a necessary condition on
physicalism.
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CHAPTER II

LOCAL SUPERVENIENCE RELATIONS FROM THE LITERATURE

A.

1.

Strong and Weak Supervenience

Canonical Formulations

According to our supervenience schema, there can be no
difference of the supervenient sort without a difference of
the base (or subvenient) sort.

versions of this idea.

There are local and global

In this chapter

I

will investigate

controversies concerning alternative formulations of, and
logical relations between, the two local supervenience

theses commonly discussed in the literature: "weak" and
"strong" supervenience.
I

begin with the following definition:

(IS)

For any set of properties. A, and any possible

objects, X and y, x and y are (individually) A-

indiscernible

Now, where S

for any P in A,

Px iff Py.

(supervenient) and B (base) are sets of

properties and possible individuals are worldbound, our two
local supervenience relations can be defined thus:
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(W)

S

we akly supervenes on B
objects, X and y,

for any possible

(within sphere of

accessibility, A) if x and y are worldmates and x
and y are B-indiscernible

,

then x and y are S-

indiscernible

S

(S)

strongly supervenes on B
objects, X and y,

for any possible

(within sphere of

accessibility. A) if x any y are B-indiscernible
then X and y are S-indiscernible

One need not fix on a single accessibility relation as

the accessibility relation relevant for interpreting

supervenience claims J

Thus, there is really no unique

relation defined by either of these formulations: each is
really a schema characterizing a family of relations with

members that differ depending on how the modal parameter is
fixed.

In general, however,

I

will treat the accessibility

relation as an unrestricted equivalence relation on the

assumption that metaphysical possibility or necessity is in
question.

Consequently,

I

will drop the parenthetical

reference to the accessibility relation in future

statements of

(S)

and

(W)

as well as in my forthcoming

formulations of other supervenience relations.

^See Kim (1984a)

pp.

165-166; Kim (1990) p. 10.
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In this chapter

I

am primarily concerned with the

formal equivalence and formal entailment relations between

variants of strong and weak supervenience
time being,

for the

(as opposed to metaphysically

The following question arises: "equivalent in

.

what logic or world theory?".
are equivalent (simpliciter)

equivalent.

Thus,

shall use 'equivalent' to abbreviate

I

'formally equivalent'

equivalent)

.

I

,

When
I

I

claim that two theses

mean that they are T-

do this because the T-axioms provide a

relatively weak modal logic, and equivalence in a weaker
system implies equivalence in all stronger systems.

When a

specific thesis fails to be T-equivalent but is equivalent
on some stronger system (e.g., S4)

I

indicate this

explicitly.
In section A

I

consider the logical relations between

strong and weak supervenience on both their canonical

formulations and on other formulations.

I

pay particular

attention to the significance of the common requirement
that the base and supervenient sets be closed under Boolean
operations.

Then,

in section B,

I

present, explain and

evaluate John Bacon's controversial argument for the

equivalence of
I

(S)

and

(W)

hasten to add that in much of this chapter

I

focus

on clarifying some relatively arcane issues, and responding
to some misleading arguments that have caused confusion and

debate among supervenience theorists.
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But quite frankly.

they are of limited philosophical significance.

The reader

who is primarily interested in the philosophical issues

raised by supervenience (such as its status as a

nonreductive dependence relation) can safely skip all but
the next section of this chapter (section A. 2).

2

Logical Relations and Boolean Closure

Kim once reguired that both the supervening set

S

and

the subvening set B be closed under the Boolean property

forming operations of negation,
(infinite) disjunction.^

(infinite)

conjunction, and

Some supervenience theorists

have added new closure conditions;^ others have found
fault with closure under negation.^

important to note that

I

Consequently, it is

am justified in not requiring

either set to be Boolean closed:

(W)/(S) with the requirement that S and B are

(Rl)

closed under Boolean operations is equivalent to
(W)/(S) without the closure requirement on either
S

or B.^

^See Kim (1987), pp. 315-316, and Kim (1984a), pp.
157-165 for detailed discussions of weak and strong
supervenience with the closure condition.

^Bacon

(

1986)

^Post (1984), and Van Cleve (1990).
^This has been noted by Oddie and Tichy, (1990), p.
For a
and hinted at by Van Cleve (1990), p. 231.
proof, see appendix I of Pauli and Sider (1992).
261,
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Despite (Rl)

,

Boolean closure still plays a role in

many of the issues discussed in this chapter.
always distinguish the base set,
closure, ^(B)

will

I

from its Boolean

B,

Of course, this in no way implies that any

particular set B

/3(B).

We are now prepared to examine the essential

difference between strong and weak supervenience

.

Weak

only requires that no two worldmates are S-discernible and

B-indiscernible.

Strong requires that no two possible

individuals from the same or different worlds are S-

discernible and B-indiscernible.

Clearly, whatever holds

for any two possible individuals holds for any two

worldmates, so strong entails weak.
To prove that weak does not entail strong consider

the property of coexisting with a sentient being.

C,

It

weakly supervenes on any set of properties because, for any
world, W, all objects in W are indiscernible with respect
to coexisting with a sentient being.
is a sentient being,

If there

(actually)

everything has C; if there is no

sentient being, nothing has C.^

Thus,

for worldmates to be C-discernible

.

it is impossible

Hence, they cannot be

both C-discernible and indiscernible in some other way,
from which it follows that C weakly supervenes on any set
of properties.

On the other hand, C fails to strongly

supervene on many sets of properties.
^Obviously,

I

For example, C does

am using restricted quantifiers here.
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not strongly supervene on
electron.

E,

the property of being an

Plenty of pairs of electrons from different

worlds will fail to be C-indiscernible

.

Specifically, take

any electron from the actual world and a duplicate from a

world without any sentient beings.
indiscernible but C-discernible

.

They are EThus weak supervenience

does not entail strong supervenience.^

More insight on the relative strength of weak and
strong supervenience is afforded by the following
considerations.

Where

'=»'

stands for formal implication,

Kim has established the following results

(WE)

S

weakly supervenes on B

property in

S,

P,

Necessarily, for each

=»

there is a coextensive property

in the Boolean closure of B.

(SE)

S

strongly supervenes on B

in S,

=»

for every property

there is a necessarily coextensive property

in the Boolean closure of B.

These results can be stated more concisely: Let
a

variable ranging over members of

members of the Boolean closure of

S
B,

and

'

b’

s’

range over

then we have

^This is based on the proof presented by Oddie
and Tichy (1990) p. 260.
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'

be

(WE)

S

(SE)

weakly supervenes on B

nVs3bVx(sx

strongly supervenes on B

=>

S

bx)

.

Vs3bnVx(sx « bx)

.®

Kim argues that (SE) establishes that strong supervenience
fails to be nonreductive

hotly debated topic which
chapter.
(WE)

The significance of (SE)

.

I

is a

will take up in the next

First, however, we need to establish the truth of

and (SE)
We begin with the observation that for any set of

properties,

B,

because

)S(B)

is closed under infinitary

Boolean operations, it will contain a special subset of
properties, the B-maximal properties.

B-maximal properties

are (metaphysically) consistent conjunctions of properties
in B and their complements

(and no other properties)

They

.

are maximal in that for any B-maximal property, M, and for

any member of

/3(B),

P,

having M entails having
L),

properties in

jS(B):

a

C&--H&--L,

--P

(but not both)

.

P,

or

For example,

the following are the B-maximal

if B = {C, H,

^C&H&-L,

either having M entails having

C&H&L, -’C&H&L, C&-’H&L, C&H&--L, ->C&-'H&L,

and -’C&--H&-L.

B-maximal properties form

partition of logical space: specifically,

(i)

every

possible object has one and only one of the B-maximal

properties from any set

B.

The proofs of (WE) and (SE)

in front of the first
®There is no need for a
universal quantifier because of the assumption that all
properties are necessary existents.
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rely on

and the fact that for every property,

(i)

any possible object

p,

and

x has P or x has -P.

x,

In order to establish (WE) we note that for any sets
P^opsi^ties, S and B such that S weakly supervenes on B,

and any property P in

S,

the B-maximal properties in

)8(B)

will divide into two exclusive classes: one class contains
all and only the B-maximal properties had by (actual)

objects that have P; the second class contains all and only
the B-maximal properties had by actual objects that have
Call the disjunction of all the members of the first

-P.’

class,

'

B1
'

,

and the disjunction of the members of the

second class,

'

B2

Since every object has P or -P and

'

some B-maximal property, every object has either B1 or B2
In fact, precisely those actual objects that have P have
Bl,

and precisely those actual objects that have -P have

B2

Vx[(Px

:

-H-

Blx)

&

B2 are members of

(3

(-’Px

(B)

.

B2x)

]

.

And clearly both Bl and

The argument is perfectly general.

It shows that for any sets of properties, S and B, the weak

supervenience of

S

on B ensures that within each world

every member of S is coextensive with at least one member
of )0(B).

(WE)

is established.

^To prove that these classes are disjoint suppose, for
reductio, that S weakly supervenes on B yet there is a Bmaximal property, E, which is a member of both classes.
Thus, there is an (actual) object which has E and P, and
But then
there is an (actual) object which has E and --P.
B-indiscernibility among worldmates does not imply Sindiscernibility among worldmates, contradicting our
supposition that S weakly supervenes on B.
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The parallel result for strong supervenience is

obtained in a similar fashion.

Where

S

strongly supervenes

on B, and P is in S, the B-maximal properties will divide

into two exclusive classes.

The first class is composed of

B-maximal properties possessed by possible objects that
have

Members of the second class are B-maximal

P.

properties had by possible objects that have

-P.”'°

Let B1

be the disjunction of the members of the first class, and

let B2 be the disjunction of the members of the second
class.

In this case, all and only possible objects that

have P will have B1 and all and only possible objects that
have

--P

will have B2

.

Thus, assuming, as

I

am,

that an

individual is a possible individual (in some context) iff
it inhabits an accessible world, the following necessary

coextensions will hold:

[]Vx(Px

Blx)

,

and nVx(-Px

B2x)

.

Since the argument was perfectly general it shows that the

strong supervenience of
S

S

on B ensures that every member of

is necessarily coextensive with a member of P (B)

(SE)

Thus,

is established.

Clearly, the necessary coextension of any two

properties entails their coextension, while the converse is
not true.

This supports the conclusion that strong

^°To show that these classes are disjoint, suppose
that there is a B-maximal property, E, which is a member of
both classes. Thus, there is a possible object which has E
and P, and there is a possible object which has E and -P.
But then B-indiscernibility does not imply Sindiscernibility, so, contrary to our supposition, S does
not strongly supervene on B.
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supervenience entails weak, but weak does not entail
strong

3.

Alternative Formulations
Kim's original formulations of weak and strong

supervenience still have some currency.

relationship to

(WK)

S

(W)

and

is far from obvious.

(S)

weakly supervenes on B

property F in

S,

And their precise

necessarily, for any

if an object x has F,

then there

exists a property G in B such that x has
for any y,

(SK)

S

and

G,

if y has G then y has F.

strongly supervenes on B

any property F in

S,

necessarily, for

if an object x has F,

then

there exists a property G in B such that x has

G,

and necessarily for all y, if y has G then y has
F.

In contrast to

(W)

and

(S)

with (WK) and (SK) the

customary requirement that the base set be closed under
Boolean operations is crucial.

Otherwise, these

formulations define relations that have little to do with

supervenience (the impossibility of independent variation)
For example, suppose that, as strong is defined in

being a morally good person,

M,
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(S)

strongly supervenes on the

set containing the properties of being courageous,

honest, H, and being loving,
a ll and only

L.

c,

being

Specifically, suppose that

possible good people have at least two of

these three properties.
is not ^-closed)
B according to

,

Let S = (M}, B = {C, H, L}

(so B

and let's see if S strongly supervenes on

(SK)

.

According to

(SK)

,

if S strongly

supervenes on B then, necessarily, for any property F in
and any object,

x,

S

if Fx then there is some G in B such

that Gx, and, necessarily, for any

y,

if Gy then Fy.

there is no such G in

H,

the property of being

honest.

B.

Consider

But

It is not the case that anyone who is honest is

good because some bad people are honest: namely those who
are neither courageous nor loving.

similar for C and
condition,

(SK)

L.

The situation is

Therefore, without the closure

fails to be equivalent to

(S)

The

analogous result for weak supervenience can be proved in
parallel fashion.

(R2)

a

So,

(WK)/(SK) without the requirement that the base

set is closed under Boolean operations is not

equivalent to (W)/(S).

With the closure condition on the base set, however,
(SK)

gives the desired result.

Specifically, for any

(possible) good person, there is some property in the

Boolean closure of

B,

such that, necessarily, anyone who
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has that property is good.

An example of such a property

is the property of being both honest and
courageous, H&C.

Of course, one instance of agreement between

with-^-closure does not constitute
equivalence.

(R3)

It does, however,

a

(S)

and (SK)-

proof of their

suffice to establish

(WK)/ (SK) with the Boolean closure requirement on

the base set is not equivalent to (WK)/(SK)

without the Boolean closure requirement on the
base set.

Given the importance of Boolean closure to Kim's
formulations,

I

suggest that we reformulate his theses to

capture its effect without requiring that

'B'

(and

'S')

only range over sets which are closed under Boolean
operations.

That way, it will be easier to compare Kim's

supervenience relations to

(S)

and

(W)

which also do not

restrict the range of

'B'

Specifically, where

and B are any sets of properties,

(WK')

S

S

(or

'S')

in that way.

weakly supervenes on B

any property F in

S,

if an object x has F,

there exists a property G in
G,

necessarily, for

/3(B)

such that x has

and for any y, if y has G then y has
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then

F.

(SK

S s trongly

)

supervenes on B

necessarily, for

any property F in S, if an object x has

there exists a property G in

/3(B)

F,

then

such that x has

and necessarily for all y, if y has G then
y

G,

has F.

For any sets

and

B,

S

strongly supervenes on

according to (SK) iff

S

strongly supervenes on B according

to (SK').

S

)0(B)

Our reformulations provide the effect of Boolean

closure on the base set without requiring it explicitly.
and

(WK')

(W)

are equivalent.''^

contrary to received opinion,
(SK')

a,

(S)

On the other hand,

is not equivalent to

in any system where the characteristic S4 axiom, DA
is not a theorem (or where the associated requirement

that accessibility be transitive is rejected)

Their

nonequivalence is apparent if we translate the respective
theses into world theory.

Letting x and y range over a

fixed domain of all possible objects,

(SKwt)

strongly supervenes on B

S

For any

accessible world, w, and any property F in
X has F in w,
j0(B)

S,

if

then there exists a property G in

such that X has G in w, and any world

z

which is accessible to w is such that for all y
in

^^See Kim

z

if y has G then y has F.

(1984)

pp.

163-164.
45

(Swt)

strongly supervenes on B

S

accessi ble worlds

(SKwt)

,

w and

indiscernible to y in

z

indiscernible to y in

z.

z,

For any
if x in w is B-

then x in w is s-

quantifies over worlds accessible to worlds

accessible to the actual world, while (Swt) only quantifies
over worlds accessible to the actual world.

It makes

sense, then, that in loqics with non-transitive

accessibility relations,
Also,

(SK')

and

(S)

are not equivalent.

it is not surprising that Kim's reputed proof of

their equivalence relies on the transitivity of
accessibility.

To show, first, that [strong supervenience
as defined by (S)
entails [strong
supervenience as defined in (SK')]: Assume,
for any property F in [S], x has F at w.
Let B. be the B-maximal property of x at
w^
Let B. be the G in the definition of
strong supervenience [namely, (SK')]; we
need to show that necessarily if any y has
it, it has F.
Suppose otherwise - that is,
at some w there is a v such that y has B
but not F
Thus, x has B. at w. and y has B.
at Wj that is, x and y have the same Bproperties in these worlds respectively, and
by [(S)1, they must have the same [S1properties in the respective worlds. Since
X has F in w
y must have F in w
contradicting the supposition. Hence, [S]
strongly supervenes on B [according to
.

.

.

.

-

^

.

;

.

.

,

(SK)

^^Kim

.^2
]

(1987)

p.

317.
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Consider the underlined portion of the passage.

Since

Kim has already considered an arbitrary possible
world,

w.,

in order for the proof to be perfectly general he
should

say that "at some

that y has
(S)

B.

w.

accessible to

but not

F”

.

w.

,

there is a y such

When he goes on to claim that

ensures that since x has F in

w.

y must have F in w

'

he assumes the transitivity of accessibility.
(S)

only guarantees that y must have F in

accessible to the actual world.
reductio assumption is that

w^.

Wj

j

After all,
if

is

w.

But all we know from the
is accessible to

w^

.

So the

proof only succeeds on the assumption that the

accessibility relation is transitive
For a countermodel to the equivalence, consider three

worlds Wl, W2

,

and W3

.

Each world is accessible to itself,

W2 is accessible to Wl and vice-versa, W3 is accessible to
W2 and vice-versa, but there are no other accessibility

relations.

Most importantly, W3 is not accessible to Wl

(the rejection of transitivity).

This is a B-model:

accessibility is symmetric and reflexive.

Each world has a

single inhabitant: the lone inhabitants of Wl and W2

instantiate both P and

Q,

while the lone inhabitant of W3

^^Of course, assuming that S5 is the correct logic for
metaphysical possibility, Kim's argument does succeed in
establishing an important equivalence. Nevertheless, since
Kim is careful not to commit himself to any particular
interpretation of the modal operators in (SK) or the
I think it is fair to
possibilist quantifiers in (S)
to establish the more
failing
criticize the argument for
general equivalence.
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instantiates Q but not

P.

According to

p strongly

(S)

supervenes on Q at W1 because the only worlds accessible
to
W1 are W1 and W2 and there are no Q-indiscernible
P,

discernible individuals in the union of the domains of
W1
and W2. According to (SK>), on the other hand, it does
This is especially clear from the world-theory

not.

formulation,

(SKwt)

although there exists

accessible to Wl, namely W2

,

a

world

and an individual in W2 which

has P and Q, not every individual existing at any world

accessible to W2 which has Q has

P.

For example, W3 is

accessible to W2 and the lone inhabitant of W3 has Q but
not

P.

This countermodel shows that in B and weaker

systems,

(S)

and (SK') are (formally) non-equivalent.

Consequently, the choice between

(S)

and (SK')

(or (SK)

with the requirement that the base set has the Boolean
closure property) is more than

a

formulations of the same notion.
(S)

choice between alternative
I

will continue to use

as my "official" formulation of strong supervenience

By way of summary, our catalogue of results now

contains the following:

(W)/(S) with the requirement that S and B are

(Rl)

closed under Boolean operations is equivalent to
(W)/(S) without the closure requirement on either
S

or B.
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(R2)

(WK)/(SK) without the requirement that the base

set is closed under Boolean operations is not

equivalent to (W)/(S).

(R3)

(WK)/(SK) with the Boolean closure requirement on

the base set is not equivalent to (WK)/(SK)

without the Boolean closure requirement on the
base set.

(R4)

(R5)

(WK')

(SK')

is equivalent to

(or

(SK)

with the base set Boolean closed)

is equivalent to

(R6)

(SK')

(or

(SK)

(W)

(S)

in S4 and S5.

with the base set Boolean closed)

is not equivalent to

(S)

in B, T,

etc.

With these results established, we are prepared to evaluate
John Bacon's controversial argument that weak and strong

supervenience are, despite all appearances, equivalent.

B.

1.

A Response to Bacon

Closure Under Resplicinq
In a rather technical paper, John Bacon offered a

proof of the equivalence of strong and weak supervenience.
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His proof relies on the novel requirement
that base sets
are closed under Boolean operations and an
operation called
"resplicing" or "diagonalization"
B is closed under
.

resplicing (or B is diagonally closed) iff

Where 0 ^ is the extension of [property]
0 at
world w, and B^ = 0 ^; 0eB}, B is also to
contain any property Y such that ¥ e B for
w
w
each world wJ^
{

To see how this works, consider the Boolean closure of

the unit set of being an electron,
^E,

E&--E,

and Ev-E.

/3{E},

which contains

The diagonal closure of

(3{E),

D,

contains any property whose extension in each world,
the extension in w of some member of

/3{E}.

E,

w,

is

D contains

properties whose extension across logical space is "spliced
together" out of the world-relative extensions of members
of

For example, suppose there are only three

possible worlds, Wl, W2

,

and W3

.

And suppose there are

twelve possible (world bound) objects denoted by the
numerals,

'1',

through '12'.

The extension of each member

of ^{E) is represented in the following table.

Wl

W2

W3

E

1

6,7,8

10

-E

2,3,4,

5,

9,11,12

E&-E
Ev-E

1

5, 6

^^Bacon

(1986)

,

p.

2

,

3, 4,

165.
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,

,

,

9,10,11,12

D,

the diagonal closure of ^(E), includes the property
that

has the same extension as E in Wl, the same extension
as
in W2 and the same extension as E&-E in W3

with the extension {1,5).

:

-^E

the property

Likewise, it includes the

property that has the same extension as -E in Wl, the same

extension as E in W2 and the same extension as E in W3

:

the

property with the (trans-world) extension,
(2,3,4,6,7,8,10).

In fact,

D includes any property whose

complete possible extension is the union of the worldrelative extensions obtained by zigzagging through the
above table taking the world-relative extension of one

property per world.

2.

The Equivalence of Strong and Weak under Full Closure

According to Bacon, base sets must be closed under the
Boolean operations and resplicing.
Tichy,

I

closed'.

Following Oddie and

call any set closed under these operations 'fully
Full closure invalidates the proof that weak is

weaker than strong in the following way.

I

argued that

C,

^^Bacon believes that properties are functions from
possible worlds to sets of individuals, so he cannot
distinguish between necessarily coextensive properties.
This is compatible with my working assumption that
properties are sets of possible individuals. On the other
hand. Bacon does not accept my assumption that all
individuals are worldbound, so, even if he were to grant
that the domains of Wl, W2 and W3 are non-overlapping, he
would describe the example differently. The preceding mode
of expression, however, affects neither the content nor the
plausibility of Bacon's basic theses.
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the property of coexisting with a sentient being,
is weakly

supervenient on any set of properties.
supervenient on

E,

Hence it is weakly

the property of being an electron.

But

it is not strongly supervenient on E because many
pairs of

electrons from different worlds will fail to be C-

indiscernible

Full closure defeats the argument by

.

ensuring the existence of a property,

P,

in D (the full

closure of {E}) that is necessarily coextensive with

P

C.

is the property that is co-extensive with E&-E in worlds

where there is no sentient being, and coextensive with
in worlds where there is a sentient being.

Ev--E

In terms of our

table above, if W1 and W3 are the only worlds with sentient
beings, the extension of P would be {1,2,3,4,9,10,11,12},

which would also be the extension of

C.

Hence,

in our

simplified model, C is necessarily coextensive with
Thus, C strongly supervenes on D because,

P.

if two possible

individuals differ with regard to the supervening property
C,

then they differ with regard to the subvening property P

(and the subvening set

D)

:

C-discernibility entails D-

discernibility
The proof that weak and strong are equivalent under
full closure is simple.

Clearly, strong entails weak.

show that weak entails strong, assume that

supervenes on

B.

S

weakly

From (WE) we know that the weak

supervenience of S on B entails that for every property,
in S,

To

and every world, w, there is some member of the
52

P,

Boolean closure of

B,

Q^ that

is coextensive with P in w.

By full closure, however, B is )0-closed, so each

member of
B,

C,

Q“

is a

and, by resplicing, there is another member
of

B,

which, at every world w, is coextensive with

other words, C is coextensive with

coextensive with

possible world.

at world

in

z,

at world u, and likewise for every

Thus C is necessarily coextensive with

P.

The preceding considerations are perfectly general.

They apply to any property P in

S,

and they show that if S

weakly supervenes on B and B is fully closed, then every

member of
B,

S

is necessarily coextensive with some member of

which entails (by the following Lemma) that

strongly supervenient on

Lemma

1:

S

is

B.

if every member of S is necessarily

coextensive with some member (or other) of B then
S

strongly supervenes on

B.^*^

The reader familiar with Bacon's article may protest
that all Bacon proved was that weak supervenience and

strong supervenience are equivalent under full closure in
^^Suppose, for reductio, that although every member of
is necessarily coextensive with some member of B, S does
So there are possible
not strongly supervene on B.
individuals, x and y, such that x and y are B-indiscernible
There must be some property P in S such
and S-discernible
Since
there exists a property Q in B such
Px
and
->Py.
that
Thus, x and
that Qx and -Qy.
follows
^
it
Qx)
that Vx(Px
contradiction.
all:
after
B-indiscernible,
y are not
S

.
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S4 and S5.

On the other hand, my proof appears to be
more

general for it makes no essential use of any S4 or S5
axioms (or assumptions about accessibility relations)

This disparity is readily explicable.

Bacon worked with

Kim's original formulation of strong supervenience
which, as

noted before, is stronger than

I

and S5 where the two are equivalent.

(S)

(SK)

,

,

except in S4

So the proof

I

just

gave establishes exactly what Bacon argues in his paper:

namely that under the full closure requirement, strong

supervenience as defined in

(SK)

supervenience in S4 and S5.
a

Of course,

it also establishes

more general equivalence between strong (as defined in

(S)

3.

is equivalent to weak

and weak under full closure.

Bacon on Coextension and Necessary Coextension
One of Bacon's results is inconsistent with some of

the claims

I

have made above.

Before considering reasons

for accepting or rejecting full closure,

I

should probably

attempt to discover the source of the inconsistency.
Bacon distinguishes nine different "variants of

supervenience", four of which are relevant to our concerns.
He "make[s] some informal use of second-order modal
logic"^^ to formulate the theses and examine their logical

relations, and consequently, so will

I.

He assumes a

"single common domain (of existent or nonexistent
^^Bacon

(1986)

p.

163.
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individuals)

for all possible worlds"^® and treats

properties as necessary existents, so he accepts a secondorder version of the Barcan equivalence:

Barcan(P).

VpDA hh DVPA

The notation
(1990)

use below was introduced by Van Cleve

I

in his discussion of Bacon:

and

's'

are

'b'

variables ranging over supervenient properties and members
of the Boolean closure of the base set, respectively, and
'X

y'.

=B y' is an abbreviation for

'x is

B-indiscernible to

Here, then, are four of Bacon's nine supervenience

relations

Weak = []VxVy(x =B y
Strong 2 =

[I]VsVx(sx

Coextension

(C)

-*

x =S y)

3b [bx

&

= []Vs3bVx[sx

Necessary coextension

(NC)

.

nVy(by
bx]

(SK)

.

.

= Vs3b!3Vx[sx

Weak is a precise formulation of
precise formulation of

sy)

(W)

H’

bx]

and Strong 2 is

What is less obvious is that

NC is formally equivalent to, and therefore a legitimate

formulation of,

(SE)

S

^®Bacon

Remember,

(S)

strongly supervenes on B
(1986)

p.

164.
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=>

Vs3bl3Vx(sx

++

bx)

.

To show that NC is an adequate formulation of
to establish the converse of (SE)

already established Lemma

converse of (SE) because in
of /3(B), but in Lemma

closure of

B.

since Lemma

1

1,

(SE)

,

we need

of course, we have

.

But Lemma

1.

(S)

'b'

1

is not quite the

ranges over members

there is no mention of the Boolean

This is easily surmountable, however, for

applies to all sets of properties

certainly holds for sets which are )0-closed.

S

and

Thus,

it

B,

it

implies

(i)

Vs3bDVx(sx

++

bx)

strongly supervenes on

S

=>

From (Rl) we know that

S

strongly supervenes on

j0(B),

so (i)

bx)

S

(3

(B)

.

strongly supervenes on B iff S
and (Rl)

imply the

converse of (SE)

Vs3bDVx(sx

(ii)

Finally,

(E)

(ii)

S

=*

strongly supervenes on

B.

and (SE) entail the desired equivalence:

strongly supervenes on B

Vs3bDVx(sx

bx)

Therefore, NC is equivalent to strong (as defined in

.

(S)

)

Now consider Bacon's results concerning the entailment

relations in (second-order)

T,
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S4 and S5 between our four

theses with the full closure requirement on the
base
set

T

S4

Strong2
C

Weak ^ Strong,

C

Weak

NC (or

S5

All equivalent

NC (or (S))

(S)

Bacon's claim that C entails but is not entailed by NC in T
or S4 amounts to the claim that weak is stronger than

strong in T and S4.

It contradicts either my earlier proof

of the (formal) equivalence of strong and weak under full

closure or my argument that

(S)

some response is required.

Bacon's paper isn't directly

and NC are equivalent, so

helpful, however, for while he proves that C entails NC
(given resplicing)

he offers no direct proof of their

,

nonequivalence (in T or S4)
To see why

am skeptical of Bacon's conclusion that

I

NC does not entail C in T or S4, consider the two theses

and Barcan

(

P)

Coextension

(C)

nVs3bVx(sx

:

Necessary Coextension
Barcan (P): VPDA

^’Bacon

(1986)

p.

hi-

(NC)

DVPA

167.
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:

bx)

.

Vs3b[I]Vx(sx

++

bx)

.

By Barcan(P), which Bacon accepts, Coextension
is

equivalent to

Coextension'

(C): VsD3bVx(sx

If NC fails to entail C,

bx)

.

it must also fail to entail

C.

That, however, would mean that the following is false:

(*)

3pDa

D3PA.

h

Even with resplicing, which does guarantee the converse

(3 pa

h

3 pC3A),^° I am

unable to conceive of how

(*)

could

be false given Bacon's (reasonable) assumption that

properties, while perhaps contingently exemplified, exist
of necessity.

Moreover,

I

think

coextension entails coextension'
coextension)

I

can prove that necessary
by Barcan(P)

(and,

in a second-order version of T.

1.

Show Vs3bDVx(sx

2

.

Vs3bDVx(sx

3

.

Show VsD3bVx(sx

4

.

--Vsn3bVx(sx

bx)

Assumption

5.

3s--n3bVx(sx

bx)

Modal Negation,

6.

--3bVx(Px

bx)

Existential Inst.

7

Vs3bDVx(sx

.

^°See

(2)

-H-

bx)

VsD3bVx(sx

bx)

Assumption

bx)

Indirect Proof

bx)

Reiteration,

bx)

from Bacon (1986) p. 165.
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2

4

8

3b[3Vx(Px

.

bx)

Vx(Px

9.

10.

12

.

13

.

Qx)

Show 3bVx(Px

11.

Vx(Px

-H-

7

Proof (T-strict)

Qx)

K reiteration,

bx)

Existential Gen.

-P

&

,

Existential Inst.,

bx)

3bVx(Px
P

Universal Inst.

9

6,10

Given Bacon's assumptions, and given that the only line
(namely line

subproof is

reiterated across a show line in a modal

9)

a

regular formula of first order quantified

modal logic, the proof appears conclusive

.

So Bacon's

results, even granting full closure, have to be amended

thus

T

S4 and S5

Strong2

NC (or

(S)

)

+ Weak

All Equivalent
C

^^The only questionable line is 12.
How do I know
that Q, from 11 by way of 9, is a base property, thereby
justifying my claim on line 12 to the effect that there is
a base property such that..., as opposed to the claim that
there is a supervening property such that...? First, Q is
an arbitrary base property as can be seen from lines 8 and
9.
And even though the existential generalization from
to '3b... b...' on line 12 occurs within a modal
.Q.
subproof. Bacon assures us that if Q is in the range of 'b'
at the actual world, it is in the range of 'b' at any
accessible world: see (1) in Bacon (1986) p. 165. Also, it
makes sense that if properties are necessary existents,
sets of properties will have the same members at every
So, once the base set has been indicated, the range
world.
of 'b' will be constant across logica], space.
'

.

.

.

.

'
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Finally, without diagonal closure, the relations
are
as follows:

T

S4 and S5

Strong^

Strong2

(^)

)

i

NC (or (S))

Weak

++

Weak

C

C

These results are born out by my previous proofs
(formally)

(S)

that (SK')

than

(S)

,

entails but is not entailed by

which is equivalent to Strong 2

in T but equivalent to (S)

,

(W)

(i)

that

and (ii)

is stronger

in S4 and S5.

With

these points clarified, we can consider the merits of

diagonal closure directly.

4.

The Case Acainst Diagonal Closure
The only reason Bacon gives in support of diagonal

closure, and the only reason given anywhere in the

literature, is that "it seems natural" to apply the

requirement.

In a recent response to Van Cleve's

criticisms. Bacon explains that this feeling of naturalness
was derived from his working assumption that properties are

functions from worlds to individuals.^^

His argument

seems to be that the functions from worlds to possible

individuals that result from resplicing are equally good
^^Bacon

(1990)

p.

239.
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properties as the functions one begins with.

But surely we

should not include any and every property in the base set
even though all of them are also functions from possible

worlds to possible individuals.

I

fail to see why the

functional conception of properties gives us any positive

reason to require that all subvenient sets be closed under
resplicing.

Many reasons for rejecting diagonal closure

are given in the literature.
in some important sense,

propertyhood.^^

,

resplicing does not preserve

The objection is most sympathetically

represented as follows.
supervenience

A common objection is that,

For most (if not all) uses of

there is a desire to consider base sets

containing nothing but (somewhat) natural properties.

And

properties respliced from the world-relative extensions of

various natural properties will often be extremely
unnatural.

Thus, base sets should not be diagonally

closed

^^Van Cleve

(1990)

p.

235; Currie (1990)

p.

246.

^^Gregory Currie argues as follows:

The things I have in mind as the bases for
aesthetic properties are natural’
properties; you can't expect to take bits of
properties (their extensions in particular
possible worlds) and knock them together to
produce a new, natural property. Call such
gerrymandered constructions properties’ if
you like, but they are not the sort of thing
that I or anyone else have in mind when we
wonder whether aesthetic properties
supervene on some other kind of property
'

'

(

(1990)

p.

246)
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Of course, Boolean closure does not preserve

naturalness either, so this argument also applies
against
that requirement. The argument does not appear

conclusive,

however.

As

I

illustrated with (SK*), only slight changes

in the formulation of (SK)

are required to get the effect

of Boolean closure without placing any closure
requirement

on the base set itself.

The same sort of thing could be

done with full closure.

For example. Bacon's Strong could
2

be redefined thus:

S

strongly 2 supervenes on B

Vy(by
'b'

sy)

,

where

nVsVx(sx

->

3b [bx

&

ranges over members of S and

's'

ranges over members of the full closure of

B.

This way there are no closure conditions on B (so it may

contain only perfectly natural properties, for example).
Yet for any sets S and

B,

S

strongly 2 supervenes on B

according to our new definition iff

S

strongly 2 supervenes

on the full closure of B on the old definition.

One of the better reasons to reject full closure

derives from the fact that it has the consequence that
every global property strongly supervenes on any base
set.^^

Global properties are properties such that if they

are instantiated at a possible world, then every object in

Coexisting with a sentient

that world has that property.
^^See Oddie and Tichy

(1990)
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pp.

262-267.

being, being such that Stalin was a dictator,
and being
such that some roses are red are all global
properties.

Because worldmates are always indiscernible
regarding
global properties, global properties weakly supervene
on
any set of properties.
And, given the fact that weak

entails strong under full closure, it follows that any
global property will strongly supervene on any fully closed
set.

But this is a very problematic result.

Unlike

necessary properties, which are trivially supervenient
because no two objects can differ with regard to then,
things can differ with regard to global properties:

certain global properties

I

I

have

could very well have lacked,

and other possible objects have different global

properties.

It is a real issue whether coexisting with a

sentient being strongly supervenes on various sets of
intrinsic and extrinsic biochemical properties, but full

closure makes all such questions as trivial as questions
regarding the supervenience of being self identical.

Full

closure ensures that global properties will strongly

supervene on anything.

^“^Whether more interesting examples of this sort can
be found depends on some metaphysical issues I do not
consider until chapter four. Essentially, any sets of
properties that supervene weakly but not strongly on one
another can be used to illustrate the deleterious effects
The problem is, only examples
of diagonal closure.
involving the supervenience of global properties are
provably immune to responses based on combinatorial
principles of the sort introduced in chapter IV.
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The essential defect of full closure is that
instead
of making weak supervenience as strong as strong

supervenience is without full closure, it makes strong

supervenience as weak as weak supervenience is without full
closure.

But as we saw in chapter

I,

weak supervenience is

really too weak to capture the fundamental idea of local
supervenience: the determination of supervenient properties
by base properties.

That, after all, was one reason Kim

felt he couldn't rest with weak supervenience, and

subsequently introduced strong supervenience.

Thus, even

if we found full closure intuitively compelling, we would

have sound theoretical reasons to introduce a local

supervenience relation that is free of the full closure
requirement.

But the fact is, full closure is not

intuitively compelling.

Nor is any discernible theoretical

purpose served by reducing the more useful supervenience
relation to its weak cousin.

I

conclude, then, that

Bacon's requirement that the base set be fully closed

should not be accepted.

5.

Conclusion
We can allow some flexibility in the formulation of

alternative supervenience claims, but the core idea of no
supervening differences without subvening differences must
be respected.

Since possible objects can differ in their

global properties, we need some supervenience relation
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strong enough to distinguish the global properties
that do
from the global properties that do not supervene
on other
sets of properties.
Strong supervenience can do so.
But

full closure makes this impossible.
is harmless on its own,

While Boolean closure

full closure is not.

is not well served by full closure.
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Supervenience

CHAPTER III

STRONG SUPERVENIENCE AND NONREDUCTIVE
DEPENDENCE

A.

1.

Stro ng Supervenience and Reducibilitv

Introduction
As noted in Chapter

I

i)

(p.

,

much of the interest in

supervenience can be traced to its promise as a

nonreductive dependence relation.

Jaegwon Kim questions

whether any one supervenience relation can play both of
these roles.

The central problem. .. has been that of
defining a supervenience relation that will
fill the twin requirements [Davidson] set
forth: first, the relation must be
nonreductive that is a given domain can be
supervenient on another without being
reducible to it. Second, the relation must
be one of dependence if a domain supervenes
on another, there must be a sturdy sense in
which the first is dependent on the second,
or the second determines the first.... The
main difficulty has been this: if a relation
is weak enough to be nonreductive, it tends
to be too weak to serve as a dependence
relation: conversely, when a relation is
strong enough to give us dependence, it
tends to be too strong - strong enough to
imply reducibility
;

:

.

^Kim

(1989)

p.

40.

66

standard example of the latter sort of
relation is
strong supervenience
He claims it is too strong to be

Kiln's

.

nonreductive.2

Many disagree.

The nonreduct ive status of

strong supervenience is important because no
supervenience

relation is stronger than strong.

nonreductive

,

So if it is

it is plausible that supervenience,

general, is nonreductive.

in

In order to adjudicate the

debate, we have to determine what sort of reducibility
is
in question.

2-1

Nagel on Intertheoretic Reduction

Most discussions of the reductive implications of

supervenience have focussed on the reduction of scientific
theories.

Although there are many models of intertheoretic

reduction, supervenience is usually discussed in connection

with Ernest Nagel's.^
Nagel construes intertheoretic reduction as a matter
of logical derivation.

In a successful reduction, the laws

of the secondary theory are derivable from the laws of the

primary theory (often with the aid of certain supplementary

principles whose nature is outlined below)

.

Nagel calls

^As we shall see in the second part of this chapter,
he now questions its adequacy as a dependence relation as
well

^For alternative models of intertheoretic reduction
see Sarkar (1992) pp. 172-175, and, especially, Sklar
(1967). For evidence that Nagel's model is assumed in
discussions of supervenience see Kim (1989), (1990), Horgan
(1982), and Petrie (1987).
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this the condition of derivability

.

The other formal

condition on an adequate reduction is the condition
of
connectibility: the theoretical concepts of the
primary
theory (the concepts expressed by terms occurrinq
in

statements of the more qeneral laws of the theory) have
to
be "connected" to the concepts appealed to in the
laws
of

the secondary theory.
(at least indirectly)

For example, without some principle

linkinq the concept of absolute

temperature from thermodynamics to the concept of mean
kinetic enerqy from statistical mechanics, the laws of

thermodynamics could not be derived from the laws of
statistical mechanics.

Such connectinq principles have

come to be called 'bridge laws' or 'bridge principles'.

Bridge laws are identity statements, conditionals, or

biconditionals.

The conditions of connectibility and

derivability are Nagel's two formal conditions on an
adequate intertheoretic reduction.^
There are also informal conditions on intertheoretic
reduction.

Roughly, the primary theory must somehow

explain the success of the secondary theory.

Preferably,

after the theories are "connected", the laws of the

secondary theory are shown to be instances of previously

accepted laws of the primary theory.

Alternatively,

translated laws of the secondary theory may sometimes be

^See Nagel

(1961)

pp.

352-354.
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added to the list of laws of the primary theory.^

But

such augmentations of the primary theory are justified
only
if these new laws somehow contribute to the overall

coherence and explanatory power of the primary theory.
They must not be ad hoc additions to the primary theory
that serve only to allow the derivation of the secondary
theory.

As Nagel says:

The two formal conditions for reduction
discussed in the previous section do not
suffice to distinguish trivial from
noteworthy scientific achievements.
If the
sole requirem^ent for reduction were that the
secondary science is logically deducible
from arbitrarily chosen premises, the
requirement could be satisfied with
relatively little difficulty.
In the
history of significant reductions, however,
the premises of the primary science are not
ad hoc assumptions ....[ I t is not enough
that previously established laws of the
secondary science be represented within the
theory of the primary discipline. The
theory must also be fertile in usable
suggestions for developing the secondary
science, and must yield theorems referring
to the latter's subject matter which augment
or correct its currently accepted bodies of laws.*^
]

^Nagel

(1961)

p.

355.

^Nagel (1961) pp. 358, 360.
Nagel uses the reduction
of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics to illustrate
these informal conditions:

the axioms of mechanics, constituting the
most general parts of the premises in the
primary science to which thermodynamics is
reduced, are supported by evidence from many
fields quite distinct from the study of
The assumption that these axioms
gases.
also hold for the hypothetical molecular
(continued.
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.

.

3.

Formulating the Isrup
In a recent paper Kim claims that
connectibility by

means of (at least nomologically) necessary
biconditionals
is all that is required for one theory to
be in principle
reducible to a second.

Reduction is standardly understood to be a
relation between theories, where a theory is
understood to consist of a distinctive
theoretical vocabulary and a set of laws
formulated in this vocabulary. The
reduction of one theory to another is
thought to be accomplished when the laws of
the reduced theory are shown to be derivable
from the laws of the reducer .... The only
requirement on the bridge laws that can be
explicitly stated, independently of the
particular theories involved, is the
following, which I will call "the condition
*^

( .

.

.

continued)
components of gases thus involved the
extrapolation of a theory from domains in
which it was already well confirmed into
another domain postulated to be homogeneous
in important respects with the former ones.
But the point having the greatest weight in
this connection is that the combined
assumptions of the primary science to which
the science of heat was reduced have made it
possible to incorporate into a unified
system many apparently unrelated laws of the
sciences of heat as well as other parts of
physics. (Nagel (1961) pp. 358-359.

These informal conditions (i.e., explanatory power and
theoretical unification) are more important when the theory
to be reduced is not a "mature" science with a clear body
of laws available for derivation from some reducing
science.
In such cases, about all that remains of the
notion of intertheoretic reduction are the informal
conditions.
See Sarkar (1992).
Kitcher (1984) essentially
argues that the reduction of genetics to molecular biology,
to the extent that it has occurred, is of this less formal
variety
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of strong connectibility"
Each primitive
predicate P of the theory being reduced is
connected with a coextensive predicate
Q of
the reducer in a biconditional law of the
form: "For all x, Px iff Qx"
and similarly
for all relational predicates.
if this
condition is met, then no matter what the
content of the two theories may be,
derivational reduction is guaranteed; for
these biconditional laws would allow the
rewriting of the laws of the theory being
reduced as laws of the reducer, and if any
cf these rewrites is not derivable from preexisting laws of the reducer, it can be
added as an additional law (assuming both
theories to be true)
In discussing
reduction and [supervenience] therefore, we
will focus on this condition of strong
connectibility
:

,

.

,

.

There are two things to note about this passage.

First,

Kim appears to be simply ignoring Nagel's informal

conditions on intertheoretic reducibility
standard view that a theory is

a

.

Second, on the

language and a set of

statements (laws) closed under logical consequence, Kim's

claim is false.
T2

,

For if the laws of the secondary theory,

when translated into the vocabulary of the primary

theory, Tl, are not derivable from the laws of Tl, then, T2
is not reducible to Tl because the condition of

derivability is not satisfied.

By allowing any translated

T2-laws into the set of Tl-theorems, Kim appears to risk

^Kim (1990) p. 19.
In a note that occurs in the
middle of this quote, Kim cites Nagel as the originator of
the model of reduction he is working with.
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trivializing the notion of intertheoretic
reduction.®

At

best, T2 is derivable from some augmented
theory of the
s ame

sort as the primary theory, Tl.

The significance of

such a derivation is hardly apparent.

Strong connectibility is primarily a relation
between
sets of terms.

One set of terms is strongly connected to

the other iff every predicate of the first set is

necessarily coextensive with some predicate of the second
set.

Since Kim's point revolves around the notion of

strong connectibility,

I

suggest that we understand

theories to be of the same sort iff they share the same set
of theoretical terms.

Now,

in light of the independence of

strong connectibility and the derivability of theories, and

because theoretical terms are closely identified with

scientific disciplines (e.g., "molecule" in chemistry,
"mass" and "energy" in physics, "action potential" and

"synapse" in neurobiology)

it seems that if the strong

,

connectibility of theoretical terms has reductive
implications, they would be primarily for disciplines (or

domains of study)

,

and only secondarily for theories.

^Apparently, in most real cases of intertheoretic
reduction, only approximations of the laws of the secondary
theory are derivable from the laws of the primary (or
reducing theory).
I don't think this empirical fact
justifies Kim's claim that strong connectibility of
predicates of the two theories is sufficient for
intertheoretic reducibility however, for there is no
indication that Kim is restricting his claim to cases where
approximations of the translated T2-laws are derivable from
the Tl-laws.
,
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Perhaps, then, strong connectibility of the
theoretical

terms of discipline X to those of discipline

Y

is

the in principle reducibility of the X-

discipline (and its idealized complete theory) to the
Ydiscipline (and its idealized complete theory)
Nagel's discussion of connectibility indicates that he
also thought it was significant because it had implications
for the reducibility of entire disciplines (or sciences)

Connectibility would indeed assure
derivability if... for every term 'A' in the
secondary science but not in the primary one
there is a theoretical term 'B' in the
primary science such that A and B are linked
by a biconditional: A if and only if B.
If
the linkage has this form, 'A' can be
replaced by 'B' in any law in which 'A'
occurs, and so yield a warranted theoretical
postulate L'.
If L' is not itself derivable
from the available theory of the primary
science, the theory need only be augmented
by L' to become a modified theory but
nonetheless a theory of the primary science
[from which] L will be deducible.’ (my
emphasis)
,

In any case,

I

think Kim's claim that strong

connectibility is sufficient for in principle reducibility
is most charitably interpreted as the claim that the strong

connectibility of the terms of one discipline (or science)

Note that Nagel only says that
connectibility would imply derivability, not reducibility.
This is because a successful reduction must satisfy both
For other comments
the formal and the informal conditions.
on this issue see Kincaid (1987) p. 344.
^Nagel

(1961)

p.

355.
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to those of another discipline is sufficient
for the

intertheoretic reducibility of the entire first
discipline
(or its complete idealized theory)

to the second.

The idea

would be that if strong connectibility obtains
between the
terms of some psychological theory, Tl, and those
of some

physical theory, T2

,

then if the translated Tl-laws cannot

all be derived from the T2-laws, they can be accepted
as

new theoretical postulates of physical theory (broadly
construed)
follows,

.

This is somewhat plausible, and in what

for the sake of argument,

I

will grant that strong

connectibility of sets of theoretical terms does have
reductive implications for the respective disciplines.
The key issue, then, is "does the strong supervenience
of S on B imply the strong connectibility of the terms of

one discipline to those of another?".

neither

S

Quite clearly, since

nor B will always correspond in any natural way

to any identifiable discipline, this won't generally be the
case.

But let's agree to limit our attention to cases

where all and only the members of

S are

expressed by the

theoretical terms of a single scientific discipline, and

where all the members of B are expressed by terms from some
other scientific discipline.

I

believe there is good

reason to doubt whether in even these cases, the strong

supervenience of

S on B

implies the strong connectibility

of the terms of the S-discipline to those of the B-

discipline.

If this is right, the nonreductive status of
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strong supervenience (at least with respect to
i ^t^^theoret ic

reduction) should be assured.

Kim's reason for rejecting the claim that strong

supervenience is nonreductive is based on

(SE)

:

the fact

that every strongly supervenient property is necessarily

coextensive with some member of the Boolean closure of the
base set (see p. 37)

(SE)

implies that terms expressing

supervenient properties are strongly connectible to terms

expressing (infinitary) Boolean combinations of base
properties, which in turn suggests that the condition of

strong connectibility could be met between the theoretical
terms of the S— discipline and those of the B— discipline.
The key question, then, is "even when S and B are

restricted as

I

indicated above, does strong supervenience

entail strong connectibility as Kim claims?".

4.

Arguments in Support of Nonreducibilitv
One of the original objections to Kim's contention

that strong supervenience threatened to entail

intertheoretic reducibility was presented by John Post.^^
For a version of Kim's argument that strong
supervenience implies strong connectibility see Kim (1990)
pp.

19-22.

165-166.
Post argued that Kim's
formulation of strong supervenience, (SK) was defective
because it required the base set to be closed under
negation.
I will ignore this aspect of the argument
because (S) does not have any such requirement. See Van
Cleve (1990) for a sympathetic development of Post's
objection.
^^Post

(1984)

pp.
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Consider some paradigmatic example of

a

physical property

such as having mass (Post's example is being
an electron).
Clearly, its complement, not having mass,
cannot be

considered a physical property unless we are willing
to say
that everything, including disembodied spirits
and Gods
(if

such there be) must have some physical properties.

The relevance of Post's point can be seen as follows.

Suppose we have two sets of properties,

and

s

B,

such that

all would agree that the members of S are psychological
(or

mental) properties and the members of B are neurological

properties;

supervenes on

suppose, furthermore, that
B.

It follows by (SE)

psychological property in

S

strongly

S

that every

is necessarily coextensive with

some property in the Boolean closure of

B.

If that

property were truly a neurological property, then every
mental property is necessarily coextensive with a

neurological property.

And this would suggest that

psychology is in principle reducible to neuroscience.

But

the Boolean closure of B contains any property

constructible from the properties in B with the aid of
conjunction, disjunction and negation.

Thus,

if we agree

with Post that the set of neurological properties is not
closed under negation, then

(SE)

does not justify the

conclusion that the mental properties in

coextensive with neurological properties.
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S

are necessarily

The threat of

reducibility seems to be avoided.

Post sums up his

diagnosis thus.

Fuirtheirmoire
if we allow every property
constructible frcpm physical properties to be
physical, there is no reason why we should
not allow the same for any other class of
P^op^i^ties.
.Then we would have to say that
electrons have moral properties simply
because they are not morally good (and not
morally bad)
Here the absurdity is even
more striking. ... it follows that a set of Pproperties is not generally closed under
constructibil ity since complementation is a
property-forming construction. Moreover,
maximally consistent conjunctions of given
P-properties and their complements are not
themselves all P-properties ... Yet it is
precisely to properties constructible out of
the others via this operation that Kim
reduces the supervenient ones. We cannot
say of such a property thus reduced that it
is "nothing but" a P-property
,

.

.

.

,

Suppose, once again, that B is a set of neurological

properties.

If there is reason to doubt whether some B-

maximal properties (e.g. the property of not having

a

brain

of such and such a structure, nor of so and so structure

nor of...) really qualify as neurological properties, then

there is reason to doubt whether the translations of the
laws and terms of some S-theory (e.g., some psychological
theory)
(e.g.

into the theoretical vocabulary of some B-theory

some theory in neuroscience) really qualify as laws

(and terms)

^^Post

of an augmented neurological theory.

(1984)

p.

166.
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Because

the translations of the laws of the S-theory
into the terms
of the B-theory will often involve complementation,
Post's

argument gives us reason to be skeptical of the
claim that
they gualify as laws of any B— theory.
In a similar vein, Paul Teller argues that

disjunctions of physical properties need not be physical
properties.

He emphasizes one of the leading ideas of

functionalism; that the same mental property can be

"realized" in (or instantiated by) an indefinite multitude
of diverse physical systems which differ greatly in their

intrinsic physical features.

Teller essentially argues

that in light of the multiple realizability of mental
properties, the strong supervenience of the mental on the

physical fails to entail the reducibility of psychological
theories.

Although each mental property will be

necessarily equivalent to some potentially infinite
disjunction of all of its possible realizations, there is
no reason to consider such disjunctions of broadly physical

properties to be physical properties themselves (or to be

expressible by the theoretical terms of physics)

.

While

discussing the multiple realizability of the property of
being currency (which has been realized by animal,
vegetable, and mineral)

,

Teller expresses his doubts thus:

Now what, I want to ask, makes it
appropriate to call a property 'physical'
when it is such a disparate and infinitely
...What is it that
long disjunction [?
]
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determines whether a description gets thrown
in as one of the disjuncts?
Not physical
facts of the sort that physicists study.
While being a Boolean combination does not
automatically exclude a property from
occurring in physical laws, Boolean
combinations like the ones we are
considering will never figure in physical
laws in any science remotely like the
physics we know today. What determined
whether or not a case gets into the
disjunction is going to be the economic
the fact as to whether or not the
economic characteristics of a situation make
something function as money or not.^^
/

Teller's objection can be reformulated as a rejection
of the claim that for every predicate expressing a

supervenient property from the S-discipline (e.g.
economics)
physics)

,

,

there is a predicate of the B-discipline (e.g.

which is necessarily coextensive with it.

So,

like Post, Teller grants that for each predicate expressing
a supervenient property there is a necessarily coextensive

predicate constructible from predicates of the reducing

discipline and (infinitary) Boolean operations.

Evidently

they both reject the thesis that the set of theoretical
terms of a discipline is closed under Boolean operations.

^^Teller (1984b) p. 59.
One might object to Teller's
example because the property of being currency is an
extrinsic property and therefore does not strongly
supervene on any set of intrinsic physical properties (e.g.
duplicate pieces of clam shell have the property in some
But this is not
social settings and not in others)
relevant because being currency may nevertheless strongly
supervene on a set including extrinsic physical properties
in which case we are still faced with Kim's claim that
strong supervenience implies reducibility
.
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and Teller apparently believes that the class
of

theoretical terms of a discipline (e.g., physics) is
not
even closed under disjunction. Not surprisingly,
Kim

disagrees

When reduction is the issue, we are talking
about theories, theories couched in their
distinctive theoretical vocabularies. And
it seems that we allow, and ought to allow,
freedom to combine and recombine, the basic
theoretical predicates and functors by the
usual logical and mathematical operations
available in the underlying language,
without checking each step with something
like the resemblance criterion; that would
work havoc with free and creative scientific
theorizing ....[I]t may well be that when an
srtif icial-looking predicate proves useful,
or essential, in a fecund and well
corroborated theory and gets entrenched, we
will come to think of it as expressing a
robust property, an important respect in
which objects and events can resemble each
other

If the artificial looking predicate was artificial in

virtue of disjoining a few (e.g., four) apparently

heterogeneous predicates of the B-discipline

,

but proved to

be particularly useful, then it does seem plausible that,
as Kim suggests, eventually, translations of laws from

theories in the S-discipline might be added to the
theoretical postulates of theories in the B-discipline.
this case, the predicates appearing in the translated

statements of these laws might well be accepted as
^^Kim

(1990)

p,

21.
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In

theoretical terms of the B-discipline

.

if the number of

disjuncts is large (say over 1000, let alone infinite),
however, as would be the case for the property of
being
currency and the translated laws are not derivable

from

,

the previously accepted laws of any theory in the B-

discipline, then

I

am inclined to agree with Teller that

the complexity of such laws and their apparently ad hoc

nature would be a decisive objection to their being
included as independent theoretical postulates of the Bdiscipline.

In such cases, the translated laws of the S-

discipline and the predicates used to express them would be
too difficult (if not impossible) to comprehend and to work
with, so considerations of theoretical simplicity would

suggest that these predicates would not be afforded the
status of theoretical terms of the B-discipline.

5.

Conclusion
Let's say that one term is Boolean definable in terms

of a set of other terms iff the former is necessarily

coextensive with some Boolean combination of the members of
the set.

The following thesis is necessary for the claim

that strong supervenience entails Kim-style reducibility of

disciplines (i.e., the strong connectibility of terms of
the S-discipline with terms of the B-discipline) and

appears to be the central point of disagreement between Kim
and Teller.

Kim apparently believes the set of terms of a
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theory (or a discipline) is closed under
Boolean
definability, and Teller does not.

i

think Post and Teller

have given us good reason to doubt whether
the closure
condition is satisfied.

hasten to add that there are many different
notions
of reduction.
Some, such as mathematical reduction,
I

are

relatively free of epistemological considerations;
others,
such as intertheoretic reduction, are not.

Certainly, it

is easier to argue that strong supervenience is

nonreductive by appealing to the more epistemologically
sensitive types of reduction.

It is somewhat surprising,

then, to find that Kim is as explicit as anyone that the

sort of reducibility in guestion is intertheoretic

reducibil ity

.

And these informal, epistemic considerations

involved in intertheoretic reducibility are not somehow

eliminated from the discussion when we move to the issue of
strong connectibility

,

even among disciplines.

They

reappear as guestions about which terms are theoretical
terms of the B-discipline and which are merely (infinitely)

definable in terms of them.

I

think Teller and Post have

given us every reason to accept the claim that when this
sort of reducibility is at issue, strong supervenience is a

legitimately nonreductive relation.
On the other hand, Kim is correct to emphasize (SE)
(SE)

makes it apparent that the strong supervenience of

S

on B would be welcome news to anyone attempting to reduce
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some S theory to a B-theory

-

welcome news, but not a

guarantee of its possibility.
Having clarified and defended the nonreductive status
of strong supervenience

,

next

I

turn to the other side of

the eguation: its status as a dependence relation.

—Stron g

B_;

1.

Supervenience and Dependence

Introduction
We think of the world as layered.

At the bottom (at

least as far as we know), are the entities, properties and
relations, presently studied by guantum physicists.

If we

contrast the quantum realm with even the properties studied
by cell-biologists,

it is natural to say that the

properties studied by biochemists are intermediate.
Moreover, the objects and properties of the "upper" levels
seem to be dependent on the objects and properties of the
"lower" levels.

For example, we are inclined to think that

the properties of social institutions are dependent on the

properties of individuals, and that the mental properties
of individuals are dependent on the neurophysiological

properties of their brains, which, in turn, are ultimately
dependent on the properties of the atomic and subatomic
entities composing the brain.

Supervenience is often taken to be an analysis of (or
a

substitute for) this sort of inter-level dependence
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between properties (events or facts).

For example,

consider these passages from Jaegwon
Kim:

Acceptance or rejection of the supervenience
of the mental on the physical leads
to
most basic division between theories ofthe
the
mind-body relation: theories that accept
psychophysical supervenience are
fundamentally materialist, and those that
reject it are fundamentally antimaterialist. This difference is
philosophically more basic and more
significant than the usual classification of
mind-body theories as "monist" or
"dualist"
am taking mereological supervenience ... as
thesis concerning the objective features
of the world - a metaphysical doctrine roughly, as I said, to the effect that the
macroworld is the way it is because the
microworld is the way it is.'"^
I

a

Other influential philosophers have treated supervenience
as a philosophically significant dependence or

determination relation (witness the quotations from G.E.
Moore and Donald Davidson in chapter

I.

A.).

In fact,

it is

the promise of supervenience to be of use in characterizing

such inter-level dependence relations, more than anything
else, that makes it attractive to philosophers.

Recently, however, this sort of reliance on

supervenience has come under attack.

Opening salvos were

launched by Lombard (1986), DePaul (1987), and Grimes
^^Kim

(1984a)

p.

^^Kim

(1984b)

pp.

156.

264-265.
84

(1988).

For example, Thomas Grimes concludes
his paper
"The Myth of Supervenience" with the
following claim:
,

Instead of being a savior of contemporary
philosophy, the concept of supervenience
turns out to be rather uninteresting, or at
least ill-suited for the applications it is
supposed to have.
For even in its strongest
form [i.e., strong supervenience], this
concept fails to serve as a general form of
dependency.
.Thus, supervenience is not an
all-purpose device for explaining how the
moral, the mental, or the macrophysical
depends in some special way on a more basic
reality.
It is just not the right sort of
concept in this regard.''^
.

.

Grimes is claiming that since supervenience is not a
general (or an appropriate?) kind of dependence relation,
it is not strong enough to play the roles that Moore,

Davidson, Kim and others appear to have envisioned for it.

David Charles has recently argued that materialism cannot
be expressed as a supervenience thesis because

supervenience fails to "capture the priority of the
physical in either an explanatory or ontological mode"^®.
Even Kim has come to believe that supervenience is not the

dependence or determination relation it was once thought to
be

Since strong supervenience is the strongest

supervenience relation discussed in the literature, by
’^Grimes

^®Charles

(1988)
(1992)

p.
p.

159.

276.
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questioning its adequacy as a dependence
relation the
critics threaten to expose all supervenience
relations as
metaphysically insignificant correlation
relations.

One of

the primary tasks of this dissertation
is to identify and
separate the truth that underlies these
criticisms from the

exaggerated implications some have drawn from
them.
l
undertake the relevant identification in the
remainder of
this chapter.

——Strong

Super venience and Functional Dependence

The word 'dependence' has a myriad of different
senses: causal dependence, functional dependence,

ontological dependence, and explanatory dependence all come
to mind.''^

Yet critics of supervenience often fail to

distinguish the kind of dependence at issue.

Let's see if

we can do better.
We begin by noting that supervenience relations really

just are functional dependence (or determination)
relations.

To see this recall that for any set of

properties. A, an A-maximal property. A*, is any consistent

conjunction of members of A and their complements such that
for every individual, x, and every member of A,
Px)

V D(A*x

--Px)

.

P,

D(A*x ^

Now, the strong supervenience of S on

B requires that any two things that have the same B-maximal

^^Peter Simmons (1987) begins his study of ontological
dependence by distinguishing ten different types of
dependence
86

property (i.e., instantiate precisely the same subset
of Bproperties) must have the same S-maximal property
(although
the converse need not hold)

.

More precisely, s strongly

supervenes on B iff there is a (potentially many-one)
function,

f,

from B-maximal properties to S-maximal

properties such that, necessarily, if an individual has Bmaximal property,

b,

then it has S-maximal property, F(b)

.

In essence, strong supervenience is a functional dependence

relation where the independent variable ranges over Bmaximal properties and the dependent variable ranges over
S-maximal properties: the S-maximal property of any
individual is functionally dependent on/determined by its

B-maximal property.
Grimes appears to be aware of the fact that

supervenience relations are functional dependence (or
determination) relations.

He distinguishes

^^Jaegwon Kim and others have treated dependence as
the converse of determination: "Supervenient properties are
dependent on, or are determined by, their base properties"
(Kim (1990) p. 9).
Despite what Grimes (1991) claims,
there is a perfectly good sense of "dependence" on which
Consider the common practice of
this claim is true.
distinguishing independent from dependent variables. Where
f(x) = y, 'x' is the independent variable, and 'y' is the
dependent variable: the idea being that the values of 'y'
are functionally dependent on (because functionally
determined by) the values of 'x*. The variable ranging
over B-maximal properties (or subsets of B) is the
independent variable, the variable ranging over S-maximal
properties (or subsets of S) is the dependent variable.
The S-maximal property of any individual is functionally
determined by, and thereby functionally dependent on, its
B-maximal property.
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(CD) One thing correlationally
determines
another if and only if given the way the first
only one way the second can

from

"(D) One thing determines another if and only if
given the way the first is there is one and only
one way the second can be because of the wav i-ho
first is.»^^
^

And he claims that

Strong supervenience.
implies the
correlational sense of determination (CD)
However, [strong supervenience] does not
imply (D)
the more interesting or
dependency sense of determination. If these
two senses are not adequately distinguished,
strong supervenience might easily be
mistaken as a form of dependency and it
falsely concluded that supervenient
properties are dependent upon their
corresponding subvenient properties
.

.

.

.

,

Despite the different terminology,
that strong supervenience is what

"functional dependence" relation.

I
I

think Grimes agrees
am calling a

He just prefers to call

its converse a "correlational determination" relation.

^^Grimes

(1988)

p.l56.

^^Grimes

(1988)

p.l56.

^^Grimes

(1988)_ p. 156.
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The idea that supervenience provides only
the

correlational (or functional) component of some
stronger

dependence relation has recently been echoed by Kim:

when nonreductive physicalists appeal to
supervenience as a way of expressing the
dependence of the mental on the physical,
they pretty clearly have in mind an
asymmetric relation.
"Functional
dependence", in the sense that two state
variables of a system are related by a
mathematical function, may be neither
symmetric nor asymmetric; however, what we
want is metaphysical or ontic dependence or
determination, not merely the fact that
values of one variable are determined as a
mathematical function of those of another
variable
.

.

.

Finally, David Charles also offers a similar criticism of

supervenience.

Charles focusses on the inadequacy of

supervenience as a means of formulating materialism:

There seem to be at least two physicalist
claims at work here. The first is that
physical properties are explanatorily prior
or primary, and that mental properties are
explanatorily dependent or secondary....
The second physicalist intuition is
expressed by a certain ontological thesis:
the physical is what the mental is composed
of
The physical constitutes the basic
building blocks of the universe, and
everything else is made up from these....
Both of these intuitions need
refinement.
However,
supervenience ... fails to capture either of
The relations of being explanatory
them.
prior and being the ontological basis of are
.

.

^^Kim

(1990)

p.

.

.

13.
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stronger than the one expressed by any
member of the supervenience family.

Grimes, Kim and Charles seem to be making
essentially the
same point: namely, that ontologically
significant interlevel dependence relations such as materialism
involve (at
least)

two components: a functional dependence or

correlation relation, and
relation.

non-functional priority

a

They also agree that supervenience provides only

the former.

They are correct.

Even without knowing

exactly what this sought for ontic priority relation is, on
the mere assumption that it is asymmetric (which comes from
Kim)

we will be able to show that strong supervenience

,

(qualified any number of ways)

,

is not sufficient for the

ontic priority of the base-properties.
Before
First,

do so, however,

I

I

want to make two points.

it is worth noting that although

I

am not offering

any official analysis of this ontic priority relation, a

Lewisian would probably understand ontic priority between

properties in terms of greater naturalness.

I

am neutral

on this proposed analysis, but those who have some grasp on

greater naturalness may find it helpful to think of ontic
priority in this manner.
Second,

I

want to comment on Kim's suggestion that

supervenience is supposed to be an ontic dependence (or

^^Charles

(1992)

p.

274

.
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determination) relation.

l

propose the following

provisional analysis of the relation of ontic
dependence
among sets of properties: S ontologically
depends

on B iff

functionally depends on B and there is an
appropriate
sense in which the members of B are ontically
prior to (or

S

more natural than) the mebers of

s.

Note,

first of all,

that since functional dependence is necessary for
ontic

dependence, if supervenience relations really amount to
types of functional dependence relations (as

strong supervenience does)

,

this sort of analysis respects

Kim s opinion that (at least some kind of) supervenience is
a

necessary condition of ontic dependence between sets of

properties
least,

.

Moreover, since strong supervenience, at

is equivalent to a variety of functional dependence,

the question of whether strong supervenience entails ontic

dependence reduces to the question "does strong
supervenience yield the ontic priority of the members of
the base set?".

The critics say "no".

It is time to see

why they are correct (about this)

3.

St ro ng Supervenience a nd On tic Prior ity

We begin by noting that ontic priority, whatever else
it might be,

is clearly an asymmetric relation,

strong supervenience is not.

while

For example, any property,

strongly supervenes on itself: no objects can differ with
^^See Kim

(1990)

p.

16;

Kim (1991) p.
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10.

P,

regard to P without differing with regard to
is ontically prior to

itself.

But no

P.

(or more natural than)

This establishes that the strong supervenience of

S on B is

not sufficient for the ontic priority of the B-

properties.

(For now

I

am assuming that B— properties are

ontically prior to the S-properties iff every member of B
is ontically prior to every member of S.

Later, this

simplifying assumption will be modified.)

Although strong supervenience is not sufficient for
the ontic priority of the base properties, perhaps

asymmetric strong supervenience will be:

(SAS)

If S strongly supervenes on B and B fails to

strongly supervene on
supervenes on

B)

,

S

(for short,

S

strongly a-

then all the members of B are

ontologically prior to any member of

S.

After all, when materialists claim that the mental is
supervenient on the physical, they are implicitly assuming
that the physical is not supervenient on the mental.
As it stands, however,

(SAS)

To see this

is false.

detailed counterexample to (SAS) in the
literature was first suggested by Grimes, and it has been
Kim and
It is unsuccessful, however.
fleshed out by Kim.
properties,
Grimes claim it is possible that three sets of
A strongly
A, B, and C, stand in the following relations.
astrongly
short,
A
asymmetrically supervenes on B (for
ontologically
not
but B-properties are
supervenes on B)
Rather, A and B both strongly aprior to A-properties
continued.
^^The only

,

.

(
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.

.

continued)
supervene on C, and it is the C-properties which
are
ontological ly prior to the others. The asymmetric
supervenience of A on B is a result of the fact that
both
supervene on C (Grimes (1988) p. 157; Kim (1990)
pp. 14 15)
Kim goes on to support these general considerations
with an example:
.

.

As a possible example consider this: I've
heard that there is a correlation between
intelligence as measured by the IQ test and
manual dexterity.
It is possible that both
manual dexterity and intelligence depend on
certain genetic and developmental factors,
and that intelligence strongly [supervenes]
on manual dexterity but not conversely.
If
such were the case, we would not consider
intelligence to be dependent on, or
determined by, manual dexterity (Kim, (1988)
p. 157; Kim (1990) pp. 14-15).

The idea is that intelligence strongly supervenes on, but
is not ontologically determined by, manual dexterity.
Rather, both intelligence and manual dexterity are onticly
determined by "certain genetic and developmental factors".
Thus asymmetric strong supervenience is not sufficient for
ontic determination (nor, therefore, the ontic priority of
the base properties)
This may seem compelling. The connection between
manual dexterity and intelligence is very tenuous. Surely,
there are possible worlds in which beings without hands (or
dispositions to use them) are very intelligent and there
are worlds in which beings without hands (or dispositions
to use them) are not intelligent.
Such considerations lead
us to accept the premise that intelligence is not
ontologically determined by manual dexterity.
Unfortunately, the very same considerations show that
intelligence does not strongly supervene on manual
dexterity thereby defeating the example. What has gone
wrong?
Perhaps Kim merely meant to claim that it is
metaphysically possible that, as a matter of nomological
necessity intelligence strongly a-supervenes on manual
dexterity.
If we grant that this is metaphysically
possible and we also grant that if such a situation were
possible, intelligence would still not be ontologically
determined by manual dexterity, Kim's counterexample
stands.
It is a counterexample to an implausible thesis,
Specifically, on this interpretation Kim's
however.
(continued.
,

.
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let S

{blueness) and let B - {blueness, redness).

s

strongly supervenes on B because no two
things can differ
with regard to blueness without differing
with regard to
either blueness or redness. But the converse

is not true.

Thus the antecedent of (SAS) is satisfied.

On the other

hand, blueness is not ontically prior to itself:

ontological priority is not reflexive.
of (SAS)

Thus the consequent

is not satisfied.

There are various ways to amend (SAS) so that it is
no
longer susceptible to such examples.^®

difficulties will remain.

But more general

Many result from the following

fact

^^(

continued)
example establishes the falsehood of
.

.

.

(SAS') If, as a matter of nomological (but not
metaphysical) necessity, S strongly a-supervenes on B,
then all members of B are ontologically prior to all
members of S.

It is not surprising that (SAS') is false.
Relations
of ontological priority, unlike causation, are not
contingent on the laws of nature. They hold of
metaphysical necessity or not at all. Thus, we should not
expect that merely nomologically necessary supervenience
relations are sufficient for ontic priority. Kim's example
reinforces this impression: or motivates it for those who
didn't have it in the first place.
I conclude, then, that
this example does not refute (SAS)
^®Here s one of them.
'

(SASl) If S strongly a-supervenes on B then all
members of B-S are ontically prior to all members of

S-B.
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(1)

For any property,
B,

P,

if s strongly a-supervenes on

then S strongly a-supervenes on B u
{P}.

can be used to argue that any property is
ontically
prior to any property, even itself. For example,
suppose
that (A) strongly a-supervenes on (C, D}, and
(1)

{C,

strongly a-supervenes on

{E,

F,

G,

D)

Such a situation

H}.

might occur with a biological property, its chemical
realizations, and their physical realizations in turn.

(1)

implies that {C,D} also asymmetrically strongly supervenes
on {E,F,G,H,A).

Thus, we have the result that A (as well

as E, F, G, and H)

is ontologically prior to C, while C in

turn is ontologically prior to A.

Assuming that

ontological priority is an asymmetric relation, this is an

unacceptable result.
In order to neutralize

(1)

,

we need some way of

limiting the membership of the base set.

introducing the notion of

(MSB)

a

We begin by

minimal supervenience base.

For any sets of properties, S and

B,

B is a

minimal (strong) supervenience base for

strongly supervenes on B and

S

S

S

does not strongly

supervene on any proper subset of

B.

Our new sufficient condition for ontic priority follows.
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(SAS2)

If s Strongly a-supervenes on B and
B is a

minimal strong supervenience base for

S,

then all

the members of B are ontically prior to
all the

members of

S.

(SAS2)

avoids the problem caused by

{C,

strongly supervenes on {E,F,G,H},

D}

(1)

because given that
{E,F,G,H,A} is not

a minimal strong supervenience base for {C,D}.

Thus, we do

not get the conseguence that A is ontically prior to C
and
D.

It also avoids our first objection to (SAS)

Unfortunately,

(SAS2)

is also defective.

One problem

arises from our oversimplified treatment of the

relationship between strong supervenience and ontic
priority.

Since the notion of

a

minimal supervenience base

can be of service here, it is worth considering this

problem first.

Although we have been assuming that all the

members of the base set have to be ontically prior to all
members of the supervenient set, the requirement is too
strong.

For example, suppose {A} strongly supervenes on

{C,D}, both members of which are ontically prior to A, and

suppose that {E} strongly supervenes on {F,G}, both members
of which are ontically prior to E.

that neither

C,

the two others.

D,

Suppose,

furthermore,

nor E is ontically prior to either of

This is a problem because it follows from

the two supervenience theses, that (A,E) strongly

supervenes on {C,D,F,G},

although C and D are not
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ontically prior to
a

E.

Suppose,

finally, that {C,D,F,G) is

minimal supervenience base for {A,E).

that (SAS2)
of (SAS2)

is false,

it follows, then,

although, in some sense, the spirit

is not clearly violated because the
properties

which A supervenes on (minimally) are ontically
prior to A
and likewise with E.
To correct the oversimplified treatment of the

relationship between ontic priority and strong
supervenience, we need the notion of minimal strong a—

supervenience base which is defined in terms of

a

minimal

strong supervenience base.

(MSBa)

For any sets of properties, S and

B,

minimal strong a-supervenience base for

B is a
S

df

B

is a minimal strong supervenience base for S and
B does not strongly supervene on S.

With this notion, we can capture the spirit of the claim
that strong supervenience entails ontic priority:

(SAS3)

If S strongly a-supervenes on B then every

member of

S,

P,

is ontologically posterior

relative to each member of some subset of B which
is a minimal strong a-supervenience base for P.
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Basically,

(SAS3)

has the effect of breaking up a
single

supervenience thesis into n supervenience
theses, one for
all n members of the supervenient set.
Then we ask of each
of these properties whether the
properties which it really
supervenes on are ontologically prior to it.
This approach
avoids the problem raised above because the
members
of the

minimal supervenience bases for both A and E are
ontically
prior to A and E respectively.
it also could be

generalized to other kinds of supervenience if the need
arose
Despite the usefulness of the notion of

a

minimal

supervenience base, there are problems with (SAS) and its
successors the notion of a minimal supervenience base
cannot solve.

For one thing, supervenience relations

are insensitive to the difference between a property and
its complement, but it is plausible that the relation of

once objected to (SAS3) as follows: suppose P
strongly a-supervenes on the set of its two possible
"realizations" {C, D}, which is a minimal supervenience
base for P, and suppose that C and D are onticly prior to
P.
Since we are assuming that possession of either C or D
is sufficient for possession of P (they are realizations of
P) it follows that P also strongly a-supervenes on {C&P, D}
(since C is equivalent to C&P)
which is also a minimal
strong a-supervenience base for P. Then it follows from
(SAS3)
as well as its predecessors, that the property,
C&P, is ontologically prior to P.
But this, I argued, was
not an acceptable result.
I was wrong.
It is perfectly
acceptable to anyone who holds that necessarily equivalent
properties are identical, as I am inclined to. For on this
assumption, C&P just is C.
Replacing C&P with CvP in the
above example is equally harmless, for CvP is equivalent to
P and {P,D) is not a minimal strong a-supervenience base
for P.
,
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ontological priority is not.

supervenes on
{-D,

-E}.

{D,

E),

For example, if c strongly a-

then it also strongly a-supervenes on

This is because two individuals are

indiscernible with respect to a property iff they
are
indiscernible with respect to its complement. On

the other

hand, there is reason to doubt that a property
and its

complement are at equal levels on the ontic priority

hierarchy
^

objection to the adequacy of supervenience

as a formulation of metaphysically significant
dependence

relations is provided by the fact that things can be
indiscernible with respect to

a set of

properties in virtue

of instantiating the complements of all of them.
(1990)

Van Cleve

and Grimes (1991) have pointed out that even the

strong supervenience of the mental on the physical is

compatible with the possibility of there being disembodied
spirits with mental states as long as they all have the
same mental properties.

For example,

if all possible

disembodied beings experience eternal bliss, we would not
thereby have a case of physically indiscernible, mentally

discernible objects, and, therefore, we would not have a
counterexample to the strong supervenience of the mental on
the physical.

Individuals which fail to instantiate any

physical properties would be physically indiscernible
nevertheless.
^°See

Some find this a rather compelling objection

Armstrong (1989)

p.
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83.

to the claim that supervenience

,

itself,

is an adequate

formulation of materialism: it does seem
incompatible with
the claim that the physical is ontically
prior to the
mental
A truly decisive objection to (SAS) and
amended

versions involves the supervenience of a property
on
of mutually exclusive properties.
Examples of this
provided by the supervenience of

a

a set

are

determinable property on

an appropriately selected set of its determinates.

For

example, suppose, to keep things simple, that there
are

only two determinate shades of green, say light green,
and dark green,

Since L and D are the only determinates

D.

of some determinable, they are contraries.

green part of

a

but not both.

L,

Thus every

thing is either light green or dark green,
In this case, greenness,

supervenes on the set
asymmetrically.

(L,

D},

or G,

strongly

and it does so

Clearly, no two things can differ with

respect to greenness (one is green and one isn't) unless
they instantiate different members of the set

although the converse is not the case.

{L,

D);

It is plausible

that determinates are more basic (or natural) than

determinables

,

so

am willing to grant that our example

I

accords with (SAS3)

.

So far so good.

But since L and D are mutually exclusive properties

(contraries)

,

and they are the only possible "realizations"

of greenness,

it is also true that light-greenness strongly
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supervenes on greenness and dark-greenness.

strongly supervenes on

{G,

D}

.

That is, L

No two things can differ

with respect to L (one is light green the other
is not)

without differing with respect to

(G,

is light green will have G but not D,

D).

The thing that

and anything that

fails to be light green will either instantiate D and
G or
to instantiate either.

So if our earlier claim that

determinates are more natural than their determinables is
correct we now have a counterexample to (SAS3)
if the earlier claim is false,

.

Of course,

then since all determinables

strongly supervene on the set of all their determinates, we
already have a counterexample to (SAS3).
Note the generality of the point.

Anytime a

contingently exemplified determinable property P strongly
a-supervenes on a minimal base set of its determinates,
any member of

B,

M,

B,

will strongly a-supervene on the set

that includes P and all members of B other than

In

^^Assume a contingent property P (a property that is
not instantiated by every possible object) strongly asupervenes on a minimal base set of mutually exclusive
determinates of P, B. Since the supervenience is
asymmetric, B must have at least two members. Now, for
reductio, suppose that some member of B, M, fails to
strongly a-supervene on {P}uB-{M} (call this set "C")
Clearly, C does not strongly supervene on M (because
otherwise P, which is a member of C, would strongly
supervene on M and therefore B would not be a minimal
supervenience base for P)
Thus, the reason M fails to
strongly a-supervene on C is because it fails to strongly
supervene on C.
But if M fails to strongly supervene on C
then things can be M-discernible and C-indiscernible
Consider two such possible objects a and b such that Ma and
Since M is a determinate of P, if Ma then Pa. Thus,
-•Mb.
(continued.
.

.
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.

such as situation, either all the members
of B are
ontologically prior to P or they are not.
if

not, we

already have a counterexample to (SAS3)
predecessors).

(and its

On the other hand, if all the members of
B

are ontologically prior to P we use an argument
of the
above form to falsify (SAS3) by taking any member

of B, M,

out of the base set, replacing it with P and then
showing

that (SAS3) entails the falsehood: P is ontologically
prior
to M.
This is a fundamental difficulty with (SAS3) and the

entire project that motivates it.

4.

Conclusion
It seems that the task of analyzing ontic priority (or

even finding an informative sufficient condition)
of supervenience is impossible.

in terms

Does this mean that

supervenience, in general, is metaphysically insignificant
as Grimes has claimed?

the final chapter

I

I

aim to show that it does not.

In

will argue that supervenience relations

are necessary conditions on materialism and other

metaphysically significant theses supervenience has

^^
continued)
from the C-indiscernibility of a and b we have Pb.
Since B
is a set of mutually exclusive determinates of P on which P
supervenes, anything that instantiates P must instantiate
some member of B.
Since ^Mb, b must instantiate some other
member of B, N (so Nb)
Because the members of B are
mutually exclusive determinates of P, if Ma then a has no
other member of B, so -Na.
But since N is in C, a and b
Contradiction.
are not C-indiscernible after all.
( .

.

.

.
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customarily been associated with.
so are the relevant theses.

Thus if they are false,

That should suffice to make

them philosophically significant (assuming they
are not
trivially true)
The claim that supervenience relations are necessary

conditions on such metaphysical dependence theses should
not be surprising.

We have already seen that strong

supervenience is essentially

a

functional dependence (or

determination) relation, and in subsequent chapters we
shall see that the same holds for other supervenience

relations.

Thus,

if ontic dependence between sets of

properties just is the functional dependence of less
natural on more natural properties, as

I

have suggested,

then whatever supervenience relation provided the

appropriate sort of functional dependence would be one part
of a two part analysis of ontological dependence between

properties.

Such a relation, and any weaker

^^The idea that supervenience is one part of a two
part analysis of the ontologically significant dependence
relations is implicit in this passage from Graham Oddie:

Supervenience theses hold out a double
promise. The first is that of ontological
economy The guiding idea is that... the
supervenient attributes of an item or state
of affairs are determined by its base
attributes.
Thus if the supervenience base
is ontologically privileged what supervenes
on it is ontologically derivative (Oddies
(1991) p. 20: my emphasis)
.

,

Oddie (conversationally) implies that a supervenience
claim, on its own, does not justify claims of ontological
continued
(
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.

.

.

supervenience relations, would, of course, be
condition on ontological dependence.

a

necessary

Even if this was the

only role supervenience theses could play in
philosophy
(and it is not)

,

it would suffice to make supervenience

philosophically significant.

In the subseguent chapters

I

that a version of global supervenience is

ideally suited to play this role.

continued)
dependence. Otherwise, the emphasized antecedent would be
redundant.
But he also implies that supervenience plus the
priority of the base set implies some sort of ontologically
significant dependence relation.
^^

( .

.

.
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CHAPTER IV

GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE AND PLENITUDE: A RESPONSE
TO KIM

A.

—Forinulat

1-i

ncf

Introduction

Global Supervenience

According to our supervenience schema, there can be
no
difference of the supervenient sort without a difference

of

the base sort.

The schema invites the question: "no

among what?".

According to local supervenience

relations such as strong and weak, individuals cannot

differ in one respect without differing in others.

According to global supervenience relations, on the other
hand, entire possible worlds or models cannot differ in one

way without differing in another.

Roughly, the mental is

locally supervenient on the physical iff no two organisms
(or objects of any sort)

can differ psychologically without

differing physically in some way.

Whereas the mental is

globally supervenient on the physical iff no two possible
worlds have different distributions of thoughts and
feelings (over their inhabitants, or over space and time)

without having different distributions of physical
properties
The standard formulation of global supervenience has a

superficial similarity to our formulation of strong
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supervenience,

(S)

Where

S

(supervenient) and B (base)

are sets of properties:

(S)

S

strongly supervenes on B

for any possible

objects, X and y, if x and y are B-indiscernible

then X and y are S-indiscernible

(G)

S gl obally

supervenes on B

worlds, w and

then w and

z

z,

if w and

for any possible
z

are B-indiscernible

are S-indiscernible as well.^

The relevant difference can be brought out by focussing on
the definition of A-indiscernibility used to explicate the

meaning of

(II)

(S)

For any set of properties. A, x and y are A-

indiscernible

If (II)

for any P in A, Px iff Py.

is accepted as the definition of A-

indiscernible worlds (i.e., global A-indiscernibility),
then

S

globally supervenes on B iff no possible worlds have

the same B-properties and different S-properties

.

Since

the properties instantiated only by possible worlds (the

ways only worlds can be) are propositions, on this
^Contingent supervenience theses are accommodated by
treating the locutions 'any possible objects' and 'any
possible worlds' as restricted quantifiers.
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interpretation global supervenience is primarily
a relation
between sets of propositions. Some writers,
such as LePore
and Loewer, seem to understand global
supervenience this
way

Global supervenience: If two nomologically
possible worlds are exactly alike with
respect to fundamental physical facts (the
facts expressible in terms of the
vocabularies of fundamental physical
theories) then they are exactly alike with
respect to all other facts.^

Their thesis is an instance of

(G)

supplemented by (II)

where S is taken to be the class of all non-physical
propositions, B the class of all physical propositions, and
the quantifier is restricted to nomologically possible

worlds
Thomas Grimes, Bradford Petrie, and Jaegwon Kim, who
first offered

(G)

as the definition of global

supervenience, are among those who interpret
differently.^

They allow

S

(G)

and B to contain properties of

any sort (as opposed to just propositions) as is the case

with weak and strong supervenience.

This facilitates

discussion of the logical relations between global, strong,
and weak supervenience.

But it also creates a need for a

^LePore and Loewer (1989) pp. 177-178.
example see Lewis (1983) p. 362.

(1988), Petrie (1987), MacDonald (1989) p.
and Pauli and Sider (1992).

^See Grimes
209,

For another
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different definition of global
A-indiscernibility
After
all, when Kim, Grimes or Petrie
claim that the mental is
globally supervenient on the physical,
they do not mean
that possible worlds with the same
physical properties
.

have

the same mental properties.

That is trivial.^

They mean,

roughly, that any worlds with the same
distribution of
physical properties (over space and time)
have the same

distribution of mental properties as well.

m

general,

then, they would say that two worlds are
A-indiscernible

iff the two worlds have the same distribution
of A-

properties over space and time.
Since this chapter focusses on Kim and Petrie's

arguments concerning global supervenience

,

I

will follow

them in distinguishing global A-indiscernibility from
individual A-indiscernibility, and in not limiting the sets
of properties related by global supervenience to sets of

propositions.

Throughout this chapter, then, our working

definition of global supervenience will be:

(G')

For any sets of properties S and

globally supervenes on B

B,

S

any two worlds

which have the same distribution of Bproperties (are globally B-indiscernible)

^Why? Because possible worlds are not the sorts of
things that have beliefs or sensations.
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have the same distribution of S-properties
(are globally S-indiscernible)

There are alternative explications of precisely
what
it is for two worlds to have the same
distribution of

some

class of properties (to be globally A-indiscernible)
the issues involved get very complex.

And

.

While these

alternatives are discussed in chapter

V,

can rest on the unexplicated notion.

The central arguments

in this chapter we

presented in this chapter are sound on any of the plausible
analyses of precisely what having the same distribution of
some class of properties amounts to.

They are also sound

even if global supervenience is understood as a relation

between sets of propositions.

Both of these assertions

will be confirmed in chapter V.

2

.

Motivations for Global Supervenience
There are three main reasons that have motivated

philosophers to take global supervenience seriously.

The

first is the existence of multiple-domain supervenience

relations, and the need to express such relations.

supervenience relation,

R,

A

is a multiple-domain relation

iff R is compatible with the existence of possible

individuals (even worldmates) with different supervenient

properties and no base properties.

More precisely, where R

is a supervenience relation between sets of properties and
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relations, s and B (i.e., S-dif
ferences require Bdifferences)
R is a multiple-domain supervenience
relation
Iff there are possible objects
which differ in their sproperties (are S-discernible)
and lack any B-properties
at all. 5 otherwise R is a single-domain
relation.
Note
that I will also refer to types of
supervenience, such as
global supervenience, that are capable of
capturing
,

,

multiple-domain supervenience relations as
multiple-domain
supervenience relations. This sort of supervenience
relation is required to adequately formulate the

supervenience of the properties of wholes (one domain)
on
the properties of (and relations between) their
proper
parts

(a

distinct domain)

.

For example, a tiger and a

mouse differ in that one has the property of being

a

tiger

while the other has the property of being a mouse, but

neither organism has any of the microphysical properties of
their microphysical parts such as negative unit charge on

which these complex structural properties ultimately
depend.

Thus, two organisms can instantiate different

members of the set of all species-properties without
themselves instantiating any members of the set of

microphysical properties (such as negative unit charge)

am indebted to Mark Aronszajn for helpful discussion
of the characterization of a multiple-domain supervenience
relation.
For more on multiple domain supervenience, see
Kim (1988)
.
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Of course, there is a property of
being composed of
such and such particles with such and
such microphysical
properties in such and such an arrangement
which the mouse
has and the tiger has not, but a complex
structural

property such as this is instantiated by one
of the
organisms, not by any of its microphysical parts.

Weak and

strong supervenience are capable of formulating
the

supervenience of properties, like being a mouse, on
complex
structural properties of organisms but they are not
,

able

to capture directly the supervenience of the property
of

being a mouse on the microphysical properties of (and
relations between?^) the microphysical constituents of the
mouse.

The advocate of strong or weak supervenience is

unable to capture the intuitive determination of the

properties of wholes by the properties of their parts
(S)

and

(W)

.

are what we might call single— domain

relations: they are falsified by any case where two objects

instantiate different S-properties but no B-properties

Clearly then, if the B-properties are of a sort that cannot
be instantiated by the objects which instantiate the S-

properties (as in the example above where the B-properties
are microphysical properties and the S-properties are

start discussing the benefits of including relations
(and the supervenient set) in chapter V.
But for now we will follow the general practice of ignoring
this complication.
By including relational properties in
the base set, we can get some, but not all, of the
advantages of including relations themselves.
*^1

in the base set

Ill

properties of whole organisms) neither
hold.

(W)

nor

(S)

will

In many such cases, however, we have
the

characteristic feature of supervenience: the
impossibility
of independent variation.
Since no two objects can
be

members of different species unless there is some
difference in the properties (including relational
properties) of their microphysical constituents, there

should be some version of supervenience capable of

expressing such claims directly.

Although in chapter VI

I

formulate new versions of

local supervenience which are suited for this purpose, the

only multiple-domain supervenience relations available in
the literature are global supervenience relations.

To see

that global is a multiple-domain relation, note that

species properties (almost certainly) globally supervene on

microphysical properties: fix the distribution of these
microphysical properties over time and space and the

distribution of mice and tigers is determined.

The lack of

any worlds with the same distribution of microphysical

properties and different distributions of mice or tigers is

perfectly compatible with the fact that no organisms (at
least no tigers or mice)

instantiate any of the members of

the set of truly microphysical properties.
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John Haugeland and Gregory Currie are
both motivated
by this consideration to make use of
global
supervenience.^

Currie,

in his paper on the global

supervenience of the properties of (he says facts
about)
social institutions on the behavior and attitudes
of

individuals, lodges the following complaint against
Kim's

formulation of weak supervenience.

Using

'M'

for the set

of supervenient properties and 'N' for the set of

subvenient properties in his definition of

(W)

,

he says

this definition is deficient from my point
of view.
The right side involves the idea
that the N- and M-properties belong to the
same objects: if two objects agree in their
N-properties they will agree on their Mproperties.
So Kim's formulation confines
us to talking about individual and social
properties which we attribute to the same
objects.
This is too restrictive.
Social
institutions [the wholes] can be treated as
objects with social properties, but they
cannot be said to have individual properties
(e.g., they do not have mental states).
We
want the idea that the N-properties of one
set of objects determines the M-properties
of another set of objects (though of course
the two sets may overlap) .®

^Haugeland seems to be motivated to present a multipledomain supervenience relation because he is concerned with
the reductive implications of single-domain supervenience.
See Haugeland (1982) pp. 96-97.
For a discussion of
Haugeland 's criticism of single-domain supervenience see Kim
(1988)

pp.

131-132.

®Currie (1984) pp. 348-349.
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A second motivation for using
global supervenience is
provided by the intuitively holistic
nature of many

determination relations.

Many would claim that the content

of my thoughts is determined by
more than just the

intrinsic state of my brain, it also depends
on my physical
surroundings (past and present)
Currie cites this as a
.

second advantage of global over local
supervenience:

Putnam has argued that a person's
psychological state is not a matter simply
of what is going on 'in his head' but also
of what external objects he is causally
related to. The same difficulty arises when
we consider facts about the social.
There
is an undeniable sense in which such facts
holistically constituted. My becoming
Prime Minister is not just a matter of what
I think or do; it depends upon what
others
think and do as well. So my social
characteristics are clearly not determined
by my individual characteristics alone.
If
individual facts determine the social facts
they do so in a global rather than a local
way ’
.

David Lewis is one of many philosophers who have made

essentially the same point.

At this point it ought to seem advisable to
formulate materialism as a supervenience
thesis: no difference without a physical
difference. .. .The thesis might best be taken
to apply to whole possible worlds, in order
to bypass such questions as whether mental

^Currie (1984) p. 349.
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life is to some extent extrinsic to the
subject.

The third and final motivation for global

supervenience is provided by the fear of the reductive
implications of individual supervenience.

Specifically,

some fear the reductive implications of the strong

connectibility of predicates expressing supervenient
properties with Boolean constructions out of predicates

expressing base properties which is entailed by strong
Lewis (1983) p. 362. Also see Petrie (1987) pp. 121122, and Horgan (1982) pp. 32-33.
Before considering the third motivation, it is worth
noting the following disanalogy between the first and second
motivations. The critics are right that neither weak nor
strong supervenience is a multiple-domain relation, but are
they correct that strong supervenience cannot formulate
holistic determination theses? Mightn't we express the
holistic determination of the mental in terms of strong
supervenience by saying that mental properties strongly (or
weakly) supervene on intrinsic and extrinsic physical
properties of individuals? Yes we can. There are
difficulties, however.
For example, "Precisely which
extrinsic physical properties have to be included in the
base set for the mental to supervene on the physical?".
If
one has nothing informative to say at this point or simply
allows all extrinsic physical properties in the set, then
one might as well formulate the thesis in terms of global
supervenience.
For if all extrinsic physical properties are
included, then two possible individuals would have to be in
physically indiscernible positions in physically
indiscernible worlds in order to falsify the individual
supervenience thesis at issue. By making the truth or
falsehood of a supervenience thesis depend on the
distribution of physical properties over entire possible
worlds, the distinctive idea of local supervenience has been
abandoned in favor of the leading idea of global
supervenience.
Perhaps, then, formulating holistic
determination relations in terms of global supervenience is
the safe thing to do so long as we remain ignorant of the
precise intrinsic and extrinsic base properties on which the
supervenient properties depend.
1

•
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supervenience (see chapter III)

Global supervenience

does not imply the strong connectibility
of predicates
expressing supervenient properties and
predicates

expressing members of the Boolean closure
of the base set.
This motivation, although rarely given
explicitly, is quite
powerful, for, although many do not find Kim's
attack on
the nonreducibility of strong supervenience
conclusive, l

suspect that many would rather sidestep this
difficult
issue altogether.
To the best of my knowledge, these are the three

primary motivations for global.

They are, once again, the

desire for a multiple-domain supervenience relation, the

desire to capture "holistic" determination theses,

particularly the determination of mental by intrinsic and
physical properties, and a desire to avoid any

reductive implications of strong supervenience.

3.

The Issue at Hand

Until recently, many found global psychophysical

supervenience to be an ideal formulation of materialism.
It was considered weak enough to be nonreductive yet strong

enough to ensure that mental properties are wholly

determined by physical properties
^^Petrie

(1987)

.

But,

since 1987

.

explicit statement to this effect, see Petrie
129-130.
Also see Heilman and Thompson (1975);
(1987) pp.
Horgan (1982); Lewis (1983); Currie (1984), and Post (1987).
^^For an
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Jaegwon Kim has consistently argued
that global
supervenience, unlike strong supervenience
,

is too weak to

be a determination (or dependence)
relation worthy of
materialism.''^

It is important to realize that
this

argument is independent of his doubts about
whether strong
supervenience entails the ontic priority of
the base
properties.
Essentially he argues that, unlike
strong,

global fails to provide for even the sort of
functional

dependence relation required for ontological
dependence
relations such as materialism.''^ If he is correct,
global

psychophysical supervenience would not even be a
significant necessary condition on materialism.
Kim's arguments have been very influential.

Most

recent discussions of supervenience either ignore global

entirely or quickly dismiss it on the basis of his
criticisms.''^

The arguments are unsound, however, and a

very promising concept is being ignored without good
reason.

Kim's criticism of global supervenience is based

on Bradford Petrie's inconclusive counterexample to the

equivalence of strong and global supervenience.

Petrie's

counterexample is subtly flawed, and since the defect is

^^See Kim
^^See

(1987),

(1989),

and (1990).

Kim (1990) p. 23.

^^Among those who do the latter are Crane (1991) p.
237; Macdonald (1989) p. 209, and Grimes (1988) p. 154.
exception to this rule is provided by LePore and Loewer
(1989)
.
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An

inherited by Kim's arguments
It in section B.

m

l

take great pains to identify

that section

I

also introduce a

metaphysical principle concerning the
plenitude of
possibilities which I use, in section C,
to defend global
supervenience from Kim's criticisms. Finally,
in section
D, I reexamine my arguments
that rely on the plenitude
principle for their relevance to contingent
supervenience
theses

—
1-:^

Petrie on the N oneq uivalence of Strong and Global

Petrie's Counterexample
Kim once argued that strong and global supervenience

are equivalent.

If true,

this would mean that global is

not a multiple-domain supervenience relation (or that

strong is)

.

It would also mean that global has the same

reductive implications that strong does and is no better
suited for formulating holistic determination theses.
Later, Kim retracted his "proof" in light of a

counterexample offered by Bradford

Petrie.'''^

Petrie's

conclusion that strong and global supervenience are not
equivalent is correct

.

His reasoning

,

however,

is

^^See Kim (1984) p. 168 for the "proof" and Kim (1987)
318 for the retraction.
See Petrie (1987) and Kim op.
cit., for the counterexample and extensive discussions of
its significance.
p.

^^For
3

Sider's proof see Pauli and Sider (1992), section

.
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subtly

f lawed

.

i

take the time to diagnose the flaw

because Kim's arguments for the weakness
of global
supervenience are explicitly fashioned on
this argument of
Petrie s
'

Petrie's counterexample to the equivalence
of strong
and global supervenience involves a supervening
set, A,

which contains only the property

Q,

which contains only the property

P.

consider two worlds, w and w'.
X and y,

and a base set,

We are supposed to

in w there are two objects,

such that Px, Qx, Py, but -Qy.

two objects x' and y', such that Px',
-Qy

'

B,

m

--Qx',

w'

there are

--Py',

and

:

Qx

-Qy

-Qx'

Px

py

Px'

-Qy'

-Py

After presenting the example, Petrie argues as
follows

[The] strong supervenience [of A on B]
requires that objects which do not differ
with regard to B-properties cannot differ
with regard to A-properties
In w and w',
however, x [and x'] differ with regard to
.

^®Since Petrie hasn't specified which properties 'P'
and 'Q' denote, strictly speaking w and w' are world-types,
not specific possible worlds. Nevertheless, it is simpler
to follow Petrie in thinking of them as particular possible
worlds
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the A-property [Q] without differing
regard to the B-property P. Thus we with
consistently suppose that A strongly cannot
supervenes on B in this case. We can
consistently s uppose that A globally
s upervenes on B, however.
The worlds w and
w| are not B-indiscernible since
they differ
with regard to what B— properties are
possessed by y [and y']. Thus global
supervenience does not require that w and w'
be A-indiscernible and thus there is no
conflict with global supervenience in the
supposition that x possesses [Q] in w but
[x' does not possess Q in w'].
Since global
gupervenience i s, and strong supervenience
is not —consi stent with this example, the
two concepts of supervenience are noh
equivalent ^ (my emphasis
.

Essentially, Petrie has provided us with a model-schema for

languages capable of expressing supervenience theses.

On

some models constructed according to this schema (e.g.

models where w and w' are the only indices)

,

the global

supervenience of A on B is true and the strong
supervenience of A on B is false.

Thus, he has proven that

the two notions are not formally equivalent

.

So far, so

good.

The problem is Petrie, Kim, and others^^ have

interpreted the example as proof that global is

metaphysically weaker than strong supervenience.
^’Petrie

(1987)

p.

According

121.

^®The distinction between formal and metaphysical
equivalence (see chapter I) is absolutely crucial to an
accurate appreciation of my criticism of Petrie's argument.
^^See Grimes (1988) p. 154; Macdonald (1989) p. 209,
and Crane (1991) p. 237.
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to Petrie the example shows that
global does not share any
of the reductive implications of
strong supervenience

according to Kim it shows that, unlike
strong, global is
too weak to serve as an adequate
determination relation.

But what is the metaphys ical significance
of
the failure of global supervenience to
entail strong supervenience? To see
Petrie's example as showing this failure
is
to see, I think, the limitation of
global
supervenience as a relation of determination
or dependence.
(my emphasis)

Evidently, many think the example establishes

(CE)

There are sets of properties

S

and B such that

supervenes globally but not strongly on

If true,

(EQ)

(CE)

S

B.

would falsify an important equivalence:

globally supervenes on B iff

supervenes on

I

S

S

strongly

B.

will show that Petrie's example fails to establish

(CE)

and therefore fails to falsify (EQ)
^^Kim

(1987)

p.

319.

complication: I have suggested that Kim and others
have taken Petrie's example as establishing (CE) and thereby
(continued.
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.

.

In order to establish (CE)

Petrie must present us with

sets of properties that supervene
globally, but not
strongly, upon one another. He uses
w and w' in his

attempt to prove that A and B are such
sets,
23
( .

.

.

w and

W

are

continued)

^ counterexample to (EQ)
But one might object
that (EQ) IS a material equivalence, and
material
equivalence is not the primary issue in discussions
of
strength of supervenience relations. Even if the
^
l am
.

right that Petrie, Kim and others have interpreted
Petrie's
example as proof of more than the formal
nonequivalence
of
strong and global, it does not follow that they
interpreted
It as proof of (CE)
Perhaps they only think that
example establishes that (CE) could be true which Petrie's
would
falsify
.

(NEQ)

Necessarily, S globally supervenes on B iff
strongly supervenes on B.

s

After all, with the proper interpretation of 'necessarily'
(NEQ) is the thesis that strong and global are
metaphysically equivalent.
If Petrie's example establishes
the falsehood of (NEQ) it would be a metaphysically
significant example.
Note, however, that as long as we are assuming that the
accessibility relation is an equivalence relation (as I am
until and unless I indicate otherwise)
(EQ) and (NEQ) are
metaphysically equivalent because strong and global are both
necessarily true (false) if true (false)
So if strong and
global have the same truth value at one world, they have the
same truth value at all worlds.
Thus, by considering
whether Petrie's counterexample disproves (EQ)
I am
simultaneously considering whether it disproves (NEQ) and,
consequently, I can avoid discussion of these complications
in the text.
On the other hand, if the relevant accessibility
relation is not an equivalence relation (because, for
example, strong and global supervenience are interpreted as
involving quantification over only nomologically possible
worlds and objects)
the possibility that (CE) is true does
not entail that (CE) is true, and thus (EQ) and (NEQ) are no
longer metaphysically equivalent. Nevertheless, once we see
why Petrie's example fails to establish (CE)
it will be
clear that it also fails to establish that (CE) could be
true.
And at that point, in note 33, I will explicitly lay
out why this is so.
We will find that Petrie's example
still fails to falsify (NEQ)
,

.

,

,

,

,
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clearly inconsistent with the strong
supervenience of A on
B.
But do Petrie's worlds succeed in
establishing
that A

globally supervenes on B?

Well, Petrie claims that their

existence is consistent with the hypothesis
that global is
true.
If he means that w and w' are not
B-indiscernible

A-discernible worlds, he is correct.
existence of w and

w'

But note that the

is egually "consistent" with the

hypothesis that global is false

,

because, for all Petrie

has told us, there may be other B-indiscernible,
A-

discernible worlds that falsify the global supervenience
of
A on B.
The existence of w and w' fails to establish
that

A globally supervenes on

B,

and therefore fails to

establish (CE)
The claim that A globally supervenes on B is a

universally quantified thesis.

So while it can be

falsified by a single case of B-indiscernible A-discernible
worlds,

it can only be established by arguments which show

that of all the possible worlds, nq two have the same

distribution of B-properties and different distributions of

A-properties

.

Recall,

with the sets A and

B,

globally supervenes on

if Petrie is going to establish

(CE)

he needs to establish that A
B.

To do so, Petrie needs to show

^^Petrie's inclusion of w' is especially mysterious.
with its two B-indiscernible A-discernible objects,
falsifies the strong supervenience of A on B all by itself.
And the supposition that global is true, if consistent with
the existence of w and w', is surely consistent with the
existence of w.
W,
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either

that there are no B-indiscernible
worlds or
that every pair of B-indiscernible worlds
are A(i)

indiscernible as well.

(ii)

it is quite clear, however, that

Petrie is considering such an incomplete model
of logical
space that there is no hope of establishing the
truth of
(CE)

or of any global supervenience claim.

One might object to my criticism of Petrie's example
by pointing out that we often consider blatantly
false

models of reality in order to present vivid
counterexamples.

Consider the standard counterexample to

the identity of indiscernibles

We are asked to suppose

.

that only two perfectly spherical, homogeneous balls exist.
If that is a legitimate form for a counterexample to take,

then why can't we understand Petrie to be asking us to

suppose that the only possible worlds are w and w'?
Clearly, if w and w' were the only possible worlds, then A

would supervene globally on

B.

The short answer to this

objection is that while it is possible that only two
spheres exist, it is not possible that w and w' are the
only possible worlds.

identical to w or w'
a possible world,

,

Since the actual world is not
and the actual world is (necessarily)

it follows that w and w' do not

(and

could not) exhaust logical space.

While there are coherent models of modal logic where w
and w' are the only possible worlds (and that is why his

example does establish the formal inequivalence of strong
124

and global

)

we know that no such model could be
accurate

because we know that the actual world is not
identical to w
or w'.
So when metaphysical possibility and
necessity are
at issue (as they are now)

,

while we can grant Petrie that

w and w' are possible worlds, we can be assured
that there

are some other possible worlds as well.

And Petrie's

example gives us no reason to believe that the other worlds
do not falsify the global supervenience of A on

Therefore, as a counterexample to (EQ)
incomplete.

section where

,

B.

Petrie's example is

Its incompleteness is highlighted in the next
I

introduce and defend a metaphysical

principle that supports the inference from the existence of
w and w' to the existence of worlds inconsistent with the

global supervenience of A on

2.

B.

Plenitude Through Isolation

Whatever one thinks of unactualized possibilities,

I

contend that one should accept the following principle: if
there are any unactualized possibilities, there is a

plenitude of such possibilities.

The claim that all truths

are necessary is compatible with this principle.

But once

one admits that some false propositions are possibly true,

good reasons are required for saying that one false

proposition is possibly true while another is not.

Unless

one is willing, with Spinoza, to forego the whole idea of
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alternative possibilities, one must be
willing to accept
plenitude of such possibilities.^^

a

This principle suggests that if some
unactualized
combination of objects and properties is a
possible
combination, then there is a plenitude of such
merely
possible combinations. And we certainly are
inclined to
believe that at least some things could have
been arranged
differently or absent altogether. For example, it
seems

possible that your refrigerator be where your kitchen
sink
actually is and that your sink be where your refrigerator
is.

Also,

it seems that your sink could have been a

color or could have failed to exist at all.
Thus, we appear to be committed to a plenitude of possible

arrangements of objects and properties.
But precisely which arrangements are possible?

Surely, there cannot be a colorless blue frog, and many

have doubted whether there can be more than one physical

object occupying exactly the same spatiotemporal location.
We need to supplement our original principle with some

specific theses about the content of logical space.

According to David Lewis,

^^The idea that there is a plenitude of possibilities
is often captured in the motto "there are no gaps in logical
space" (Lewis (1986a) p. 86).
See Bricker (1991) for an

example of how to develop the idea behind this motto into
genuine theory of plenitude.
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a

anything can coexist with anything else,
at
least provided they occupy distinct
spatiotemporal positions. Likewise,
anything can fail to coexist with anythinq
e se.
Thus, if there could be a dragon,
and
there could be a unicorn, but there couldn't
be a dragon and a unicorn side by side
would be an unacceptable gap in logical that
space, a failure of plenitude.

(By "logical space" Lewis means,

sum of all possible worlds.

metaphysical possibility

-

roughly, the mereological

Also, Lewis is speaking of

not some weaker kind of formal

possibility.
Lewis expresses two principles of plenitude in the
passage.

One says that if it is possible for x to exist

and it is possible for another object,

y,

to exist, then it

is possible for x and y to exist together.

The other says

that if it is possible for x to exist together with
it is possible for x to exist without y.^^

I

then

y,

will use a

version of Lewis's second principle of plenitude in my
defense of global supervenience

:

for any possible object

(including any mereological fusion of objects), it is

possible for a duplicate of that object to exist in
isolation.

^"^Lewis

I

call this "the principle of isolation".

(1986a)

p.

88.

^^Since Lewis restricts these theses to possible
obi ects (as opposed to allowing any combination of objects
and properties)
he is not committed to the possibility of
colorless blue frogs.
,
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(I)

For any possible individual,

x,

there is a

possible world containing only* a duplicate
of x

Where

^ contains onl y* a duplicate of x

duplicate of

x,

w contains a

its parts, and no other possible

individuals.

Where

Y is a possible individual

(actually)

y could fail to

exist, y is not a space-time point, and y

has no members.^®

(I)

is the principle that for any possible object,

it is

metaph ysically possible for an object with the same
intrinsic properties to exist without worldmates
(I)

is compatible with different views on the nature

of logical space.

For example, it is consistent with both

Lewis's modal realism and D.M. Armstrong's "naturalistic"

^®My intention is to allow the existence of contingent
entities such as sets whose only members are parts of x in w
and to stay neutral on the spatiotemporal structure of the
worlds resulting from isolation.

does not state that it is nomologically
possible for any object to exist in isolation.
^^Note that

(I)
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combinatorial theory of possibility

disparate modal ontologies can use

People with
(I)

as a way of

partially specifying the extent of the plenitude
of
possibilities (as a way of "filling in" some of

the gaps in

incomplete and potentially misleading models of
logical
space)

To see how

(I)

can help us "fill in the gaps",

reconsider Petrie's counterexample to

(EQ)

w

PX

In section B,

I

“’Qy

--Qx

'

->Qy

Py

px

«

_py

I

argued that while the example falsifies the

strong supervenience of A

(=

{Q})

on B (= {P}),

establish their global supervenience.

demonstrate this by using

(I)

Now

I

it fails to

shall

to show that on a natural

interpretation of the example, there must be worlds which
falsify the global supervenience of A on

B.

Petrie's presentation of his example leaves certain
issues unresolved.

Are x and

they have proper parts?

properties?

^°See

x'

atomic individuals or do

Are P and Q intrinsic or extrinsic

Petrie does not say.

Suppose that P and Q are

Armstrong (1989) pp. 61-65.
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intrinsic properties and x and
individuals.

x'

are atomic

implies that there is a world,

(I)

only* a duplicate of x
only* a duplicate of x'

(v)

,

and a world,

(v').

f,

t,

with

containing

Since P and Q are intrinsic

properties, they cannot differ between
duplicates so
z' will be as they are represented
below.

z

and

Because x and

x'

also atomic.

So neither v nor v' has any parts which might

are atomic, their duplicates, v and v' are

disrupt the apparent B-indiscernibility and A-

discernibility of

z

and z'.

Clearly, then,

i^*^iscernible but A— discernible

supervene on
I

t

z

and

z'

are B-

A fails to globally

B!

have just used the principle of isolation to

demonstrate that if P and Q are intrinsic properties and x
and X' are atomic, then the existence of w and w' is

inconsistent with the global supervenience of A on

B.^^

^^In fact, Petrie appears to
For if
y and y' are atomic.

implicitly assume that x,
any of these objects have
proper parts, the global B-indiscernibility of w and w'
would not be established because he has not told us which of
the parts have P and which of them have Q.
x',

^^Even if P or Q is extrinsic (or x and x' are not
atomic), Petrie's example is still incomplete (and therefore
(continued.
.
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.

This illustrates both the essential
defect in Petrie's
example and the usefulness of (l)

continued)
inadequate)
Although in this case (I) cannot be used to
B^ove that there must be worlds which falsify global, the
fact remains that Petrie has not established that there
are
no other possible worlds which falsify global.
.

.

this point I can make good on my promise in note
23 to show why Petrie's example fails to establish that
(CE)
true, and therefore fails to falsify (NEQ) even on

the assumption that the supervenience theses are
metaphysically contingent. The thesis that (CE) could be
true is restated thus:

(PCE) Possibly, there are sets of properties S and B
such that S globally but not strongly supervenes on B.

One establishes (PCE) thereby refuting (NEQ) by showing that
there is a possible world, v, at which (CE) is true.
In
other words, one needs to show that there is a possible
world, V, and sets of properties, S and B, such that v is
accessible to the actual world and there are B-indiscernible
S-discernible possible individuals in worlds accessible to
V, but there are no B-indiscernible S-discernible worlds
accessible to v.
Petrie's example failed to establish (CE) because it
failed to show that while w and w' are accessible, no other
(accessible) worlds are B-indiscernible and A-discernible
Likewise, the example fails to establish (PCE) because it
fails to show that there is any possible world, v, from
which both w and w' are accessible but from which no Bindiscernible A-discernible worlds such as z and z' are
accessible as well.
In both cases, the (possible) global
supervenience of A on B is not established.
Finally, as I mentioned before, although Petrie's
example failed to be conclusive, (EQ) is indeed false; for
Sider's proof, see Pauli and Sider (1992), section 3.
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The Defens e of Global Superv^ni

c_,

-i-:

Kim's First Araumerrh

Kim claims that the "metaphysical
significance” of
Petrie's example is that it shows "the
limitation of global
supervenience as a relation of determination or

dependence

.

He has repeatedly presented two Petrie-

style examples to establish the weakness of
global

supervenience.

Here is one of them.

But before we accept global psychophysical
supervenience as a significant form of
materialism we should consider this: it is
consistent with this version of materialism
for there to be a world which differs
physically from this world in some most
ti^ifling respect (say, Saturn's rings in
that world contain one more ammonia
molecule) but which is entirely devoid of
consciousness. .. .As long as that world
differs from this one in some physical
respect, however minuscule or seemingly
irrelevant, it could be as different as you
please in any psychological respect you
choose.... It is doubtful that many
materialists would regard [this consequence]
as compatible with their materialist tenets;
it seems clear that rit1 is not compatible
with the claim that the mental is determined
wholly by the physical
(my emphasis)
.

This example parallels Petrie's in the following respects.
First, Kim considers two possible worlds which are
^^Kim

(1987)

p.

319.

^^Kim

(1987)

p.

321.

example see Kim (1989)

For other versions of this
p. 41, and Kim (1990) p. 23.
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discernible with regard to the base set of
properties and
therefore do not themselves falsify any global
supervenience claim, and he concludes that some
other
feature apparently exemplified by the two worlds
is

compatible with the truth of global supervenience.

in

Petrie's case the "other feature" is the falsehood
of
strong supervenience.

In Kim's example the other feature

is the apparent lack of determination of the mental
by the

physical.

Second, like Petrie, Kim does not establish that

the example really is compatible with the truth of global

supervenience.

An argument is needed that such a partial

description of a model of logical space can be extended to
a complete model on which the relevant global supervenience

thesis is true, the dependence/determination claim is
false, and the plenitude of possibilities is respected.

No

such argument is presented, so the counterexample is

incomplete
There is an important disanalogy with Petrie's
example: while the principle of isolation can be used

merely to illustrate the incompleteness of Petrie's
example, it provides us with a proof that Kim's example

cannot succeed even if it were filled out.

One can use

to demonstrate that if Kim's worlds are possible, then

either global psychophysical supervenience is false or
there is no lack of determination of mental by physical

properties
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(I)

Before we do so however,

i

need to introduce a

variation on the distinction between
intrinsic and
extrinsic properties.
For any object x and any property
let's say that P_is intrinsic to y
iff having

P,

P is a

necessary condition for being a duplicate
of
other hand, P_is extrinsic to x iff having

x.

On the

P is not a

necessary condition for being a duplicate
of

x.

Note that

all intrinsic properties will be intrinsic
to every object

which instantiates them.

On the other hand, some extrinsic

properties will be intrinsic to some objects and
extrinsic
to others.
For example, suppose that my hand is presently
within two inches of my printer's printer ribbon.
In this

case, assuming that my printer ribbon is a part
of my

printer(I), the extrinsic property of having

a

part within

two inches o f a printer ribbon is intrinsic to my
printer,
t>ut

extrinsic to my hand.

it is now,

can fail to have a part two inches from a

printer ribbon.
part.

No duplicate of my printer, as

But a duplicate of my hand may lack such a

With this distinction we can respond to Kim's

objections without begging any questions against him.
Kim asks us to imagine

a

possible world, W, which

differs physically from the actual world,

@,

only by

containing an extra ammonia molecule somewhere in the rings
of Saturn.

This minute physical difference is accompanied

by the complete lack of any mental states.

extra ammonia molecule,

'e',

Let's name the

and the property of having no
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sentient parts,

*N'.

(Also,

note that

mereology, and, for simplicity,

l

I

make full use of

follow Lewis in assuming

that a possible "world is the mereological
sum of all the
possible individuals that are parts of it"
Clearly,
since W has N (in other words, no part of W is
sentient),
the mereological difference, W minus e (W-e)

also has N.

,

Two exclusive and exhaustive possibilities arise.
is intrinsic to W-e,

Either N

or it is not.

Suppose N is intrinsic to W-e.

By the principle of

isolation there is another world, W', which contains only*
s psi^foct duplicate of W-e.

Since W-e has N and W'

contains only* a duplicate of W-e, W' also has N (i.e.,
also lacks sentient parts)

sentient parts.

.

But,

of course,

Thus, we can conclude that

mentally discernible.

Next we establish that

physically indiscernible.

@

does not!

@

@

and W' are

is that W has e

So W', which contains only* a duplicate of

W-e, must be physically indiscernible from @.

only physical difference between W and both

that W contains the extra molecule,
not.

and W' are

Note that by stipulation the

only physical difference between W and
and

has many

@
@

W'

Thus, W' and

0

e,

@

In fact, the

and W' is

while W' and

0

do

are physically indiscernible and

mentally discernible: global psychophysical supervenience
is false!

With isolation we have established that if N is

^^Lewis

(1986a)

p.

69.
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intrinsic to W-e, Kim's example is not
compatible with the
truth of global psychophysical supervenience
The other possibility is that N is
extrinsic to W-e.
If so, the preceding argument for the
falsity of global is
blocked.
The problem is that if N is extrinsic
to W-e,

then, when we isolate (a duplicate of) w-e,
we no longer

have any guarantee that it will have N and thereby
be
mentally discernible from @. We need isolation to
falsify
global, but isolation is useful only when we know
that
the

properties involved are intrinsic to the isolated
individuals.

So if N is extrinsic to W-e, we can defeat

the example only if we can argue that the apparent lack
of

psychophysical determination is illusory

-

and so we can.

If N is extrinsic to W-e, then W-e has N because of

its relations (or lack thereof) to some part(s) of W that

are not parts of W-e.

But the only other part of W is e.

We are left with the conclusion that whether a duplicate of

W-e (or

@)

has N is determined by its relations (or lack

thereof) to an object like e.

between W and

0

A minute physical difference

accounts for the fact that

parts and W does not.

Thus,

0

has sentient

if N is extrinsic to W-e,

while global psychophysical supervenience may be true, the
apparent lack of determination of the mental by the
physical is defeated.
In conclusion, N is either intrinsic or extrinsic to

W-e.

If N is intrinsic to W-e, the example is inconsistent
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with global psychophysical supervenience
in which case
global supervenience is strong enough to
rule out the

possibility envisioned by Kim.

On the other hand,

if n is

extrinsic to W-e, the example is perfectly
consistent with
the determination of the mental by the
physical and thus it
is no threat to the claim that global
supervenience is a

meaningful determination relation.

Either way, Kim's

example is demonstrably incapable of illustrating
that
global supervenience is compatible with

a

lack of

determination of supervenient by subvenient properties.

2

.

"Weird" Dependence

One might object that it is problematic enough that

global supervenience is compatible with the kind of weird
functional dependence (or determination) relation which

obtains if N is extrinsic to W-e.

It seems that any

supervenience relation that doesn't rule out the

possibility of my sentience being determined by the nonexistence of one extra molecule in the rings of Saturn is
not a supervenience relation worthy of serious attention.

Bizarre functional dependence seems no more acceptable than

independence
This response is misguided.

The fact is, no

supervenience thesis, on its own, is capable of ensuring
"the right kind" of dependence (or determination)

.

To see

that this is so, consider the following argument against
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the adequacy of strong supervenience
that parallels Kim's
objection to global.
The Argument: Strong supervenience
is too weak a
dependence relation because it is compatible
with the
possibility of a non-sentient near physical
duplicate of
George Bush.
Call this mindless entity, 'Bushless'.
Imagine that the only physical difference
between the
actual world and Bushless' world is that
Bushless has one
,

atom in his brain than Bush has in his.
atom, e,

So an extra

is lodged somewhere in Bush's brain.

The fact

that Bush is sentient while Bushless is not, seems

incompatible with any appropriate dependence of the
mental
on the physical.
But it is not incompatible with strong

psychophysical supervenience.

First of all. Bush and

Bushless are not physically indiscernible.

Second,

for

some reason. Bush's sentience is so dependent on e that no

physical duplicate of Bushless is sentient.

This is a case

of weird dependence which is not incompatible with the

truth of strong psychophysical supervenience.^^
This argument shows that strong supervenience, like
global, is compatible with cases of weird dependence.

It

does not show that strong supervenience is an inadequate

dependence relation.

The truth is, both strong and global

supervenience guarantee that there is some dependence of
^^The possibility of paralleling Kim's examples with
examples like this was something I learned from Sider. See
Pauli and Sider (1992)
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supervening on subvening properties.

As we have already

seen, the strong supervenience of
S on B ensures a

functional dependence of S-properties on
B-properties
every member of the Boolean closure of B
is associated with
a unique member of the Boolean
closure of S.
Likewise, if
S globally supervenes on B then
there is a function whose
domain is possible global distributions of
B-properties and

whose range is possible global distributions of
Sproperties.

The details of this functional determination

relation depend on which precise analysis of global
A-

indiscernibility one accepts, and will not be considered
until chapter VI.

in any case,

just as strong

supervenience is mute on which subsets of B-properties

determine which subsets of S-properties, global

supervenience is mute on which distributions of B-

properties determine which distributions of S-properties.
The existence of some such function is ensured, but its

values are not

-

and we may find them to be "weird".

It is a mistake to expect supervenience theses to rule

out cases of "weird dependence".

All we can expect from

supervenience theses is the assurance that the subvening

properties of an individual (or their distribution across
world) uniquely (i.e.,

a

functionally) determine the

supervening properties of that individual (or world)
Discovering the nature of the determination relation (e.g.,

discovering which neurological properties determine which
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psychological properties is (primarily)
the business of
empirical scientists studying the
properties in
question.
To expect more from supervenience
is to
misunderstand its nature.

—Kim's

3_:

Second Argument

With this clarification in mind,

turn to Kim's

l

second example against the strength of
global

supervenience

If that doesn't convince you of the
weakness
of global supervenience as a dependency
relation, consider this: it is consistent
with global supervenience for there to be
two organisms in our actual world which,
though wholly indiscernible physically, are
radically different in mental respects (say

your molecule-f or-molecule duplicate is
totally lacking in mentality)
This is
consistent with global supervenience because
there might be no other possible world that
is just like this one physically and yet
differing in some mental respect.^’
.

We are to imagine that

physical double.

I

actually have a perfect

Despite Kim's claim that my double and

I

are wholly indiscernible physically (in which case the

actual world is a very strange world indeed)

,

I

think he is

really only asking us to imagine a version of the standard
twin— earth scenario according to which
^®See Hill

^^Kim

(1991)

(1989)

p.

p.

5.

42.
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I

have a perfect

physical duplicate in somewhat different
physical
‘O
surroundings.
Kim asks us to imagine that my
molecule
for molecule double is totally
lacking in any positive
mental properties.
In response

I

offer the following dilemma.

Either
some (positive) mental property of
mine is intrinsic to me
or they are all extrinsic.
If one or more is intrinsic
then, by (i)
there is a world, M, containing only* a

duplicate of me and another world,

D,

duplicate of my non-sentient double.

containing only*

a

Since my actual

double is a physical duplicate of me, the worlds
which
result from isolating us, namely M and D, will
be

physically indiscernible.
property,

P,

have some intrinsic mental

I

so my duplicate in M also has P.

But my

actual physical double has no mental properties; it
fails
to have P.

Hence,

its duplicate in D also fails to have P.

M and D are physically indiscernible, mentally discernible
worlds.

Either global psychophysical supervenience is

^°Although I think I have correctly interpreted Kim
here, it is only fair to point out that if I am wrong and
Kim did mean that my physical double and I are physically
indiscernible so we have the same extrinsic physical
properties (e.g., we are in the same position in different
epochs of some kind of world of eternal physical
recurrence)
then the example cannot be dismissed as
readily.
Specifically, the second horn of the dilemma
presented in the text would have to be fleshed out in much
greater detail. Whether isolation could be used to respond
successfully to the example would depend on subtle details
not provided by Kim.
,

"positive mental properties", I mean to exclude
properties such as not being sentient which even rocks have.
^^By
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falsified or, on the supposition that
global is true, the
example is shown to be impossible.
This shows that if
of my actual mental properties
are intrinsic, global
psychophysical supervenience is strong
enough to rule out
the possibility Kim envisions in
the

^

example.

on the

other hand, if all my mental properties
are extrinsic,
since extrinsic properties are those
properties that can
differ between duplicates, it is possible
that my physical
duplicate and I share no mental properties.
No lack
of

psychophysical dependence has been established,
however,
for my extrinsic mental properties may depend
on extrinsic
physical properties I have and my physical duplicate

lacks.

4.

Intermediate Conclusion
With the aid of isolation, we have seen the inadequacy

of Kim's influential arguments for the comparative weakness
of the functional dependence relation provided by global

supervenience vis-a-vis that provided by strong
supervenience

It must be emphasized,

results do not hinge essentially on

however, that these

(I)

other plenitude

principles could be used to refute Kim's examples.

So the

lesson is not that philosophers must choose between

accepting Kim's counterexamples or the principle of
isolation.

Rather,

it is a more general choice between the

^^Kim apparently holds that at least some mental
properties are intrinsic: see Kim (1982) p. 59.
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plenitude of possibilities and
Kim's examples.
Nonreductive materialists can take
heart.
Global
psychophysical supervenience may yet
be of service in the
characterization of materialism.
The advantages of global
supervenience come at a
price, however.
order to be assured that global
will
not be trivially satisfied, one
must be assured that the
plenitude of possibilities is respected.
But when
supervenience theses are interpreted as
involving

m

restricted quantifiers, our principle of
isolation becomes
much less plausible. This is important
because, although
there are some dissenters, the majority
of present day
materialists think materialism is a contingent
thesis.

—Isolation
i-:

and Contingent Supervenience

Obiections to Isolation
I

have few doubts that there is

unactualized possibilities.

a

plenitude of

Principles, such as the

principle of isolation, however, which put some flesh on
the bones of programmatic affirmations of plenitude, are

more controversial.

For instance, consider (I)'s role in

my response to Kim's second counterexample to the strength
of global.

From the (stipulated) possibility of a universe

^^Among the dissenters are Tye
(1984a)
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(1983),

and Teller

somewhat like our own, except for
the existence of a pair
of people who are physical
duplicates, (I) is used to
derive the existence of two other
worlds, one containing
only* a duplicate of the first member
of the pair the other
containing only* a duplicate of the
second member. One
might be suspicious of the possibility
of such worlds.
First of all. If we isolate temporal
stages with no
temporal dimension, we have the odd consequence
that there
are possible worlds with instantaneous
temporal
duration,

and small finite spatial dimensions,

one may doubt whether

such worlds are really possible.

Things are even stranger if we isolate temporally

extended individuals.

in this case, we get two worlds

which are composed of only* a human being that exists
for
some finite temporal duration (e.g., 24 hours).
Consider
the process of breathing.

if a world contains a physical

duplicate of any temporally extended segment of me, it
^oritains an object that breathes.

As

I

breathe, oxygen

atoms are being absorbed into my body through my lungs.

Consider what goes on at the surface of my duplicate lungs
in my isolated duplicate.

Spontaneously, new oxygen atoms

are appearing, atoms which didn't exist in that world the

moment before.

Puzzling questions arise: since there is

never any air in his lungs, why does my duplicate's chest
expand when he "breathes"?

metabolic functions.

Similar puzzles attend other

Such a world is very peculiar indeed.
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The objection is important because
of the central role
isolation played in my response to
Kim's arguments against
the adequacy of the functional
dependence/determination
relation provided by global supervenience
if isolation is
false, although Kim's examples would
be incomplete in the
same way Petrie's is (because he has
not shown that the
partial model of logical space can be
completed in a way
that respects plenitude and fails to falsify
the relevant
global supervenience thesis)
l would have failed to
.

,

demonstrate that they cannot be successfully
completed.
The classic response to this sort of objection
is to

distinguish metaphysical possibility from more restricted
(but perfectly legitimate and important)

forms of

possibility such as nomological possibility.

The claim

would be that such worlds are nomologically impossible yet

metaphysically possible.

Even if this response succeeds,

however, the objection successfully illustrates one of the

major limitations of isolation: worlds which contain only*
a

duplicate of some part of another world are likely to

violate the laws of that other world.

Consequences for Contingent Global Supervenience Theses
It is commonly assumed that materialism is

contingently true (or false)

Those who accept this

view and wish to formulate materialism as
^^See Horgan

(1982),

a

supervenience

Lewis (1983), and Petrie (1987).
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thesis must use a restricted
supervenience thesis, One
common way of restricting
supervenience is to quantify over
only nomologically accessible
worlds and their inhabitants.
Both Kim and Petrie advocate
restricting psychophysical
supervenience theses in this way.« But
we just saw that
while isolation preserves metaphysical
possibility, it
fails to preserve nomological
possibility: there is no
assurance that if the first world is
nomologically
possible, the isolated world will also
be nomologically
possible.
Thus, my responses to Kim's counterexamples
to
the strength of global supervenience have
to be qualified.
Since my arguments are based on isolation,
they do not
succeed in establishing that the truth of such
a restricted
global psychophysical supervenience thesis is
inconsistent
with the lack of functional determination of the
mental by
the physical which Kim takes to be illustrated by
his
examples.

Global supervenience theses which only quantify

over all nomologically possible worlds may be as weak as

Kim claims.
We seem to have a dilemma.

One option is to abandon

the claim that materialism is contingent, formulate

materialism as

a

metaphysically necessary global

supervenience thesis, and use isolation to defend global
supervenience from Kim's examples.

The other option is to

stick with the claim that materialism is contingent and
^^See Kim

(1984c)

p.

49;

Petrie (1987) p. 120.
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abandon the hope of formulating
materialism as a global
supervenience theses. Fortunately,
however, this is a

false dichotomy.

One can continue to formulate
materialism

as a contingent supervenience
thesis and accept my response
to Kim's arguments if one substitutes
an appropriate

restriction on the quantifiers in
to nomologically possible worlds.

worlds to which the quantifiers in

(O')

for the restriction

Specifically, the set of
(G-)

are restricted must

be closed under the operation of isolation:
when isolation
is applied to any part of any member of
that set, the

resulting world must also be

a

member of the set.

Surprisingly, such formulations already exist.

Both

Terrence Morgan and David Lewis have, during the course
of
their discussions of materialism, proposed contingent
supervenience theses which appear to meet our requirements.
They both argue that although materialism is best

formulated as a contingent supervenience thesis, the

quantifiers should not range over all or only nomologically

possible worlds.

We should not quantify over all

nomologically possible worlds because there may be some

nomologically possible worlds with spiritual substances
which have no effects on anything non-spiritual.

As Morgan

says

One major problem concerns Cartesian souls,
and other kinds of spiritual substances like
angels or God. We who claim that the
microphysical facts determine all the facts
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want to deny that such beings
exist in our
However, we need not deny
there are some possible worlds
in which
ly.ll do exist
they
and in which the microphysical
laws of our world are never
violated
in
spirits would not interfere
with the^^^^r^^^®
the ordinary operations of
physical
laws upon physical substances

Horgan and Lewis also argue that we
should not restrict the
quantifiers to only nomologically possible
worlds.

Lewis

points out that if materialism were
defined as the thesis
that no two nomologically accessible
worlds differ mentally
without differing physically, materialism
would be true "at
a world where [intuitively] materialism
is false but
spiritual phenomena are correlated with
physical phenomena
according to strict laws"."^^

Their solutions to these difficulties are slightly
different.^®

I

will focus on Lewis's solution.

by defining an alien property as one that

(i)

He begins
is not

instantiated in the actual world, and (ii) is not

analyzable as a conjunctive property or a structural

property whose constituents are all instantiated in the
actual world.

He then presents the following definition of

materialism:

^^Horgan (1982) pp.
'^^Lewis

(1983)

p.

34-35.

363.

^®See Horgan (1982) pp. 35-36 for his original
proposal, and Horgan (1984) pp. 36-37 for a discussion of
Lewis's objection and the amended version.
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Among worlds where no natural
properties
lien to our world are instantiated,
no two
physically; any two
such
sucfworids°l?h
worlds that are exactly alike
physically are duplicates/^

f

It is worth noting that Lewis
developed and defended this
thesis as the best formulation of
materialism long before

Kim voiced his objections to the
adequacy of global
supervenience as a formulation of materialism.

Nevertheless, it turns out that the set
of worlds with no
alien natural properties is closed under
isolation.
in
other words, for any world w in the set
of all worlds with
no alien properties and for any world v
which is such that
isolation has the consequence that if w exists
then v
exists,

worlds.

it follows that v is also in the set of
non-alien

This is because isolation only states that if

something already exists as part of a world, then
a

duplicate of that thing can exist in isolation.

The

resulting world clearly cannot have any natural properties

which are alien to the original world for it contains only*
a duplicate of part of that world.

This means that anyone

who accepts Lewis's formulation of materialism can hold

both that materialism is contingent and that Kim's

criticism of global supervenience as a formulation of

materialism is refuted by my arguments from the previous
section.
^’Lewis

(1983)

p.

364.
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Let me reiterate that

roy

demonstratinn that Kim's

counterexamples to the strength of
global supervenience
could not be successfully completed
hinged on the adequacy
of isolation.
since the set of all nomologically
possible
worlds IS not closed under isolation,
one cannot use
isolation to defend the adequacy of
global supervenience
theses which quantify over only such
worlds.
The worlds
which I rely on in the demonstration
may not be

nomologically possible and therefore may
not be relevant to
the truth of the nomological global
supervenience thesis.
Fortunately, however, both Morgan and Lewis
have provided
independent reasons against formulating materialism
in this
way.
And at least Lewis's alternative has the
consequence
that the set of worlds relevant to the truth of
materialism
is closed under isolation.

This means that my original

defense of global supervenience can be adopted by
anyone
who believes materialism is

a

metaphysically contingent

thesis as long as one accepts Lewis's formulation of
materialism.

This appears to be an argument of sorts for

Lewis's formulation of materialism (or one relevantly

similar to it)

3.

Conclusion
We have found

(i)

that my defense of global

supervenience can be used to defend contingent global
supervenience theses, and

(ii)
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that the formulation of

materialism which Lewis finds most
plausible on independent
grounds is strong enough to be vindicated
by my defense of
global supervenience.
Consequently, l think my defense of
global supervenience is successful enough
to justify
a

detailed examination of exactly how the
general statement
of global supervenience should be
understood.

in the next

chapter

I

engage in that investigation.
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CHAPTER V

GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE: A CLOSER
LOOK

Introduction

A.

In the introduction to chapter IV,

l

noted that the

canonical formulation of global supervenience
is ambiguous.

(G)

globally supervenes on B

s

worlds, w and

z,

if w and

for any possible
z

are B-indiscernible

then they are S-indiscernible as well.

Explicated in terms of the standard notion of individual
indiscernibility

(II)

For any set of properties. A, x and
y are A-

In discernible

for any P in A, Px iff Py,

global supervenience is a relation between classes of

propositions: properties instantiated only by possible
worlds.

When

I

want to indicate that

interpreted in this way

I

Most who actually use

(G)

is to be

will refer to it as (Gt)
(G)

.

to formulate global

supervenience, however, interpret it the way we did in

chapter IV.

S

and B range over classes of properties.
152

individual A-indiscernibility
(defined in (li)) is
distinguished from a new relation of
global Aindiscernibility (A-indiscernibility
between worlds
(G)

IS interpreted in terms of the
latter.

reader to interpret

(G)

in this way,

I

When

^

,

and

want the

I

refer to it as

(Gk)

As

I

noted in chapter IV,

(Gk)

is also susceptible to

different interpretations depending upon
one's
understanding of global A-indiscernibility.
Definitions of
this notion which are precise fail to be
suitably
general,

and no precise, suitably general definition
has any

currency in the literature.
said that two worlds, w and

For instance, Kim has often
are A-indiscernible iff for

z,

every property P in A and every object
X has P in z.^

x,

x has P in w iff

Although this definition is precise, it is

not sufficiently general.

On this definition, any worlds

^ith distinct domains of individuals are A— discernible for
every class of properties.

A,

and are, therefore,

of falsifying any global supervenience thesis.

incapable

This lack

of generality is illustrated by the following example.

For any world-bound individual, b (or, for Kripkeans,
a

world-object pair <w,b>)

a

counterpart of b

.

a

,

Let us call the property, being

counterpart property.

Now, according

to Lewis's doctrine of anti-haecceitism, representation de
^'K'

in honor of Kim who interpreted it in this way.

^See Kim (1984)

p.

168.
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re supervenes on qualitative
character.

What this means is
that any two worlds that are
globally indiscernible with
respect to qualitative properties
will be globally
indiscernible with respect to counterpart
properties.
The
problem is that on Kim's definition of
global
A-

indiscernibility, worlds with different
domains of
individuals are incapable of falsifying
any global
supervenience thesis, including this one.
Even if we apply
Lewis's analysis of de re modality to
Kim's definition so
we allow for worlds with world-bound
individuals to have
"the same domain of individuals", the
global supervenience
formulation of anti-haecceitism will be trivially
satisfied.

Specifically, let us say that two world-bound

individuals are the same trans-world individual iff
they
are each a counterpart of the other.
Let us also

say that

two worlds have the same domain of transworld individuals
iff each individual in either world has a unique

counterpart in the other world, and the counterpart
relation between the individuals in the two worlds is
symmetric.

Now if we interpret Kim's definition of global

indiscernibility as requiring A-indiscernible worlds to
have the same domain of transworld individuals (as opposed
to Lewisian individuals which are world-bound)

worlds can be A-indiscernible.

,

Lewisian

But even with this

interpretation of Kim's definition, Lewisian worlds with

different domains of transworld individuals are always
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globally discernible with respect
to any set of properties.
This means they are incapable of
falsifying any global
supervenience thesis. Thus, on Kim's
definition, worlds
that differ only haecceitistically
(i.e. worlds
that are

qualitatively identical but are inhabited
by different
transworld individuals) do not falsify
the global
supervenience of counterpart properties on
qualitative
properties.
But, clearly, such worlds are precisely
the
sorts of worlds that Lewis intends
anti-haecceitism to rule
out.

So Kim's definition of global
indiscernibility makes

global supervenience incapable of adequately
expressing

anti-haecceitism.
The goal of this chapter is to develop precise,

general definitions of global supervenience.

In order to

be suitably general, a definition of global
supervenience

must allow worlds with distinct domains of individuals
(or

different spatiotemporal structures^) to falsify global
supervenience theses, and it must allow relations as well
In Pauli and Sider (1992), we said that w and z are
A-indiscernible iff for any spacetime region, r, in w, and
any property, P, in A, an individual instantiates P at r in
w iff some individual instantiates P at r in z
While it
our purposes, this definition is not sufficiently
general either.
It has the consequence that global
supervenience theses are trivially satisfied by worlds with
different spatiotemporal structures because any such worlds
are globally discernible with respect to any base set.
So
in this case, for reasons analogous to those given in the
anti-haecceitism example, the definition fails to be
general enough to allow interesting theses about the
supervenience of spatiotemporal structure such as
Leibnizian relationalism, to be formulated in terms of
global supervenience.
.
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as properties into the
supervenient and base sets,
we should aim to capture the
three desiderata that

Also,

motivated global supervenience in the
first place: it
should be a multiple domain, nonreduct
ive supervenience
relation capable of expressing holistic
determination
theses
I

will argue that there are two substantively

different, precise, general global supervenience
relations
worthy of further development. it is worth
noting at the
outset that this difference is not the difference
between
(Gk)

and (Gt)

Inspiration for both the weaker and the stronger of
these two new global relations is provided by the
model-

theoretic determination relations developed by Geoffrey

Heilman and Frank Thompson (1975, 1977).
B,

I

Thus,

In section

present and compare Heilman and Thompson's (H&T's)

determination relations.

In section C,

I

show that their

weaker determination principle is really a model— theoretic
version of

(Gt)

.

Then

show that given a natural way of

I

correlating classes of propositions and classes of ordinary
properties (and relations)

,

(Gt)

is equivalent to

suitably general analysis of global A-indiscernibility
section

D,

I

.

formulate the stronger global relation, and

show that it is genuinely independent of the weaker
version.

on a

(Gk)

In section E,

I

illustrate the importance of

allowing relations into the sets related by global
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In

supervenience, and
in section F,

I

show how this can be done.

Finally,

reconsider the central arguments of
chapter
IV in light of the two new global
supervenience relations
developed in sections C and D.

B_.

1

Heilman and Thom ps o n 's Determinat on Princinlf^t.
i

The term "global supervenience" was
introduced into
the literature by Kim by way of Paul
Teller/ But the
basic Idea behind global supervenience was
first discussed
in detail by H&T in the course of
presenting their version
of nonreductive physicalism which consists
of either of two

"determination" principles, and a principle of physical

exhaustion/

I

am only concerned with their determination

principles
Both determination principles are model-theoretic

variants of (and inspirations for) later formulations of
global supervenience.

According to one, all truth is

determined by physical truth.

According to the other, the

^Kim (1984) p. 167.
Kim credits Teller with
introducing the term, but Teller's paper was unpublished at
the time.

^According to the principle of physical exhaustion,
every (scientifically possible) entity is an aggregate of
entities referred to in theoretical physics (e.g., quarks,
electrons, photons, etc.) or a set-theoretic construction
composed of such entities.
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extension of all predicates is
determined by the extension
Of the predicates of mathematical

physics/

H&T argue for the need for a
model-theoretic
characterization of determination thus:

If one kind or realm of facts
determines
another, then, at a minimum, the
truth
values of sentences expressing facts
in the
latter realm cannot vary without
variance of
the truth values of sentences
expressing
facts of the former kind.
What cannot
happen happens under no scientifically

possible circumstances. Circumstances
are
possible if they are compatible with what
is
fixed.
A model-theoretic characterization
of determination is in order.

One wonders whether the first sentence is
true.

Couldn't one realm of facts determine

a

second even though

there are comparably few sentences that express
any facts
about the first realm? What if the language involved

(say

Scientific English) has many predicates that express
attributes characteristic of the determined realm but few

H&T say that "predicates of mathematical physics"
include
those which might be drawn from texts
concerning elementary particles, field
theory, space-time physics, etc, as well as
identity, the part-whole relation, '<', of
the calculus of individuals, and a full
stock of mathematic predicates (which, for
convenience we may suppose are built up
within set theory from 'e'). (H&T (1975) p.
553)

^Heilman and Thompson (1975) p. 558.
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predicates expressing attributes of
the determining realm?
In this case, it is unlikely that
"the truth values of
sentences expressing facts in the latter
realm cannot vary
without variance of the truth values of
sentences
expressing facts of the former kind". This
suggests that
it would be preferable to define
determination
as a

relation between non-linguistic entities.

l

put the

objection aside for now.
H&T let

'

0

'

and

'ij;'

range over sets of nonlogical

terms of some language capable of expressing all
the truths
(theorems)

of present scientific theory, and 'a' denote a

set of model structures representing "scientific

possibilities".

Given that two models are elementary

equivalent (m eleq

n)

iff exactly the same sentences are

true in each model, and m |0 = the model structure that

results when the interpretations of all expressions not in
0 are omitted from m, they go on to formulate "the notion

of a complete 0 characterization of the world uniquely

determining a complete

(HTTD)

ij;

characterization"^:

In a structures, 0 truth determines
(

Vm)

(

Vn)

(

(m,

nea

&

m |0 eleq

n|

0

)

^

mlij;

ij)

truth iff
eleq

n|il;).

®Hellman and Thompson (1975) p. 558.
By a "model
structure" representing a scientific possibility they mean
an interpretation (of some language capable of expressing
all scientific truths) on which all theorems of any science
are true.

^Heilman and Thompson (1975) p. 558.
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According to H&T,

The intuitive appeal of this notion
is
clear.
Given a full characterization of
things in 0 terms, one and only one
full
characterization in
terms is correct.
Once the 0 facts have been established,
so
i|i

are the

i|;

facts.

The best way to understand (HTTD)

is to contrast it

with H&T's other determination relations:

(HTRD)

In a structures, 0 reference determines

reference iff VmVm
m'

'

(

(m, m

'

ea & m|0 = m'|0)

i]j

m

1|;

=

1

i|j)
I

Heilman and Thompson (1975) p. 558.
H&T also
require that in the interesting case - namely where
<p
contains precisely the vocabulary of mathematical physics,
IS the non— logical vocabulary "needed to describe any
phenomena in any branch of science" (1975, p. 555
), a is
the set of structures representing scientifically possible
worlds, and T is the whole of scientific theory - a will
contain only a proper subset of the models of T. Any model
of T in which the vocabulary of pure arithmetic gets a nonstandard interpretation will not be included in a. The
restriction on a is a way of eliminating models which do
not seem to model any real possibility.
See Heilman and
Thompson (1975) p. 563 and elsewhere. Also see Tennant
1

i|i

(1985)

p.

349.

Phillip Bricker has pointed out that it is peculiar
that H&T do not take this opportunity to restrict a to
models where all necessary truths, including analytic
truths, are true.
Without this additional constraint, it
is hard to see how models where 'bachelor' receives a
different interpretation from 'unmarried male' are going to
be ruled out.
Surely, some such models validate the
theorems of mathematical physics, and H&T claim that all
truths are fixed by physical truths. Teller (1984a) has
presented a similar objection to which Heilman (1985) has
replied
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That IS, If any two structures
in
the references they assign to the a agree on
0 terms;
i.e.
their restrictions to the
0
^
are identical; then they agree on vocabulary
the
references they assign to the
terms; i.e
their restrictions to the
vocabulary
^ are*'
i|i

il;

Identical.’^

So in order for 0 reference to determine

ijr

reference,

models that assign the same extension to
the 0 vocabulary
must assign the same extension to the
vocabulary.
ijr

It is simple to show that (HTRD)
(HTTD)

Ml |0

.

Suppose 0 = (P),

ij;

does not entail

= (qj and a = {Ml, M2}.

Qa

Qb

^Qa

-Qb

Pa

-Pb

-Pa

Pb

Ml 0 = <{a,b}

<P,

#

M2|0, so (HTRD)

(

M2 0 = <(a,b)

a

is trivially satisfied.

is falsified by these models.

between these two models

(a

<P,

But (HTTD)

There is a 0-isomorphism

one-one function from the

domain of Ml to that of M2 which preserves all 0 predications)

,

the function from Ml to M2 which taJces a to

^Heilman and Thompson (1975)

p.

559.

^^My notation indicates that a model consists of an
ordered set whose first member is a set (the domain of
discourse)
and whose second member is a set of ordered
pairs (the interpretation function)
When the
interpretation function only involves a single predicate
(as in this case)
I drop the set braces around the lone
ordered pair representing the interpretation function.
,

.

,
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b and b to a.

Thus, the same

<p

sentences are true in Ml

and M2: namely, 3xPx, ^VxPx,
and their entailments statable
in the 0 vocabulary.
Thus, Ml |0 eleq M 2 0
But, clearly,
MlU is not eleq M 2 |^,: the sentence, VxQx, is
true in M 2
and false in Ml.
So (HTRD) does not entail (HTTD)
|

.

It is no surprise that (HTTD) does
not entail

either.

Proof: Suppose 0 = (P),

= jq,,

4,

(HTRD)

a = (M3,

M3

M4

)

M4

Qa

-^Qb

--Qa

Pa

-Pb

Pa

= <{a,b}, <Q,{a)»
M3
M3 0 = <{a,b)
<P, (a)»

ij;

,

In this case, 0 reference fails to determine
ij;

|

-^Pb

= <{a,b)
M4
M4 0 = <(a,b}

lij

because M3 0 = M4|0, but M3

Qb

^

|

M4

,

,

<Q,
<p,

{b}»
{a}»

reference

iji

On the other hand,

1|; .
1

the 0 truths in M3 = the 0 truths in M4 = 3xPx and
-VxPx
and all their entailments stateable with the logical

expressions and the 0 terms.

equivalent to M4|0.
the set of

i|;

ij;

.

is elementarily

In both cases the only truths

vocabulary (plus the logical vocabulary)

are 3xQx and -VxQx, and their
case, 0 truth determines
(HTTD)

|

The set of ^ truths in M3 also equals

truths in M4

stateable in the

Thus, M3

i|;

i|i

entailments.

truth.

Thus,

This establishes that

does not entail (HTRD)

^^Note that Pa is not a 0-truth because
non-logical term which is not a 0 -term.
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in this

'a'

is a

Essentially, truth determination
holds (non-trivially)
as long as there is both a
0-isomorphism and a ij;isomorphism between the two models.
But non-trivial
reference determination requires
the identity mapping
between the two models to be such
that if it is a 0isomorphism then it is a i|f- isomorphism.
Of course, if
there is no identity mapping, or if
it fails to be a 0isomorphism (as was the case between Ml
and M 2 then
reference determination is trivially
satisfied.
in cases
where the antecedent of reference
determination
)

holds,

reference determination is clearly stronger
than truth
determination. This can be seen by reflection
on M 3 and M4
Specifically, note that the sentence, " 3 x(Px
&

true in M 3 and false in M 4

truth determining
both 0 terms and

is

This is compatible with 0

truth because the sentence contains

ij;

ij;

.

Qx)",

terms.

the determination of

i|j

But it is not compatible with

reference by 0 reference.

As long

as it isn't trivially satisfied (because the antecedent

fails to hold)

,

reference determination is sensitive to

differences to which truth determination is not.

This is

an important difference that foreshadows the essential

distinction between our two global relations developed

^^Here I am assuming that 0 ni|; = the empty set.
H&T
allow this to be the case. H&T suggest that in order to
characterize physicalism, however, the 0 vocabulary be a
(non-empty) proper subset of the
vocabulary.
i|r
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below.

Before we develop this difference,
however, we need
to clarify the relationship
between (Gk) and (Gt)

Rec onciling fGk^ and

rnt-)

^ Suitab]p Definition of Glo b al
A-Indiscernibi
(Gt)

is quite clearly an descendent
of

1

(HTTD)

i

ty

where

models are replaced by worlds and
sentences by propositions
(or facts)

.

As

I

mentioned in chapter IV, a significant

number of philosophers understand global
supervenience this
way.
Of course, Kim and others interpret
(G)
differently, along the lines of (Gk)

descendent of (HTRD)

.

.

appears to be

(Gk)

This would indicate that it is in

some sense stronger than (Gt)

.

We need to determine the

nature of the relationship between (Gt) and (Gk)

Surprisingly enough, Kim claims they are equivalent.

After defining the global supervenience of A on B as
in
(Gk)

,

he continues:

Some writers individuate worlds in terms of
what truths (or states of affairs hold in
them, explaining supervenience something
like this:
)

(Gt)
A globally supervenes on B just in
case there are no two worlds indiscernible
with respect of truths of kind B and yet
discernible in respect of truths of kind A.
[

^^Among them are Currie (1984) pp. 348-350; Lewis
(1983) p. 362; Haugeland (1982), and Lepore and Loewer
(1989) pp. 177-178.
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a

But this IS an equivalent
idea [to (Gk)
since we may assume that all
the truths
holding in a world are fixed,
in the
s andard ways, by the
"singular truths" that
distribution Of the
available properties over individuals.^^

In order to determine whether
(Gk)

really is

equivalent to (Gt) we need an analysis
of global Aindiscernibility. At one time, Kim would
have said that
two worlds are A-indiscernible iff
the same individuals
have the same A-properties in both
worlds.
i criticized
this definition in the introduction
to this chapter because
It makes all global supervenience
theses trivially

satisfied by worlds with different domains
of individuals.
For essentially the same reasons, one cannot
expect to
establish the equivalence of (Gk) and (Gt) using
this

limited characterization of global A-indiscernibility

The

.

problem is that if the A-truths are all general (i.e.,
nonsingular) propositions, then worlds with disjoint
domains

may well be indiscernible (in the sense of
the A-truths.''®
16

But,

(ii)

)

regarding

of course, all such worlds are A-

Kim (1988) p. 137. Kim explicitly cites Haugeland
(1982) as someone who formulates global this way (Kim
(1988) p. 149, note 17).
*

^^See

Kim (1984) p. 168.

^®This line of thought is perfectly compatible with
Kim's claim that all truths are fixed by the singular
truths.
It is of the nature of determination (or "fixing")
relations, that the same general truth (e.g., 3xFx) could
be "fixed" by different singular truths in different worlds

(continued.
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.

.

discernible according to Kim's old
definition of global Aindiscernibility. So we need a new,
general definition of
global A-indiscernibility in order
to really establish the
equivalence: it must apply to worlds
with different
individuals (and different locations)

.

Kim appears to be

aware of the need for a general
definition of global Aindiscernibility in order to establish
the equivalence.
Shortly after presenting (Gt) he
continues thus:
,

As we just noted, indiscernibility for
worlds is more difficult to characterize
if
we take global supervenience in full
generality, allowing domains of individuals
to vary from world to world.
Consider for
example two worlds with disjoint domains of
individuals. What is it to say that two
such worlds are indiscernible in respect of
a certain class of properties, say
physical
properties? Clearly, in evaluating these
worlds for indiscernibility we must consider
only general truths, disregarding singular
truths all together; for otherwise, no two
such worlds would be
indiscernible. .. [Refusing to allow worlds
with disjoint domains to be A-indiscernible]
means that the existence of the following
two worlds would not violate psychophysical

(

.

.

.

continued)

(e.g..

Fa in one world, Fb in another).
Thus, we still
have to account for the case where only general truths are
being considered and some of the possible worlds have
distinct (or even disjoint) domains.
One might object that perhaps Kim meant the A-truths
to include singular propositions concerning which
individuals have which A-properties in which case his
original definition of global A-indiscernibility appears
more reasonable.
But as long as one allows the set of Ahi'uths to contain general A— truths not derivable from any
singular A-truths in the set, as I think one should, then a
more general notion of global A-indiscernibility is needed
to establish the equivalence.
,
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supervenience: worlds w and v,
with disioint
individuals, agree completely
in
ooin^n/^
point of generalized physical
truths rwp
~~

Of w to t hat of V sunh
ln the former ha s ph ysical
in
property p
in_case f(x) in the Ta;i- er ha.
si milarly for relations) but
the two

_

worlds
are radically different psychologically
say w IS much like our world
whereas v is
wholly lacking in mentality. Common
references these days to "Twin Earth,"
which
IS just like this earth in all
physical
respects," make sense only if singular
truths are excluded from the basis of
comparison. Also, common talk of "overall
similarity" between worlds, familiar from
semantics for counterf actuals tacitly
assumes the meaningfullness of similarity
judgments for worlds with disjoint domains
of individuals.^’
,

Although Kim did not go on to prove that

(Gt)

and (Gk) are

actually equivalent (see note 20), the definition
of global

A-indiscernibility suggested in the parenthetical comment
can be used to construct such a proof.
Kim suggests that two worlds "agree completely in

point of generalized physical truths" iff there is an

appropriate isomorphism between them.

His parenthetical

comment inspires the following characterization of global
A-indiscernibility.
relations)

,

w and

z

Where A is any set of properties (and
are any worlds, and

Kim (1988) pp. 138; my emphasis.
In the next
sentence Kim switches topics without reconsidering the
equivalence of (Gk) and (Gt)
The sentence reads, "There
is a second problem; how are we to compare worlds with
domains with different cardinalities?".
.
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an A-isomo rphi sm betwp.^n w

anri

^

=

f

i c,

^

one-one function from the parts of
w to the parts
of z such that for any n-place
relation
(or

property), r, in a, and for each
part of w,
X2,

(GI)

X3,..., Rx^...x^ iff Rf

(x^)

.

.

.

,

f (x^) .20

For any class of properties and
relations, A,

possible worlds, w and
indiscernible

between w and

z,

are globally A-

there is an A-isomorphism
z

This definition of global A-indiscernibility
is

suitably general because it has the consequence
that worlds
with different domains of individuals (or spacetime
points)

can falsify global supervenience understood in terms
of
(Gk)

.

Another respect in which it is more general than

previous definitions of global A-indiscernibility is that
global A-indiscernibility is defined even when A includes
relations.

The significance of this latter feature will be

discussed in section

2

.

E.

The Reconciliation
In order to see if (Gk)

is equivalent to
(GI)

(Gt)

,

we begin by consolidating (Gk) and

into a single thesis,
^“^Note

supplemented by (GI) and (ISO)

(Gw)

that if w=z, then

f
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,

and restating (Gt) to make

is an A-automorphism.

It clear that the truths are
non-linguistic entities.

Assume that

(Gw)

S

S

and B are sets of properties
and relations.

globally supervenes on B

and

for any worlds, w

if there is a B-isomorphism
between w and

z,

(they are B-isomorphic) then there
is an s-

z

isomorphism between w and

z

(they are S-

isomorphic as well)

(Gt)

S

globally supervenes on B

and

if any worlds, w

are indiscernible with respect to B-truths

z,

(the same B-propositions are true in w and

then w and

z

z)

,

are indiscernible with respect to S-

truths (the same S-propositions are true in w and
z)

.

To establish their equivalence, we need to prove that
for any set of properties and relations. A, and any

worlds, w and

w and

z,

z

are A-isomorphic iff w and

indiscernible with respect to A-truths.

trivially from
definitions.
to say,

(i)

z

are

It follows

that (Gw) and (Gt) are equivalent

Clearly, in order to establish

(i)

we need

for any class of properties (and relations)

,

A,

which true propositions are A-truths and which are not.
I

begin by noting that the relation,

isomorphic to

,

is an equivalence relation.
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is A-

It generates

a partition on the class
of all possible worlds.

For any
cell in the partition, there
is a preposition that is
true
at all and only the members
of that cell.
if propositions
are classes of worlds, the
proposition in question is the
class of all and only the members
of the cell; otherwise,
we can identify the proposition
associated with any

particular cell as the conjunction of
all propositions true
at all members of the cell.
We call such propositions
maximal A-propositions. They are
maximally specific ways a
world can be with respect to the properties
and relations
in A (but not with respect to who
or what instantiates
them)

We have one maximal A-proposition for
each cell of the

partition of the class of possible worlds induced
by the
A-isomorphic to

relation.

Now,

for any class of

properties, A, let us say that P is an A-proposition
iff
for every maximal A-proposition, M, either M
entails P or M

entails

-iP.^^

A-propositions may be true at worlds from

cells of the partition, but if they are true at
one world in any cell of the partition induced by the

A-isomorphic to
that cell.
proposition.

Now

is

relation, they are true at all worlds in
I

define an A-truth as any true A-

This has the consequence that if no

^^This is essentially the same method of
characterizing A-propositions introduced (to me) by Ted
Sider.
We make use of it in section V of Pauli and Sider
Note that on this definition all necessary truths
(1992)
are A-propositions.
.
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haeoceities are members of A, then
no singular propositions
are A-truths.
This consequence illustrates
that our notion
Of an A-truth approximates H&T's
notion of a 0-truth. 22
In any case, it follows that w
and z are discernible

with respect to A-truths (some
A-proposition is true at w
and false at z) iff the maximal
A-proposition true at w is
false at z.
But, the maximal A-proposition
true at w is
false at z iff w and z are in different
cells in the
partition induced by the
is A-isomorphic
to

relation.

In other words, different maximal
A-propositions are true
at w and z iff w and z are not A-isomorphic.
But this

means that w and

z

are discernible with respect to A-truths

iff they are not A-isomorphic.

The proof is complete.

On

the preceding definitions of "A-indiscernible
worlds" and

"A-truths",

(Gw)

and (Gt) are equivalent definitions

We have good reason to consider (Gw)

supplemented with (GI)

- a

-

or (Gk)

suitably general definition of

global supervenience: it unifies the two divergent

interpretations of

(G)

in a natural way,

and it accords

with definitions of global supervenience and global truth

determination offered by a significant number of
philosophers

To verify that this consequence accords with H&T's
notion of a 0-truth, see note 14 and the discussion of the
difference between (HTTD) and (HTRD) on page 158.
^^I trust the reader can mentally substitute corner
quotes when appropriate.
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On the other hand, it is worth
noting that Kim's
original understanding of (Gk)
which basically required
both isomorphisms to be (transworld)
identity mappings,
does appear to be the legitimate
possible worlds
,

formulation of (HTRD)

.

What seems to have happened is
that

in the quest to make (Gk)

a

suitably general global

supervenience relation, it has been somewhat
weakened.
After all, as I mentioned above in my
discussion of H&T's

determination relations, in cases where (HTRD)
is not
trivially satisfied (or, more precisely, in
cases where
is closed under automorphic images)
reference

a

,

determination is stronger than truth determination.

Once

again, the reason for this is that reference
determination

requires the only relevant 0-isomorphism between the
models
(i.e.

the identity mapping) to be a

ijj-

isomorphism as well,

while truth determination allows other non-identity

mappings to be relevant isomorphisms, thereby opening up
the possibility that the 0-isomorphism is not a
isomorphism.

3x(Px

&

Qx)

This explains why the fact that the sentence,
"

is true in M3 and false in M4 is compatible

with 0 truth determining

determining

i|t-

iji

reference.

ij;

truth but not with 0 reference
Likewise, on Kim's original

definition of global indiscernibility

,

the only relevant B-

isomorphism between worlds is the identity mapping.
had better be an S-isomorphism as well.

And it

On the new, more

general definition of global indiscernibility, however.
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worlds can be B-indiscernible
in virtue of one Bisomorphism, and S-indiscernible
in virtue of another.
By
abandoning the requirement that the
base isomorphism be a
supervenient isomorphism, the relationship
has been
weakened.

There is a way to restore the strength
to global
supervenience without abandoning its
new-found generality.
What we need is a version of global
supervenience that

maintains the requirement that the base
isomorphism be a
supervenient isomorphism. The relation
developed below is
really a strengthened, generalized descendant
of reference
determination, as should soon become apparent.

D_;

i-:

—Inspi ration

—Stron

cf

Global Supervenience

from the Literature

In a footnote, H&T provide us with the basis for
a new

global supervenience relation.

They claim that

if a is closed under automorphic images,
then
(HTRD)
is equivalent to the condition
that any bijective map between domains of m
and m' which is a 0-isomorphism is a ij;isomorphism.
[

]

^^Hellman and Thompson (1975) p. 559.
An
automorphism, is an isomorphism between models with the
same domain.
An automorphic image of a model is an
isomorphic model with the same domain.
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strictly speaking, H&T are
incorrect.

on the other

hand,

if „e restrict ourselves
to models with the same
domain of individuals, H&T-s
equivalence holds.
any
25

Th© pirobl 0 in 9iris©s
hjcp
models with distinct domains
(H&T
1977
the only models in a are:
^

M

i

(
^

)

n
P-

326).

Suppose

N

Qa

^Qb

Pa

Pb

Neither M nor N has any automorphic
imaqes.
So
Q-reference because M|P
nIp.
But^not^^^^^^^D isomorphism is a
Q-isomorphism
because
the
onlv P-i^nm^^
^ Q"

isomorphism?''''

Closed under automorphic imaqes
same domain of individuals
every 0 -isomorphism is a il;- isomorphism
iff'
VmVn??M^
VmVn((M,nea
& m |0 = n| 0
^ m|i|; = n|4/).
Left to riqhf
0 -isomorphism is a i|;- isomorphism, and suppose
^
m|0 = n|0.
So for an^
domain of m, x is in the extension of
the same 0 predicates in both m and n.
Hence there is a 0 isomorphism between m and n which is an identity
mapping.
Thus, by our conditional assumption, the
identity mappinq
etween m and n is also a i|i-isomorphism
So every obiect
as the same i|;-predicates apply to it in
both
m and n: mU^
=
^

)

.

n

I

.

1

Right to left.
Suppose VmVn((m,nea & m|0 = n|
^ mlilj
n|y).
Now consider any 0-isomorphism, f, between 0 two
models m and n.
Since a is closed under automorphic
images, there is a model m' which is an automorphic
image
of m and such that m' |0 = n|0.
To see that this is so,
consider the permutation of the domain of m (D(m)),
which takes each member of D(m) to the individual in g,D(m)
that f takes to D(n)
Let m' be the automorphic image of m
under permutation, g. So g is an automorphism from m to
m'.
Now since g is an automorphism and for any individual
in D(m) it selects the same individual in m' as f selects
in n, the composition of g
and f is the identity mapping
between n and m'. Thus, since f is a 0-isomorphism between
m and n, and g is an overall isomorphism between m and m',
the identity mapping between n and m' (which is the
)

^

(continued.
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.

.

case,

want to focus on the global
supervenience relation
that results when the claim "every
0-isoraorphisir, between
I

models is a i|.-isomorphism-' is
translated into a possible
worlds framework;

(Gs)

s

globally supervenes on B

and

for any worlds w

every B-isomorphism between w and

z,

z

is an

S- isomorphism.

2.

The Need for rCs)
It should be no surprise that (Gs)
is stronger than

(Gw)

.

-

for strong global

if every B-isomorphism between

any two worlds is an S-isomorphism, then any
two worlds

which are B-isomorphic are S-isomorphic as well.
entails (Gw)

.

So (Gs)

To see that (Gw) does not entail (Gs)

consider the following worlds

W1

W2

Qa

-Qb

-Qc

Pa

-Pb

Pc

Qd
-.pd

continued)
composition of g and f) must be a 0-isomorphism. But
this means that each 0-predicate has the same extension in
m' as it has in n,
Thus m'|0 = n|0.
But then m'|4r = n|ilJ,
so all i|/-predicates have the same extension in m' as in n.
This means that the identity mapping from between m' and n
is a i|f-isomorphism
Since g is an automorphism from m to
m', f, which is the composition of the identity mapping
from n to m' and g‘\ must be a i|f- isomorphism as well.
^^

( .

.

.

^

.
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The function which takes a to
o and b to d is the only
Pisomorphism between these worlds.
Likewise, the only Qisoitiorphism is the function
which takes a to d and b to c.

These are different isomorphisms,
so, while these worlds
are not counterexamples to the
(Gw) -supervenience of
Q on
P, they are counterexamples
to the (Gs) -supervenience of
Q
on P.
This proves that (Gs) is formally
stronger than
(Gw)

.27

The fact that W1 and W2 are formally
consistent with
the (Gw) -supervenience of Q on P strongly
suggests that
(Gw)

is too weak to capture all determination
relations

which should be expressible in terms of
global
supervenience.

in order to see this, think of P as the

physical property of having a head composed of
plastic,
and,

just to make the example vivid, let us refer to

individuals that have -P as metal heads. 2 ®
of Q as the property of being conscious.

Finally, think
So there are two

individuals in Wl: one is a metal head and the other is

plastic head; one is conscious and the other isn't.

a

Things

Unlike Petrie's and Kim's examples, in this example
the two worlds are indiscernible with respect to the base
properties, so the global supervenience thesis is not
trivially satisfied. On the other hand, like Petrie's and
Kim's examples, we are not taking account of the plenitude
of possibilities so we have not established that (Gw) is
metaphysically weaker than (Gs)
That will be established
in section 3.
.

^®Nothing hinges on this, purists are welcome to
replace all occurrences of "metal" with "non-plastic" in
what follows.
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are likewise in W2

.

The important difference is
that in Wl

only the plastic head is conscious,
while in W2 only the
metal head is conscious.
fact, the only individual
which has the property of being a
metal head, being some
distance from a single plastic head,
and having no other
irreducibly relational properties to
other metal heads or
plastic heads is conscious in W2 but
unconscious

m

in Wl.

wi

and W2, if possible, would prove that
the physical

properties of (and relations between) an
individual and all
Its worldmates do not fix the individual's
mental
properties, because physical duplicates from
physically

indiscernible positions in physically indiscernible
worlds
have different mental properties.
Global supervenience is supposed to express relations
of holistic determination.

Here we seem to have a lack of

holistic determination of the mental by the physical.

(Gs)

is sensitive to this lack for the existence of Wl and
W2 is

incompatible with the (Gs) -supervenience of Q on

according to

(Gw)

,

Yet,

P.

these worlds do not constitute

counterexample to the global supervenience of Q on

a
P.

This

indicates that (Gw) is not strong enough to be the global

supervenience relation intended by those materialists who
were lead to abandon strong and weak supervenience (as

formulations of materialism) because of the "context

dependence" of mental properties.
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It is important to see

if (GW)

can capture this sort of
holistic determination
relation.
if not, a need for (Gs) has
been established.
A promising defense of (Gw) runs
as follows.
We begin
by pointing out that by including
the base property in the
supervenient set, (Gw) can accommodate
the intuition that
W1 and W2 are inconsistent with
an important global
supervenience thesis involving only P and
Q.
Specifically,
these worlds do falsify the global
supervenience of PuQ on
P according to (Gw)
Although there is a P-isomorphism
.

between W1 and W2

,

{<a,c>, <b,d>},

since it fails to be a

Q-isomorphism, there is no PuQ-isomorphism between
these
worlds.
So the advocate of (Gw) can claim that this
is
what accounts for the intuition that there is
no real

determination relation between these worlds.
it seems that when two worlds satisfy (Gw)

in general,

even though none

of the base isomorphisms are supervenient isomorphisms,
one

can defend (Gw) from the conclusion that it is too weak
by

pointing out that the

(Gw)

-supervenience of the union of

the base set and the supervenient set on the base set is

falsified by the worlds after all.
This defense of (Gw) may seem implausible because it

requires one to reinterpret the claim that

S

globally

supervenes on B as the claim that SuB globally supervenes
on B.

After all, philosophers speak of the supervenience

of values on facts (or the mental on the physical)

;

they do

not speak of the supervenience of facts and values on facts
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(or the mental and the physical
on the physical).

or do

they?

According to Heilman and Thompson,

The principle of Physical Determination
Truth states roughly that all the truths of
statable in the language of mathematicalphysics fix ^1 the truths statable in
language whatsoever
is the class of
<p
mathematical-physical terms...
includes
terms needed to formulate truths in any all
branch of science.
i|j

Clearly, the truths of mathematical-physics
will be a
subset of the truths statable in any language.
So 0 will
be a subset of

ijr

.

Next consider Lewis's formulation of

materialism:

Among worlds where no natural properties
alien to our world are instantiated, no two
differ without differing physically; any two
such worlds that are exactly alike
physically are duplicates.

If worlds do not differ qualitatively in any way (i.e., do

not fail to be duplicates) without differing physically,

then all respects of qualitative difference, including the
base properties, should be included in the supervenient

^^Hellman and Thompson (1977) pp.
^°Lewis

(1983)

p.

364.
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310-311.

set.

Haugeland presents a similar
formulation of

materialism.^^

Clearly, then, there are statements
of global

supervenience which are naturally
interpreted in the way
that an advocate of (Gw)
who is worried about worlds like
W1 and W2, would be advised to
formulate them.
,

So this

response on behalf of
appeared.

(Gw)

is not as ad hoc as it may have

Nevertheless, it is unsuccessful.

The weakness

of (Gw) vis-a-vis (Gs) which is
analogous to that of truth

determination

vis-a-vis reference determination, can be

illustrated by somewhat more complicated examples
of the
same sort.
(Gw)

only requires all worlds that have a B-

isomorphism to have some S-isomorphism, although the Bisomorphism need not be an S-isomorphism.
as a subset, then (Gw)

If s includes B

is satisfied only if all worlds that

are B-isomorphic are such that at least one of the B-

isomorphisms is an S-isomorphism.

(Gs)

is still stronger

because it requires every B-isomorphism to be an Sisomorphism.

One BuS isomorphism between two worlds is

insufficient to establish worlds as compatible with

(Gs)

.

Once we consider worlds with three or more individuals,
this difference between (Gs) and the strengthened version
of (Gw) becomes apparent.

^^Haugeland (1984) p.

1.
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W3

W4

Qa

-Qb

Qc

Qd

Qe

Qf

Pa

Pb

-Pc

Pd

Pe

-Pf

The (Gw)-supervenience of
Q on P is true at a model
with only these worlds in the domain.
There is a P-

isomorphism and a Q-isomorphism between
these worlds.
But
not every P-isomorphism a Q-isomorphism.
This shows that
these worlds falsify the (Gs) -supervenience
of Q on P.

Note,

furthermore, that there is a P-isomorphism
which is a

also a PuQ-isomorphism.

For example, consider the PuQ-

isomorphism between W3 and W4 which takes a to
and c to

f.

b to d,

e,

This shows that these worlds are also

compatible with the (Gw) -supervenience if PuQ on

P.

Therefore, the (Gw) -supervenience of SuB on B is not

formally equivalent with the
SuB)

(Gs)

-supervenience of

S

(or

on B.^^
In chapter IV. A. 2.,

I

showed that one reason

philosophers have preferred qlobal to local supervenience
is because global appears better suited to formulate

^^For the same reason (Gs) is formally stronger than
this intermediate version of global:
(Gi)

globally supervenes on B
for any worlds, w
and z, if there is a B-isomorphism between w and
z then some B-isomorphism between w and z is an
S-isomorphism as well.
S

We can see this because S (Gi) -supervenes on B iff SuB
(Gw) -supervenes on B.
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holistic determination relations.

For example, many claim

that the mental properties of
individuals are determined by
more than just the intrinsic
physical properties of the
very same individuals: their
physical relations to other
individuals and the physical properties
of the individuals
they are related to also play a role.
This
lead,

I

think,

to the idea that the best way to
formulate psycho-physical

supervenience is as global supervenience
thesis.
The idea
was that, at the very least, physically
indiscernible
individuals from physically indiscernible
locations in

physically indiscernible worlds have the same
mental
properties.
That much had to be true.
This was
abbreviated by saying that the distribution of
physical

properties across a world determines (or fixes) the

distribution of mental properties, or that physically
indiscernible worlds are mentally indiscernible, or that

worlds with the same physical truths have the same mental
truths.

But when these abbreviations are formulated

explicitly in terms of

(Gw)

they are insensitive to a

crucial aspect of the original idea that the mental is

holistically determined by the physical.
For example, consider W3

.

I

stipulate that the

inhabitants of W3 are in all interesting respects

spatiotemporally indiscernible from one another: they are
spatially equidistant from one another, created at the same
time, and destroyed simultaneously at some later time.
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Also let us return to our earlier
suppositions regarding
the Identity of the properties P,
and
Q.

As before,

l

will

refer to individuals with -P as metal
heads.
Now, in W3
there are two plastic heads, a and b.
Each is a certain
distance from a metal head and the same
distance from

another plastic head.

Supposing, once again, that P and -P

are the only physical properties, it
follows that a and b
are physical duplicates in physically
indiscernible

positions in W3

.

And clearly, since a and b are both

inhabitants of W3 they are inhabitants of physically

indiscernible worlds.
IS not.

But one is conscious and the other

So just W3 provides us with a case where

physically indiscernible individuals from physically
indiscernible locations in physically indiscernible worlds
are mentally discernible.

This is incompatible with the

idea that the mental properties of an individual are

holistically determined by the physical properties of that
individual and its surroundings.

(Gs)

is sensitive to this

failure of the holistic determination of Q by

P,

incompatible with the (Gs) -supervenience of Q on
is not sensitive to this failure for W3 itself

the pair of W3 and W4)
(Gw)

P.

(Gw)

(as well as

is formally consistent with the

-supervenience of Q (and QuP) on

(at least formally)

for W3 is

P.

Therefore,

(Gw)

is

weaker than the core idea of holistic

property determination which motivated global supervenience
theses in the first place.

(Gs)
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more faithfully expresses

such holistic determination
relations.
(HTRD)

The strength of

and then some, has been regained
in a much more
general formulation.

3_,

,

The Metaphysical Ine qui valence of
(Gs^

anr^

The preceding arguments for the
significance of (Gs)
have all been based on vastly
oversimplified models of
logical space.
Thus, it is worth reflecting on the
metaphysical significance of these arguments.
For example
I used W1 and W2 to prove that
(Gw) does not formally
entail (Gs)

W1

W2

Qs

-’Qb

-,QC

Pa

-Pb

Pc

Qd

^pd

The only P-isomorphism fails to be a Q-isomorphism, yet

there is some Q-isomorphism between them.

Given my arguments in chapter IV, it is natural to

expect that

I

would defend the metaphysical significance of

this result by arguing that it violates no principles of

plenitude
isolation.

-

specifically, that it does not violate
To do this some additional stipulations

concerning the nature of the properties, P and Q must be
included.

We need to know whether they are intrinsic

properties, or, if not, precisely how or whether P depends
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on Q.

Also, even if we adjusted the
example accordingly,
it would not prove that (Gw)
is metaphysically weaker
than
(Gs)
This is because a model of logical
space which
.

includes impoverished worlds such as
Wl and W2 and accords
with plenitude principles may still
be a very impoverished
model.
For example, there is no plausible
plenitude
principle I can think of that would allow
one to infer the
existence of a world anything like the actual
world from
worlds like Wl and W2

What we really need is an independent argument
that
shows that (Gw) is indeed metaphysically weaker
than

(Gs)

.

We need to establish

(NCE)

There exist sets of properties (and relations)
and B such that

globally supervenes on B

S

according to (Gw)

s

,

but

S

fails to globally

supervene on B according to (Gs)

Let S be the (unit set of the) property of being the first

planet to exist and let B be the (unit set of the) property
of being such that there is a unique first planet to exist.

Clearly, any two worlds which are B-isomorphic are S-

isomorphic as well: any possible worlds which have the same

number of individuals and are such that there is

a

first

planet must be such that there is some isomorphism which
takes the first planet of the one world to the first planet
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of the other world.

Thus s (Gw) -supervenes on

every B-isomorphism is an
S-isomorphism.

B.

But not

in tact,

supposing that there was a first
planet in the actual
world, consider any of the
B-automorphisns on the actual
world which fails to take the first
planet to itself.
it
fails to be an S-automorphism.
Plenitude principles are of
no relevance here.
We clearly have found sets of
properties that are globally supervenient
according to (Gw)
but not according to (Gs)
Thus, we have established that
.

(Gw)

is metaphysically weaker than

So far,

I

(Gs)

have argued for the need to supplement

with a stronger version of global supervenience
not simply replace (Gw) altogether?

.

(Gw)

So why

The main positive

reason not to abandon (Gw) is that it captures
the idea
that truths of one kind determine truths of another
kind
(as I will confirm in chapter VI)

,

and the literature is

clear that global supervenience is often understood in
this
way.

Besides its equivalence to (Gt)

there is other

evidence to support the contention that

(Gw)

is a more

faithful representation of earlier formulations of global

supervenience.

For example, on (Gs) but not (Gw), a global

supervenience claim can be falsified by a model with only a
^^Likewise, SuB (Gw) -supervenes on B, but not every Bisomorphism is an SuB-isomorphism. Thus, S (Gi) -supervenes
on B (see note 39) yet S fails to (Gs) -supervene on B.
Once again, plenitude principles are not relevant here.
Thus, (Gi) is also metaphysically weaker than (Gs)
.
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single world in the domain because
plenty of worlds will
have B-automorphisms which fail to
be S-isomorphisms (e.g.,
W3).
But on the generic formulation of
global,

(G)

whether it is interpreted along the lines
of (Gk) or (Gt)
there have to be at least two possible
worlds in a model in
order for that model to falsify (g)
,

Likewise, there have

to be at least two possible worlds in any
model sufficient
to falsify (Gw)

On the other hand, one should not overemphasize
the

importance of such considerations.

Most who understood

global supervenience along the lines of (Gk) were
really
only interested in one isomorphism between any two
worlds.
If it was a B-isomorphism it had better be an
S-isomorphism

as well.

For example, Kim often said that two worlds are

A-indiscernible iff the same individuals exist in both
worlds and have the same A-properties in each, so only
identity mappings between worlds were capable of falsifying
global supervenience theses.

Likewise, in Pauli and Sider,

we restricted the relevant isomorphisms to those that

preserved spatiotemporal location.

Under these

constraints, there is no difference between (Gw) and

(Gs)

.

The claim that for any two worlds, if there is an identity

mapping which is

a

B-isomorphism then there is an identity

mapping which is an S-isomorphism is true iff, between any
two worlds, every identity mapping which is a B-isomorphism
is an S-isomorphism.

Thus many explicit statements in the
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literature are incapable of differentiating
between (Gw)
and (Gs)
It is only when the limitation
to identity
.

mappings has been set aside, and truly
general versions of
global supervenience are sought, that
the difference
between (Gs) and (Gw) becomes apparent.
And in this

context It is clear that both are legitimate
construals of
global supervenience.
(Gw) captures the notion of
truth

determination which some have taken to be the
essence of
global supervenience, while (Gs) recaptures
the

characteristic strength of H&T's reference determination
relation that was lost when
of (GI)

:

(Gk)

was generalized in terms

namely the requirement that the base isomorphism

be a supervenient isomorphism as well.

So we seem to have

two global supervenience relations worthy of further
study
and development.^^

E.

The Importance of Relations

Having seen that we should abandon neither
(Gs)

,

I

(Gw)

nor

want to consider an objection to the adequacy of

both relations that may occur to someone who is used to

^^The essential difference between (Gw) and (Gs) is
paralleled in two alternative definitions of determinism
discussed by Butterfield (1989). He finds the weaker
definition, the one analogous to (Gw)
to be the preferable
formulation of determinism, at least for a substantivalist
about spacetime.
,
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thinking of global supervenience as
a relation between sets
of properties.
As we saw in chapter IV, one of
the (reputed)
advantages of global supervenience is
that it is a version
of multiple-domain supervenience.
The globally

supervenient properties can be possessed by
one class of
objects (e.g., macrophysical objects) and
the subvening
properties by another class (e.g., their
microphysical
parts)

This makes global supervenience appropriate
for
formulating the important thesis that everything
.

is

determined by the microphysical realm.

For an example of

this sort of (global) supervenience claim consider
Lewis's

doctrine of Humean supervenience:

Humean Supervenience ... is the doctrine that
all there is to the world is a vast mosaic
of local matters of fact. .We have geometry:
a system of external relations of
spatiotemporal distance between points.
Maybe pcpints of spacetime itself, maybe
point— sized bits of matter or aether or
fields, maybe both.
And at those points we
have local qualities: perfectly natural
intrinsic properties which need nothing
bigger than a point to be instantiated. For
short: we have an arrangement of qualities.
And that is all. There is no difference
without difference in the arrangement of
qualities.
All else supervenes on that. ^^
.

^^Lewis (1986a) p. x; my emphasis.
Lewis actually
advocates a restricted version of this thesis.
First, it
is a metaphysically contingent thesis: it holds at a world,
w, iff all the worlds with no natural properties alien to w
are such that none of them differ in any way without
differing in the arrangement of point qualities. Second,

(continued
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.

.

.

One who thinks of supervenience
as a relation between
sets of properties might try to
formulate Humean

supervenience as the claim that all
properties globally
supervene on the set of perfectly natural
properties of
spacetime points (call it •?•).
Fix the distribution

of

the point qualities,
fixed.

P,

one might say, and all else is

Now consider the property of being alive,

L.

As we

have interpreted Humean supervenience, it
implies that L
globally supervenes on P.
(Gs)
however, is too strong to
capture this claim. Since my computer and I are
P-

indiscernible (neither of us is
has any of the point qualities)

point so neither of us

a
,

there will be some P-

automorphism on the actual world that takes me to my
computer and my computer to me.

But

I

am alive while my

computer is not so that P-isomorphism is not an Lisomorphism and L does not

(Gs)

The argument generalizes.

—supervene on
If

(Gs)

P.

is the correct

formulation of global, then macro-properties such as being
a chair,

being red, or being human will all fail to be

globally supervenient on the set of microphysical
properties.

But global supervenience, being a multiple-

domain relation, is supposed to be ideally suited to
capture such theses.

^^

( .

.

.

One might conclude from this that

continued)

it fails for non-qualitative properties such as

haecceities
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(Gs)

is actually too strong to be
a legitimate formulation

of global supervenience after all.
If one approaches Lewis's claim
without the bias that

global supervenience is exclusively a
relation between sets
of p roperties however, it is apparent
that Lewis is not
claiming that all qualitative properties
are globally
supervenient on P. Rather, he is claiming that
they are
globally supervenient on PuR, where R is the
,

set of all

natural spatiotemporal relations.
that "we have geometry:

a

system of spatiotemporal distance

relations between points".

supervenience base.

After all, Lewis said

That is part of the

And note that my counterexample to the

(Gs)

-supervenience of L on P is no counterexample to the

(Gs)

-supervenience of L on PuR.

The P-automorphism which

takes me to my computer is not a PuR-automorphism.

computer and

I

My

stand in different spatiotemporal relations

to infinitely many objects.

This example illustrates the importance of allowing

relations in the sets related by

(Gs)

—supervenience

can be adapted to make the same point about (Gw)

:

.

It

worlds

that are P-isomorphic might fail to be L-isomorphic because

worlds with different arrangements of the same point
particles with the same natural properties might fail

^*^In chapter VI, I will argue that strictly speaking,
we need to make the base isomorphism preserve the
part/whole relation in order to capture Lewis's
supervenience claim.
I ignore this complication for now.
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completely to have any living
inhabitants,
not (GW) -supervene on P either.

Thus, L does

But it is plausible that L

does (Gw) -supervene on PuR: worlds
which have some PuRisomorphism (have the same number of
point particles with
the same natural properties distributed
in the same way
over space and time) may well be
L-isomorphic

When one thinks about it, it is to be
expected that
many global (and local) supervenience
relations
will

involve relations.

A major advantage of (Gw) and (Gs) over

traditional formulations of global supervenience
is they
are both well-defined when relations are
included
in the

base set or the supervenient set.^^

in the next chapter.

It is by including relations in the sets related
by
especially the part -whole relation,
that its multi-domain character is assured. Otherwise
(^s) -supervenience would entail weak supervenience,
and
since weak supervenience is a single-domain relation, (Gs)
would fail to be a multi-domain relation after all. To
prove that the (Gs) -supervenience of any set of properties
on any other set of properties entails their weak
supervenience, suppose S (Gs) -supervenes on B, where S and
B both contain no relations.
Then every B— isomorphism is
S-isomorphism
To prove that S weakly supervenes on B
suppose that in some world, w, two individuals, x and y,
are B-indiscernible, and show that they must be S(Gs) -supervenience,

.

indiscernible
Since they are B-indiscernible, there is a
B— automorphism on w which takes x to y, y to x, and every
other inhabitant of w to itself. Because B-automorphisms
are B-isomorphisms and every B-isomorphism is an Sisomorphism, this B-automorphism on w must be an Sisomorphism as well. Thus, x and y share the same Sproperties, and so they are S-indiscernible
(Gw)
on the
other hand, does not formally imply (W)
even for sets of
properties: consider a model of logical space with only one
world in the domain (so (Gw) is trivially satisfied) but
which contains objects that are B-indiscernible but S.

.

discernible
(continued.
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.

.

we will introduce versions of
local supervenience which,
unlike (S) and (W)
also hold between sets of
properties
and relations.
First, however, I must deliver
on a promise
I made in chapter IV.

—Petrie
i-i

and Kim ReconsiderpH

Petrie's Counterexampl p
Petrie's example is based on the following
worlds:

Qx

-Qy

^Qx

'

-.Qy

'

Px

Py

Px

'

-.Py

I

In chapter IV,

l

argued that although Petrie's example

shows the formal inequivalence of global and strong,
it
fails to establish that global is metaphysically
weaker

than strong because it fails to establish

.

continued)

In fact, with an appropriate plenitude principle one
can show that (Gs) -supervenience of properties as I have
.

presently formulated it, entails strong supervenience.
Proof: assume S (Gs) -supervenes on B.
Then we suppose that
two possible individuals, x and y, are B-indiscernible
To
prove that they are S-indiscernible consider a world that
is a duplicate of the mereological sum of x's world and y's
world.
If such a world always exists (which is
controversial) then we can argue as I did above that the
(Gs) -supervenience of S on B implies that x and y are Sindiscernible as well.
.
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(CE)

There are sets of properties

S

and B such that s

supervenes globally but not strongly
on

B.

In order for Petrie to prove that
the unit sets of Q
and P are such sets, he would have
to establish that Q

globally but not strongly supervenes on

But in order to

P.

establish that Q globally supervenes on
P Petrie would have
to establish that, of all the possible
worlds,
none are P-

indiscernible and Q-discernible

.

Just exhibiting two

possible worlds which fail to be P-indiscernible
is not
enough.

used the principle of isolation to illustrate
the
incompleteness of Petrie's example.
Isolation implies
I

that

if P and Q are intrinsic properties, x and
y are atoms (as
is compatible with everything Petrie said)

and w is a

possible world, then the following are possible worlds as
well

z

I

z

'

Qv

-Qv

Pv

Pv'

claimed that since

z

and

z

'

are P-indiscernible but Q-

discernible, Q does not globally supervene on
is not established.
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P.

Thus (CE)

It is at this point that we
need to see whether the
new definitions of global support
my response to Petrie's

example.

Specifically, we need to be sure
that according
to both (Gs) and (GW)
Q fails to globally supervene on
P.
Z and z' are counterexamples
to the (Gs) -supervenience of
Q
on P because the one P-isomorphism
between these worlds
fails to be a Q-isomorphism; They are
also counterexamples
to the (Gw) -supervenience of
Q on P because there is a pisomorphism but no Q-isomorphism between z
and z'.
Thus,
,

as

I

2

Kim on The Extra Atom

claimed at the outset of chapter IV, the
differences
between the precise formulations of global are
immaterial
to my response to Petrie's argument for (CE)

.

As you may recall, Kim claims that the metaphysical

significance of Petrie's example is that it shows the

weakness of global supervenience as a relation of
dependence or determination.

Kim asks us to imagine a

possible world, W, which differs physically from the actual
world,

0,

only by containing an extra ammonia molecule,

somewhere in the rings of Saturn.

e,

This minute physical

difference is accompanied in W by the complete lack of any
mental states.

Letting N be the property of having no sentient parts,
I

argued as follows:
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Since W has N (in other words, no
part of w
IS sentient)
the mereological difference
w
minus e (W-e)
also has N.
Two exclusive
and exhaustive possibilities arise.
Either
N IS intrinsic to W-e, or it is
not.
if n
IS intrinsic to W-e, by the
principle of
isolation there is another world, W,
contains only* a perfect duplicate of which
w-e.
Since W-e has N and W' contains only* a
duplicate of W-e, W' also has N (i.e., W'
also lacks sentient parts).
But, of bourse,
@ has many sentient parts.
Thus, we can
conclude that @ and W' are mentally
discernible.
Next we establish that @ and
W' are physically indiscernible.
Note that
by stipulation the only physical difference
between W and @ is that W has e and 0 does
not!
So W', which contains only* a
duplicate of W-e, must be physically
indiscernible to 0.
in fact, the only
physical difference between W and both 0 and
W' is that W contains the extra molecule,
e,
while W' and 0 do not. Thus, W' and 0 are
physically indiscernible and mentally
discernible: global psychophysical
supervenience is false!
,

,

If the existence of e in W is the only physical

<Iiff®^6nce between

0

and W, then any duplicate of W-e,

should be physically isomorphic to W.

Thus, there should

be at least one physical isomorphism between W' and

one that takes each object in
W'.

0

0,

the

to a physical duplicate in

But there will not be any mental isomorphism between

and W' because there is nothing in W' which is mentally

indiscernible to me.

So (Gw) -psychophysical supervenience

is falsified by the existence of

supervenience is falsified, so is

0

and W'.
(Gs)

And if (Gw)-

-supervenience

.

rest of the argument (concerning what happens if N is

extrinsic to W-e) is not affected by the different
196

The

0

definitions of global.

Thus, as

I

claimed in chapter iv my

response to Kim-s objection applies
no matter which of the
suitably general formulations of
global supervenience is
adopted.

G.

In this chapter

Conclusion

illustrated the need for a suitably

I

general definition of global supervenience,
and
two candidates from the literature.

I

Along the way

extracted
I

have

also shown why it is important to formulate
global

supervenience in such

a

way that relations are allowed into

the base and supervenient sets.

Finally,

i

have shown that

my arguments in chapter IV would stand no matter
which of
the two formulations of global supervenience one
accepts.
In the next chapter

I

will formulate and investigate

generalized, multi-domain, local supervenience relations

inspired by (Gw) and (Gs)
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CHAPTER VI

GENERALIZED LOCAL AND GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE
RELATIONS

A.

Introduction

Consider the classic distinction between
primary and
secondary qualities (conceived of in roughly
the Lockean
way as powers in objects). The secondary
qualities of an
individual are supposed to depend on the primary
qualities
of,

and relations between, the individual

parts.

'

microphysical

This sort of dependence should be expressible in

terms of supervenience

.

For example, pliability (to some

determinate degree) is plausibly locally supervenient on
some set of microphysical properties and relations.

if one

possible individual is more pliable than another, either
their microphysical parts have different microphysical

properties or they stand in different external relations to
one another.

Many natural kind properties, such as being

water molecule, seem to locally supervene in this way.

We

could use (Gs) or (Gw) to formulate such dependence

relations as supervenience theses, but that would not

reflect their status as local determination relations.
And, as

I

showed in chapter IV. A. 2., if we try to capture

these relations in terms of

(S)
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or

(W)

we will fail.

a

The advocate of strong supervenience
may protest that
strong supervenience can capture
the supervenience of
pliability on structural properties of
macrophysical
individuals, where the structural
properties are themselves
"composed of" the microphysical properties
and relations.
Since the structural properties are
properties of the
pliable individuals, we are no longer faced
with a multiple
domain supervenience relation. But what
about the

dependence of pliability on the microphysical
properties
and relations themselves? Aren't these the
properties

(and

relations) on which pliability ultimately depends?
Clearly, we need a local supervenience relation
capable of

expressing at least the functional component of the

metaphysically significant dependence relations holding
between the macrophysical and the microphysical realm or
between the properties of wholes and the properties of, and
relations between, their parts.

Since (Gs) and (Gw) can

express global multiple domain determination relations, it
seems advisable to formulate relations of local multiple-

domain supervenience on analogy with
In section B,

relations.

I

(Gs)

and (Gw)

develop such local supervenience

In section C,

I

present my final formulations

of the two global supervenience relations.

In section D,

consider the formal and metaphysical entailment relations
among our new generalized supervenience relations.
section

E,

I

consider the kind of correlation and
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In

I

functional dependence relations between
supervenient and
base properties entailed by these
relations.
Finally,

section

F,

in

consider their status as nonreductive

1

dependence relations.

—Generalize d

Local Supervenience

^ Initial Formulations

2

Let S and B be any sets of properties and/or
relations

(Lw)

locally supervenes on B

S

objects, X and y,

for any possible

if there is a B-isomorphisiti

between the parts of x and the parts of
y then
there is an S~isoinorphisin between the parts of x
and the parts of y.

(Ls)

locally supervenes on B

S

for any possible

objects, X and y, every B-isomorphism between the

parts of X and the parts of y is an Sisomorphism.

Where

(ISO)

f

is an A- isomorphism between x and v

f

is a

one-one function from the parts of x to the parts
of y such that for any n-place relation (or
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property), r, in a, and for each
part of
^2,

X3,..., Rx^...x^ iff Rf

(X,)

.

.

.

f (x^)

x,

,

.

Both (Ls) and (Lw) are less than
optimal formulations
of local multiple domain supervenience
We can see this
most simply by considering cases where
the supervenient set
contains only properties. We want our
formulation to
.

capture the idea that no possible individuals
can differ
regarding their supervenient properties without
differing
regarding the base properties of, and relations
between,

their parts.

But neither (Ls) nor (Lw) does so.

The problem with (Lw) can be seen by comparing
it to
an alternative formulation of the local supervenience
of

properties

(La)

S

locally supervenes on B

for any possible

objects X and y if there is

a B— isomorphism

between the parts of x and the parts of y then x
and y are individually S-indiscernible (have the

same S-properties)

According to

(La)

,

two possible individuals which have a B-

isomorphism between their parts must themselves be

individually S-indiscernible (although there need not be an

S-isomorphism between their parts)

.

This more faithfully

captures the idea behind the local supervenience of
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p roperties than

(Lw)

does because (Lw) does not require

individuals with a B-isomorphism between their
parts to be
S-indiscernible (to have the same S-properties)
there need
only be some S-isomorphism between their
parts.
:

The core

of the problem is that the S-isomorphism
between the parts
of two individuals need not take the two whole
individuals

to one another, and thus they might be S-discernible.

if

the individuals themselves fail to be S-indiscernible,
why

should we care whether there is some S-isomorphism between

their parts?

We already seem to have a counterexample to

the local supervenience of S on

Next consider (Ls)

.

B.

Let S = {being an H2O molecule)

and B = (the property of being a hydrogen atom, the

property of being an oxygen atom, and the relation of being
bonded to) where being bonded to is understood as a
relation holding exclusively among atoms (e.g., an OH

molecule is never, strictly speaking, bonded to another
hydrogen atom, rather, the oxygen atom in the OH molecule
is bonded to another hydrogen atom to compose a water

molecule)

.

Consider any two water molecules, M and

M = HOH

W:

W = H'O'H'

For S to locally supervene on B according to (Ls) every B-

isomorphism between M and W must be an S-isomorphism.

Now

consider the isomorphism which takes OH to H'O'H' and HOH
202

to O'H'

OH and H'O'H' have the

san,e

B-properties: neither

IS a hydrogen atom or an oxygen
atom, and since they are

not atoms, neither stand in the
bonded relation to any
other parts of M or W.
So there is such a B-isomorphism
between M and W, and it clearly fails
to be an Sisomorphism.
Thus, according to (Ls)
M and W are
counterexamples to the local supervenience
,

of s on B.

But,

surely, M and W do not really constitute
a counterexample
to the basic idea behind the local
supervenience thesis

because M and W are individually S-indiscernible
really does appear to be locally supervenient
on

Another problem with
(La)

is that like

(Ls)

(Lw)

Also

.

S

B.

and unlike

it has the consequence that two individuals
can be

non-trivial positive instances of the local supervenience
of S on B (for any sets S and

S-indiscernible.

(Ls)

B)

without being individually

has this consequence because it

could be that every B-isomorphism between two possible

individuals is an S-isomorphism, yet there is no S-

isomorphism which takes the one (whole) individual to the
other because there is no B-isomorphism taking each
individual to the other (whole)

2.

individual.

Taking Account of the Part/Whole Relation
The preceding difficulties can be resolved by

requiring the isomorphisms to preserve the part/whole
relation.

For example, the B-isomorphism which takes OH to
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H'O'H' and HOH to O'H' does not
preserve the part/whole
relation (<)
Thus, if we require the isomorphisms
to

preserve

it would be irrelevant to the
truth of the

<,

local supervenience of s on

B.

Also if we require the base

and supervenient isomorphisms to preserve

<,

then (Lw) will

imply (La) because all isomorphisms
between any two
individuals which preserve < must take the two
whole

individuals to one another.
But how should we see to it that all
isomorphisms

relevant to the truth of a local supervenience
thesis

preserve the part/whole relation?

One way to do so is

always to reformulate individual local supervenience
theses
by adding < to the base set (and in the case of
(Lw)

to the

supervenient set as well)

.

Since our objections point to

general defect afflicting both (Lw) and (Ls)

a

however, it

would be preferable to replace them with the following
formulations

(Lwm)

S

locally supervenes on B

for any possible

individuals, x and y, if there is a B-isomorphism

between the parts of x and the parts of y which
preserves the part/whole relation, then there is
an S-isomorphism between the parts of x and the

parts of y which preserves the part/whole
relation.
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(Lsm)

S

locally supervenes on B

=^,

for any possible

individuals, x and y, any B-isomorphism
between
the parts of x and the parts of
y which preserves
the part/whole relation is an
S-isomorphism
as

well

These are mereological versions of local
supervenience.

But we shouldn't see them as special
cases

of local supervenience.

Even

(S)

can be seen as a limiting

case of mereological supervenience: the
supervenient

properties of a whole are determined by the
subvenient

properties of its non-proper part.
(Lwm)

In any case,

(Lsm)

and

appear to be preferable to our non-mereological

formulations (Lw) and

(Ls)

,

and

I

will work with them in

what follows.

3.

The Local Supervenience of Relations

Before

I

go on to reformulate my two global

supervenience relations in light of (Lsm) and (Lwm)

,

I

want

to make some remarks about the local supervenience of

relations.

The main idea behind the local supervenience of

properties is that no individuals can instantiate different

supervening properties without there being some difference
in the base properties of,

or base relations between, their

parts (including their non-proper parts).

An individual's

locally supervenient properties depend on (are determined
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by)

the distribution of base properties
and relations over
that individual's parts.
it is ridiculous, however, to
claim that whether an individual stands
in certain

supervenient relations depends on, or is
determined by, the
distribution of any set of intrinsic properties
and

relations over the individual's parts.

Two perfect

duplicates can stand in very different external
and
extrinsic relations to other individuals.

Perhaps the

whole notion of relations being locally supervenient
is a
mistake.
To see that it isn't a mistake, it is helpful to note

that globally supervenient relations do not (usually) hold

between entire worlds.
of worlds.
R,

is

(

Rather they hold between proper

Now consider the claim that a relation,

Lsm) -supervenient on some set of properties and

relations, Q, iff every pair of possible individuals are

such that every Q-isomorphism between their parts which

preserves the part/whole relation is an R-isomorphism.
This is a coherent thesis because we avoid the trap of

expecting the total base nature of an individual and its
parts to determine its locally supervenient relations to

other individuals.

Instead we only expect the total base

nature of an individual and its parts to determine which of
the individual's parts stand in the locally supervening

relation to one another.

No attention is paid to whether
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the individual or its parts stand
in R to individuals which
are not parts of the original individual.

Generaliized Global Su perv e n ience

:

Final Ad-justinents

In light of my decision to work with
(Lsm) and (Lwm)
it is advisable to consider analogous
versions of global

supervenience

(Gwm)

S

globally supervenes on B

worlds, w and

z,

between w and

z

for any possible

if there is a B-isomorphism

which preserves the part/whole

relation then there is an S-isomorphism between w
and

(Gsm)

S

z

which preserves part/whole relations.

globally supervenes on B

worlds, w and

and

z

for any possible

every B-isomorphism between w

z,

which preserves the part/whole relation is

an S-isomorphism.

These relations have advantages their more general
ancestors,

(Gw)

and (Gs)

,

lack.

For instance, the

preceding example concerning the failure of the (Ls)supervenience of the property of being a water molecule is

problematic for

(Gs)

but not (Gsm)

.

More importantly,

consider our previous example (from chapters IV. A.
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2.

and

V.E.) of the global supervenience of
all qualities and

somewhat natural relations on the set of
perfectly natural
microphysical properties and relations, Q.
Lewis

indicates

that he believes the perfectly natural external
relations
are spatiotemporal relations which hold between
spacetime
points, or point-particles:

We have geometry: a system of external
relations of spatiotemporal distance between
points.
Maybe point sized bits of matter or
aether or fields, maybe both. And at those
points we have local qualities: perfectly
natural intrinsic properties which need
nothing bigger than a point at which to be
instantiated.
For short we have an
arrangement of qualities. And that is all.
There is no difference without a difference
in the arrangement of qualities.
All else
supervenes on that.^

since the part/whole relation is neither

a

distance

relation, nor a perfectly natural intrinsic property, Lewis

does not appear to be including the part/whole relation in
the supervenience base.

With this point in mind

I

want to

consider whether this thesis is best formulated in terms of
(Gs)

or (Gsm)

As before, we call Lewis's base set of microphysical

properties and relations,

Q.

In chapter V (pp.

184-186)

I

argued that the natural external relations in Q were not

preserved by any automorphism which takes me to my computer

^Lewis (1986c)

pp ix-x.
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because, for example, my computer
and
external relations to my television.

I

stand in different

This was used as an

argument for the importance of allowing
relations in the
sets related by supervenience
(especially the base set)
.

(Gs)

(and (Gw))

appeared capable of capturing Lewis's

supervenience thesis as long as these
relations were
included in Q.
Strictly speaking, however, because
all qrelations are relations between point-particles
(or

points), and neither of us are point-particles,
my computer
and I do not stand in any Q-relations to
anything: we
aren't the right sort of things. While we
stand in less

than perfectly natural external relations such
as the
relation of having midpoints which are one-meter
apart (or
having nearest points which are one inch apart)
it
,

seems

that we do not stand in any of the perfectly natural

distance relations in

if this is correct, then, because

Q.

neither my computer nor

I

am a point-particle and so

neither of us instantiate any of the Q-properties or stand
in any of the Q-relations, contrary to what

I

said in

chapter V, there would be Q-automorphisms on the actual

world which took me to my computer despite taking all point
particles to themselves.

Such a Q-automorphism fails to

preserve many important properties such as the property of
being alive.

Thus,

if we formulate Lewis's plausible

supervenience thesis in terms of
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(Gs)

,

we get the result

that it is blatantly false.

(Gs)

does not appear to

capture the plausible thesis Lewis had
in mind after all.
On the other hand, on our new mereological
versions of
global supervenience, we can follow Lewis
in allowing
only

perfectly natural properties and natural
external relations

^tween point-particles

in Q.

For if the Q-isomorphisms

have to preserve the external relations between
the point
particles, then, in virtue of preserving the
part/whole
relation, they will preserve the less natural
external

relations between the things these particles compose.

By

requiring the isomorphisms to preserve the part/whole
relation, we ground the less natural spatiotemporal

relations between macroscopic individuals (such as having

midpoints which are one meter apart) on the spatiotemporal
relations between their point-particles.
that (Gsm)

This suggests

is a more suitable formulation of the

supervenience thesis intended by Lewis than is

(Gs)

.

Similar remarks could be made in defense of (Gwm) vis-a-vis
(Gw)

.

One who is wed to (Gs) or (Gw) could achieve the same

result by reformulating the base set (and in the case of
(Gw),

the supervenient set as well) of Lewis' supervenience

thesis by adding the part/whole relation to it.

course is probably defensible.

Either

And my remarks in chapter

V.E. concerning Humean supervenience and the need to allow

relations in the sets related by supervenience can be
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reinterpreted in either fashion.

since

I

have occasion to

compare local and global supervenience
relations, however,
and the local relations are best
understood along the lines
of (Lsm) and (Lwm)
it suits my purposes to adopt
(Gsm) and
,

(Gwm)

as my formulations of global supervenience

henceforth

D.

1.

Entailment Relations^

The Basic Picture
One way to learn more about these four new multiple

domain supervenience relations is to consider the logical
relations among them.

Previous proofs that

(Gs)

entailed

but is not entailed by (Gw) apply equally well to (Gsm) and
(Gwm)

.

Surprisingly, however, they do not suffice to

establish that (Lsm) entails but is not entailed by (Lwm)
In fact, as

I

will prove below, if we restrict membership

in the supervenient set to properties,

equivalent.

(Lsm)

and (Lwm) are

Thus, we need to consider the supervenience of

relations to establish the greater strength of (Lsm)
S be

the unit set of the relation,

.

is the father of

Let
,

^In this section, except where I explicitly indicate
otherwise, the relevant kind of entailment is some kind of
formal entailment because, for the most part, I will
consider simplified models of logical space without taking
plenitude principles into account. For definiteness, I
will always assume that accessibility is an equivalence
relation, so the relevant formal system would be a version
of S5.
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and let B be the unit set of the
relation
is the father
or only child of
clearly, any two individuals
which
are such that there is a Bu{<)
-isomorphism between their
parts would have to be such that there
is an Su{<}.

isomorphism between their parts.

But not all Bu{<}-

isomorphisms are S-isomorphisms

For instance, consider

.

any mereological sum of father and only
child where the
father and child have the same number of
parts (perhaps

they have the same mass)

Any B-automorphism on the sum

which takes the father to the child and the
child to the
father fails to be an S-automorphism. This shows
that

(Lsm)

is indeed stronger than

(Lwm)

It is no surprise that our local supervenience
theses

entail the corresponding global supervenience theses.

Consider (Lsm) and (Gsm)

.

Since possible worlds are

possible individuals, if every B-isomorphism between

possible individuals which preserves

<

is an S-isomorphism,

then any B-isomorphism between possible worlds which

preserves

<

Now if
(Lwm)

,

is an S-isomorphism as well.
I

can establish that (Gsm)

is independent of

we will have a clear picture of the entailment

relations between our new supervenience relations.
I

First,

use a version of the example used above to establish the

^There is room for differences of opinion on what are
the parts of any individual.
For example, some will take
any mereological sum or difference of parts to be parts.
Others will not. My formulations of supervenience are
neutral on such issues.
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greater strength of (Lsm) to show that
(Lwm) fails to
entail (Gsm)
Let S and B be as before.
Consider a model
with one world containing a father-child
pair,
.

each with

the same number of parts, and nothing
distinct from their
sum.
The sum is such that there is a Bu( <}
-automorphism
between its parts and an Su( <} -automorphism
as well.
And
no other possible individuals in this world
would threaten
the truth of the (Lwm) -supervenience of S on
B.
But,

clearly, not every Bu{ <} -automorphism on the world
is an
Su{<) -automorphism.
Consider a Bu{ <} -automorphism that

takes father to child, and child to father.

Thus,

(Lwm)

does not formally entail (Gsm)

Next we need to establish that (Gsm) does not formally
entail (Lwm)

.

To do this

consider the following model

I

with two possible worlds each of which is viewed as

consisting of two atomic individuals which together compose
a third possible individual,

itself.

I

namely the possible world

stipulate that the worlds have the following

properties: W has P and

Q,

while

z

has P and -Q.

Pw

Pz

Qw

--Qz

Pa

Pb

Pc

-Pd

Qa

Qb

Qc

Qd
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In this model, P (Gsm) -supervenes
on Q because there is no
Q-isomorphism between w and z and every
Qu{ <} -automorphism
on w and on z is a P-automorphism.
p fails to (Lwm),

supervene on

Q,

however, because there is a Qu{<}-

isomorphism between the parts of a and the
parts of c but
no P-isomorphism between them.
Thus, we have discovered
that the following formal entailment relations

hold among

our four new versions of local and global
supervenience

No Restrictions on

S

or B

(Lsm)
(Lwm)

(Gsm)

(Gwm)

2.

Special Cases
As

I

mentioned above, when the supervenient set

contains only properties, then (Lsm) and (Lwm) are actually
equivalent.
(Lwm)

,

Since we already know that (Lsm) entails

to prove the equivalence we only need to establish

that for any set of properties,

properties and relations,

properties

S

if S

B,

then S (Lsm) -supervenes on

S,

and any set of
(Lwm) -supervenes on B

So suppose some set of

B.

fails to (Lsm) -supervene on a set of

properties and relations

B.

Then some pair of possible

objects, X and y, is such that some Bu{ <} -isomorphism,

between their parts fails to be an S-isomorphism.
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f,

So there

are possible objects, x- and

y,

which are parts of x and
y

respectively and are such that f(x')
=
S-discernible (they have different

y

yet x' and

S-properties)

is a Bu{<) -isomorphism and f(x')

=

y,

.

y

are

since

f

it follows that

there is some Bu( <} -isomorphism between
the parts of x' and
the parts of y'.
Yet there is no Su{ <) -isomorphism
between
their parts because any such isomorphism
would
have to take

the two wholes to one another, and they
are S-discernible.
Thus the (Lwm) -supervenience of S on B is
false.
in light
of our earlier results, this establishes
that when

membership in the supervenient set is limited to
properties, the formal and metaphysical entailment

relations between our four generalized supervenience
theses
are as follows:

S

Contains Only Properties
(Lsm)

-H-

(Lwm)

(Gsm)
i

(Gwm)

Finally, if the supervenient and base sets only

contain intrinsic properties, we can use isolation to prove
that the four relations are metaphysically (but not
formally) equivalent.

The following example illustrates

this point as well as illustrating why (Lsm) and (Lwm) are

formally equivalent when

S

contains only properties
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although (Gsm) and (Gwm) are not.

The example is a slight

variant of our original example in chapter
V of the formal
inequivalence of (Gs) and (Gw)
But instead of having two
worlds each with two individuals, we have
six possible
.

individuals: a is composed of o and d, while
b is composed
of e and f.

-Qa

-Qb

-Pa

-Pb

Qc

-Qd

-Qe

Qf

Pc

-Pd

Pe

-Pf

There is both a P-isomorphism and a Q-isomorphism between
the parts of a and the parts of b which preserves

<,

but

not every Pu( <} -isomorphism between the parts of a and the

parts of b is a Qu{ <} -isomorphism.
show that, contrary to what

I

This would appear to

have proven above, when S

contains no relations (Lsm) is not equivalent to (Lwm)
Actually, however,

(Lwm)

is a universally quantified

thesis, and, while a and b are consistent with the (Lwm)-

supervenience of Q on

P,

c and e

(and d and

f)

are not.

After all, c and e are possible individuals and, according
to (Lwm)

,

any possible individuals that have a base-

isomorphism between their parts which preserves
a

<

also have

supervenient isomorphism between their parts which

preserves

<.

But while there is a Pu{ <} -isomorphism
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between c and

e,

there is no Qu{ <} -isomorphism between

them.

Thus this model falsifies the (Lwm)
-supervenience of
Q on P after all.
One may then wonder why our original model
from
chapter V (see p. 170) where a and b are worlds
does not
falsify (Gwm)
too.
The reason is that (Gwm) only
,

quantifies over all possible worlds

.

and while the parts of

possible individuals are possible individuals, the
proper
parts of possible worlds are not possible worlds. Thus,
the fact that parts of possible worlds may be such that

their parts are Bu{ <} -isomorphic without being Su{<}isomorphic is perfectly compatible with the truth of (Gwm)-

supervenience

-

except, that is,

in situations where the

principle of isolation can be invoked.
This brings me to the final lesson of this example.
If S and B are both sets of intrinsic properties, then
(Gwm)

metaphysically (but not formally) entails (Lwm)

because any possible individuals which falsify (Lwm) will
be such that isolated duplicates of those individuals will

falsify (Gwm) as well.

After all, the principle of

isolation ensures us that for any possible individual there
is a world containing only* a duplicate of that individual.

So if S and B are sets of intrinsic properties and there

are two possible individuals which have a Bu{<)-

isomorphism, but no Su{ <} -isomorphism, between their parts,

then isolation implies the existence of two possible worlds
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with a Bu{<) -isomorphism but no Su{ <}
-isomorphism between
their parts. The result does not hold for
formal

entailment because not all admissible models of
modal logic
validate isolation. The important thing is that
if

(Gwm)

metaphysically entails (Lwm) for sets of intrinsic
properties, then in light of our earlier results it
follows

that all four formulations of supervenience are

metaphysically equivalent when

S

and B include only

intrinsic properties:

S

and B Contain Only Intrinsic Properties
(Gwm)

(Lwm)

With these proofs

I

(Lsm)

++

(Gsm)

have established the central

formal and metaphysical entailment relations between our
four generalized supervenience theses.

I

now consider the

functional correlation and functional determination

relations provided by our new supervenience relations.

E.

1.

Correlation and Functional Dependence

Introduction
In chapter II

P,

(p.

40)

I

showed that for any property,

that strongly supervenes on a base,

B,

there is some

member of the Boolean closure of B which is necessarily
coextensive with

P.

It was this correlation relation that
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Kim used to argue that strong
supervenience entailed some
kind of intertheoretic reducibility
In this section I aim
to investigate the correlations
implied by our four general
versions of supervenience. since none of
them are stronger
than (S)‘, my arguments in support of the
nonreductive
.

character of strong supervenience should apply
here as
well
In chapter III.B.2.,

I

gave a precise account of the

functional dependence relation implied by strong

supervenience.

I

showed that if s strongly supervenes on B

then there is a function,

f,

from the set of B-maximal

properties to the set of S-maximal properties such that for
any possible individual x, and any B-maximal property,
B*,

necessarily if B*x then f(B*)x.

This gives precise content

to the claim that an individual's S— properties are

determined by, and depend upon, its B-properties
section

I

.

In this

will also characterize the functional dependence

relations implied by our new supervenience relations.

Our

results concerning the correlation and functional

determination relations implied by these theses will help
^For any sets of properties S and B, if S strongly
supervenes on B then S (Lsm) -supervenes on B. Assume S
strongly supervenes on B so all B-indiscernible possible
individuals are S-indiscernible as well. Now to show that
(Lsm) is true, consider any Bu{ <} -isomorphism, f, between
the parts of any two individuals, x and y.
Since B only
contains properties, any part of x, x', must be
individually B-indiscernible to f(x').
It follows from (S)
that x' and f(x') are S-indiscernible as well.
Since this
is the case for any part of x and the corresponding part of
y, f must be an S-isomorphism as well.
.
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US evaluate the philosophical significance
of these new

supervenience relations.
Locally supervenient relations raise complications

which are peripheral to my main concerns.^

So

I

will

limit my remarks concerning local supervenience to
the

supervenience of properties.

This means that

I

can take

advantage of the equivalence of (Lwm) and (Lsm) under
this

restriction and simplify matters by dealing with both of
these relations at once.

-2-:

—(Gsm)

,

Correlation, and Functional Dependence^

We begin with a definition:

(Cl)

Possible individuals, x and
z

y,

(from worlds w and

respectively) are completely A-indiscernible

=df

and

there exists some A-isomorphism,

f,

between w

which preserves the part/whole relation and

z

is such that f(x)

= y.

^The complications involve the difference between the
functional dependence and correlation relations implied by
(Lsm) and (Lwm)
This is something I have not been able to
work out to my satisfaction. Fortunately, these
complications affect neither the nonreductive status of our
local supervenience relations nor their status (or lack
thereof) as necessary conditions for ontological dependence
relations, so I can safely sidestep this issue.
.

^The arguments in this section were significantly
influenced by, and to some extent modelled on, an excellent
discussion of similar points in Sider (1991).
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To establish the nature of the
functional dependence

relation provided by (Gsm) -supervenience

first we need to

,

prove that the relation of complete
A-indiscernibility is
an equivalence relation and therefore
partitions the

set of

possible individuals.

Clearly, being completely A-

indiscernible is reflexive and symmetric.

To prove that

it's transitive, consider three individuals,
x, y, and v.
We suppose that x is completely
A-indiscernible to y, and y
to V, and argue that x is completely
A-indiscernible to v.
More precisely, we assume that (i) there is an
A-

isomorphism,

^(y

)

f,

such that

between x's world, w(x)
f (x)

= y,

and y's world,

and (ii) there is an A-

isomorphism, g, between w(y) and w(v) such that f(y) =
v.
But then the composition of g and

f,

gof,

is an A-

isomorphism between w(x) and w(v) such that g(f(x)) =
Thus, X and v are completely A-indiscernible too.

v.

This

establishes that even when A includes relations, the

relation of complete A-indiscernibility is an equivalence
relation on the class of possible individuals.

Thus,

it

partitions the class into cells of completely Aindiscernible possible individuals.

For any cell in the

partition there is some property which is instantiated by
all and only the members of that cell.

Such properties are

instantiated by an individual in virtue of that
individual's total (intrinsic and extrinsic) A-nature.
us call such properties complete A-natures
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.

An

Let

individual's complete A-nature encompasses
its Aproperties, the A-properties of its worldmates,

and their

Au{<) -relations to one another.

Complete A-natures are

properties but they need not be (and usually will
not be)
members of A (or /0(A)).
Given that

(1)

S

(Gsm) -supervenes on B iff every pair of
possible

individuals which are completely B-indiscernible
are completely S-indiscernible^,

and given that being completely A— indiscernible is a matter
of having the same complete A-nature,

that the (Gsm) -supervenience of

S on B

it stands to reason

ensures that there

is a functional dependence of complete S-natures on

complete B-natures.

More precisely,

^Left to right: suppose every B-isomorphism which
preserves the part/whole relation is an S-isomorphism. Now
we assume some arbitrary x and y are completely Bindiscernible
That means there is a Bu{ <} -isomorphism
between w(x) and w(y) which takes x to y. Thus it must be
an S-isomorphism as well, and consequently x and y are
completely S-indiscernible
For the other direction,
assume that all completely B-indiscernible individuals are
completely S-indiscernible. Now consider an arbitrary
Bu{ <} -isomorphism, f, between worlds w and z.
Since f is a
Bu{ <} -isomorphism, for any x in w, x and f(x) are
completely B-indiscernible for all x in w. Thus, by our
assumption, x and f(x) are completely S-indiscernible for
all X in w.
But then f must be an S-isomorphism too.
.

.
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(GsmD)

(Gsm) -supervenes on B iff there
is a

S

function,

f,

from complete B-natures onto (the

set of all) complete S-natures such
that for any

possible

individual,

x,

and any complete B-

nature, B*, necessarily if B*x then f(B*)x.

If there was no such function then there
would be two

possible individuals with the same complete B-nature
but
different complete S-natures. Such individuals would

be

completely B— indiscernible yet not completely Sindiscernible

Thus, by (1), they would falsify the (Gsm)-

.

supervenience of

S on B.

portion of (GsmD)

.

assume that there is such

This establishes the left to
To establish the other direction,
a

function between complete B-

natures and complete-S-natures

.

So any pair of possible

individuals that are completely B-indiscernible are

completely S-indiscernible
supervenes on

.

Thus, by (1), s

(Gsm)

B.

Now we are prepared to establish the correlation

relation between supervenient and base properties analogous
to the one entailed by
B.

(S)

Suppose

Consider any property P in set

S.

S

(Gsm) -supervenes on
I

claim that the set

of all possible individuals which have P "follows the

borders" of the partition induced by being completely B-

indiscernible in the sense that for any cell in the
partition, one member of that cell instantiates P iff all
223

members of that cell instantiate
some P in

P.

For proof, suppose

doesn't "follow the borders" of the
partition.
Then there must be some B-cell with at
least one
S

member, x,

which instantiates P and another member,
have

y,

which does not

Because x and y are from the same B-cell they
are
completely B-indiscernible
But since one instantiates P
and the other doesn't, they are not completely
P.

.

S-

indiscernible, which contradicts our assumption that
(Gsm) -supervenes on B in light of
P,

(1).

S

Thus, any property,

in S is necessarily coextensive with some disjunction
of

complete B-natures.

(GsmC)

If s

More precisely.

(Gsm) -supervenes on B then for any

property P in

S

(in fact,

for any property in

^(S)), there is a set of complete B-natures, N,

such that D(Px

x instantiates some member of

N)

similar result can also be obtained for
supervenient relations. Suppose S (Gsm) -supervenes on B.
Consider any relation R in set S. Say that a relation R is
instantiated in a possible individual iff the relation
relates proper parts of that possible individual to one
another.
I claim that the set of all possible individuals
which instantiate R "follows the borders" of the partition
induced by being completely B-indiscernible in the sense
that for any cell in the partition, one member of that cell
instantiates R iff all members of that cell instantiate R.
For proof, suppose some R in S doesn't "follow the borders"
of the partition.
Then there must be some B-cell with at
least one member, x, which instantiates R and another
member, y, which does not instantiate R.
Since x and y are
from the same B-cell they are completely B-indiscernible.
But since one instantiates R and the other doesn't, they
(continued.
224

.

.

Complete B-natures are completely
specific ways an
individual can be with respect to the
B-properties of
itself,

its worldmates and the Bu<-relations
between them.
Clearly, if the attribution of any
complete B-nature to x
were to be expressed in the predicate
calculus (or an

infinitary analogue thereof) the formula would
contain
quantifiers (because one needs to express whether

x has any

worldmates, and, if so, what their B-properties
are).
Also, given that many worlds contain infinitely
many

individuals, B-natures, let alone disjunctions of
them,

could only be expressed in an infinitary language with

quantifiers and relation symbols.

Contrast this with the

kind of correlation relation provided by

(S)

every

strongly supervenient property was necessarily coextensive
with a disjunction of B-maximal properties.

So as long as

the base set has finitely many members, a predicate

expressing a supervenient property is necessarily
coextensive with a finite open sentence constructed out of
predicates expressing base properties and the operators of
disjunction, and negation.

It seems,

then, that if (S)

®
continued)
are not completely S-indiscernible there would not be any
S-isomorphism that preserves the part/whole relation and
takes X to y. That, however, contradicts our assumption
that S (Gsm) -supervenes on B in light of (1). The
preceding establishes that
( .

.

.

:

(Gsm) -supervenes on B then for any relation R in
there is a set of complete B-natures, N, such that
(Rxy...z
x+y+...+z instantiates some member of N)

If S
S,

.
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fails to entail the theoretical reducibility
of

supervenient disciplines to base disciplines (as
in III.B.),

^—(Lwm)

,

I

argued

so does (Gsm)

C orrelation,

and Functional Deoendencp

Next we turn to the nature of the correlation and
functional determination relations provided by our new

versions of local supervenience,

mentioned above

(p.

215)

,

I

(Lsm)

and (Lwm)

.

As

I

am ignoring some complications

regarding locally supervenient relations and focussing on
only locally supervenient properties, thereby taking

advantage of the equivalence of (Lsm) and (Lwm) when
contains no relations.

I

S

will work with the relation as

formulated in (Lwm) but my remarks apply equally to the
(Lsm) -supervenience of properties.

If S

(Lwm) -supervenes on B then any individuals which

are such that there is some Bu{ <) -isomorphism between them
are such that there is some Su{ <} -isomorphism as well.

For

any set of properties and relations, A, the relation of

being Au{ <} -isomorphic partitions the set of all possible
individuals.

For each cell in the partition there is some

property which is instantiated by all and only the members
of the cell.

Such properties are instantiated by an

individual in virtue of the individual's internal A-
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nature. 9

Internal A-natures are not usually
members of A.
They are constructed out of members
of A, the part/whole
relation and logical operations. This
suggest the
following definition of internal A-1
ndiscernibi
i-y
x and
1

y are internally A-indiscernible

i

.

x and y have the same

internal A-nature (i.e., there is an Au{ <}
-isomorphism

between the parts of x and the parts of
then, that (Lwm)

y)

.

it is clear,

is equivalent to the thesis that

internally B-indiscernible objects are internally
sindiscernible.
But this means that the (Lwm) -supervenience
of S on B is necessary and sufficient for the
existence of
a function from internal B-natures to
internal S-natures:

(LwmD)

S

(Lwm) -supervenes on B iff there is a

function,

f,

from internal B-natures onto

internal S-natures such that for any possible
individual,

x,

and any internal B-nature,

B^

necessarily if B.x then f(B.)x.

It is a short step to the following correlation

relation between S-properties and properties constructed
out of the members of the base set:
’l use the label "internal A-nature" in order to
distinguish these properties from complete A-natures. I
hope to indicate that an individual's internal A-nature
depends solely on the distribution of A-properties (and
relations) over the individual and its parts.
I refrained
from calling these properties intrinsic A-natures because A
might include some extrinsic properties.
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(LwmC)

If s

(Lwm) -supervenes on B then for any

property,
natures,

P,

In other words,
,

x instantiates some

I)

if S

in S,

P,

such that n(Px

I,

member of

in S, there is a set of internal B-

(Lwm) -supervenes on B then for any

there is a (perhaps infinitary)

disjunction of internal B— natures which is necessarily
coextensive with
that
P,

S

(

P.

To prove (LwmC) we begin by supposing

Lwm) —supervenes on B.

in S.

Now consider any property,

The set of all possible individuals instantiating

P will "follow the borders" of the partition induced by

internal B-indiscernibility

:

for any cell in the partition

induced by internal B-indiscernibility, and any member of

that cell,

instantiate

x instantiates P iff all of x's cell-mates

X,
P.

For proof, suppose there is some y such

that Py yet one of y's cellmates,
P.

x,

fails to instantiate

Since x and y are cell-mates in the partition induced

by internal B-indiscernibility, they are internally B-

indiscernible

:

they have the same internal B-natures.

since P (Lwm) -supervenes on

B,

But

they had better be

internally P-indiscernible as well.

Thus either each

instantiates P or neither does, contrary to our
supposition: contradiction.

We have established that for any property P in
cell in the partition induced by internal B228

S,

any

indiscernibility

,

and any member of that cell,

x,

x

instantiates P iff all of x's cell-mates
instantiate
This means that any individuals with the
same

P.

internal B-

nature must be such that both or neither
instantiate
Thus, there must be a set of internal
B-natures,

l,

P.

such

that an individual instantiates P iff it
instantiates some
member of I.
(LwmC) is established.

^—CGwm)

,

Cor relation, and Functional Dependence

In chapter V (p.

163),

I

said that two worlds are

globally A— indiscernible iff there is an A-isomorphism
between their parts.

Now,

in light of the general

importance of the part/whole relation and its central place
in our new supervenience relations,

I

need to introduce a

new notion of global A-indiscernibility

:

w and

z

are

globally A— indiscernible iff there is an Au{ <} —isomorphism

between the parts of w and the parts of

This is best

z.

thought of as a second, stricter kind of global A-

indiscernibility

.

They are interdef inable

two worlds are

:

A-indiscernible in the new sense iff they are Au{<}indiscernible on the old definition.
We begin by noting that the strict relation of global

A-indiscernibility (being Au{ <} -isomorphic)
one,

,

like the old

partitions the set of all possible worlds.

For each

cell in the partition induced by global A-indiscernibility,

there is a maximal A-proposition true at all and only the
229

worlds in that cell.

We can think of it as a complete

description of a way a world could be with
respect to the
properties and relations in Au{<). An
A-proposition is any

proposition which is such that either it or its
negation is
entailed by every maximal A— proposition.
Quite clearly, if

s

(Gwm) -supervenes on B then there

will be a function from maximal B-propositions
onto maximal
S-propositions

(GwmD)

S

(Gwm) -supervenes on B iff there is a

function,

f,

from maximal B-propositions

(complete ways a world can be with respect to the

properties and relations in Bu{<}) onto maximal

S-propositions such that for any possible world,
and any maximal B-proposition

w,

if P is true at w then f(P)

,

P,

necessarily

is true at w.

Otherwise, there would be two worlds at which the same

maximal B-proposition is true but different maximal S-

propositions are true.

Such worlds would be Bu{<}-

Essentially, I am now treating < as a logical
relation (or concept) which can be "contained" in any sort
of proposition without affecting its non-logical subject
matter.
Previously, < was not afforded this lofty status.
I am, in effect, introducing different notions of an Aproposition and a maximal A-proposition.
It is important
to note that the soundness of my earlier arguments in
chapter V.C., regarding the equivalence of the two standard
ways of interpreting (G)
is not compromised when they are
interpreted in terms of these new definitions of "global Aindiscernibility" and "A-proposition" (or "A-truth")
1

•
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isomorphic but not Su{ <} -isomorphic
and would be
counterexamples to the (Gwm) -supervenience

of s on B.

Now

aim to establish the following:

I

(GwmC)

If s

(Gwm) -supervenes on B then any s-

proposition,

P,

is equivalent to a disjunction of

maximal B-propositions

To prove (GwmC), suppose that

S

(Gwm) -supervenes on B.

So

any two worlds which are Bu{ <} -isomorphic are
Su{<)-

isomorphic as well.

Now consider any S-proposition,

P.

claim that if p is true at w, then every other world,

l

z,

which is Bu{<) -isomorphic to w must also be such that
P is
true at z.
In other words, for any cell in the partition
of the class of all possible worlds induced by the relation
of being Bu{ <} -isomorphic, and any S-proposition,

P,

P is

true at one world in the cell iff it is true at all of
them.

For reductio, suppose some cell contains a world, w,

at which P is true and another world,
false.

Since w and

z

z,

at which P is

are in the same cell of the partition

induced by global B-indiscernibility

isomorphism between them.

,

there is a Bu{<}-

Thus, according to (Gwm)

must be an Su{ <} -isomorphism between them.

both worlds.

P,

there

It follows that

the same maximal S-proposition is true at w and at
the S-proposition,

,

z,

so

must have the same truth value at

This establishes that any S-proposition,
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P,

has the same truth value at all worlds in
any cell in the
partition induced by being globally B-indiscernible
Likewise, P is false at a world in a cell iff it
is false
at all of them.
Thus, any S-proposition, P, is necessarily

equivalent with the disjunction of all the maximal B-

propositions associated with the cells in the partition
at
which P is true. This is sufficient to establish (GwmC)

F.

1.

Nonreductive Dependence Again

Reduction
In chapter III. A.,

of strong supervenience

I

.

defended the nonreductive status
Kim's challenge to its

nonreductive status seemed to be strongest when we
interpreted his remarks concerning strong connectibility as
the claim that the existence of necessary biconditionals

linking all theoretical terms of the secondary discipline

with terms of the primary (or reducing) discipline is all
that is required for the secondary discipline to be

reducible to the primary discipline.

I

argued that even if

we accept this undemanding notion of intertheoretic

reducibility and we restrict our attention to cases where
both the supervenient and base sets of properties could be

identified with a respective discipline (e.g. one with
economics, one with physics) the strong supervenience of

S

on B does not imply the (in principle) reducibility of the
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S

discipline to the B-discipline

The main reason for this

.

was that even though the strong supervenience
of S on B
implies that every property in S is necessarily
coextensive
with some member of the Boolean closure of B
(see
(SE)

p.37), there is reason to think that even if all
members of
B are expressed by theoretical terms of
some scientific

discipline (the B-discipline)

,

in many cases the

complicated predicates expressing members of the Boolean
closure of B would fail to qualify as terms of that

discipline
We have seen that like

(S)

(Lwm)

and (Gsm) all

(Lsm)

,

guarantee that every property in the supervenient set is

necessarily coextensive with some logical construction of
members of the base set.

But we also saw that the

constructions are more complicated in the case of (Lwm)
(Lsm)

,

and (Gsm)

:

they include quantifiers and relational

predicates while those provided by

(S)

do not.

For

example, even predicates expressing locally supervenient

properties are necessarily coextensive with open sentences
consisting of quantifiers, the logical operators of
disjunction, conjunction and negation, and predicates

expressing base properties, base relations, and the

part/whole relation.

It seems,

then, that my reasons in

defense of the nonreductive character of

(S)

are,

anything, more compelling in the cases of (Lwm)
(Gsm)

.

,

Finally, the nonreductive status of (Gwm)
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if
(Lsm)

,

and

is really

beyond dispute because it does not even imply
the existence
of any necessary coextensions between
supervenient

properties (or relations) and constructions out of
base
properties and relations. Thus, I think we can
conclude
that when one is concerned with a kind of reduction

that

has (even minimal) epistemological (and sociological)

requirements, as is surely the case with Nagel-style

intertheoret ic reduction, then all these supervenience
relations are capable of formulating nonreductive
relations
On the other hand,

it is worth recalling that locally

supervenient properties and relations, especially, may be

necessarily coextensive with finite, manageable
constructions out of the base set which would satisfy the
strong connect ibility requirement of theoretical
reductions.

So while these new relations are compatible

with the irreducibility of S-theories to B-theories, like
(S)

they certainly do not ensure that the relevant S-

theory (or discipline) will fail to reduce to the relevant
B-theory (or discipline)

.

David Lewis sums up the

relationship between supervenience and reducibility thus:

A Supervenience thesis is, in a broad sense,
reductionist.
But it is a stripped down
form of reductionism unencumbered by dubious
denials of existence, claims of ontological
priority, or claims of translatability
Even if reductionists ought to be less
cautious and aim for translation, still it
is a good idea to attend to the question of
.
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.

.

supervenience.
For if supervenience
then no scheme of translation can be fails
and we needn't go on Chisholming away correit
in
search of one.
if supervenience succeeds
on the other hand, then some correct
scheme
^^^^t exist; the remaining guestion
is
whether there exists a correct scheme that
is less than infinitely complex.

The basic claim is perfectly correct: without
the

functional correlation implied by supervenience,
there is
no hope of finding a necessarily coextensive
predicate

of

the reducing theory for each predicate in the
theory to be
reduced.

This raises an interesting guestion.

Precisely which

supervenience relation is the strongest one whose

correlation must be satisfied if some sort of
intertheoretic reduction is possible?

Although it is a

necessary condition for this sort of reducibility

,

(Gwm)

is

too weak because it neither entails the infinite

definability of predicates expressing supervenient
attributes in terms of predicates expressing base
attributes, nor does it guarantee that any such translation

scheme of the sort Lewis mentions exists.

(Gsm)

and our

local relations, on the other hand, do imply that some such

scheme exists for any predicate expressing any member of
the supervenient set.

However,

if,

as seems likely,

some

reductions will involve extrinsic properties which fail to

^^Lewis

(1983)

p.

358.
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be locally supervenient on the reducing
properties, then
(Lsm)

and (Lwm) are too strong.

This leaves (Gsm) as the

likely candidate to be the strongest of our
generalized

supervenience relations which is necessary for
intertheoretic reducibility

2

.

Dependence
In chapter III.B.2,,

I

distinguished ontic (or

ontological) dependence/determination from both functional

dependence/determination and ontic priority.

I

suggested

that the ontic dependence relation which Kim, Charles, and

others criticize supervenience for failing to provide could
be analyzed as a functional dependence relation between

sets of properties where, roughly, the members of the base

^^One might wonder whether this is correct.
After
all, we know that (Lwm) does not entail (Gsm), and didn't
just say that (Lwm) is too strong to be a necessary
condition on intertheoretic reducibility? This seems to
imply that (Gsm) is not necessary for intertheoretic

I

reducibility because intertheoretic reducibility may hold
in some cases where (Lwm) is true and (Gsm) is false.
But
appearances are deceiving. To straighten things out we
need to recall that (Lwm) does entail (Gsm) when the
supervenient set is restricted to properties, as I have
been assuming throughout this section. Thus, when the
supervenience of properties is in question, (Gsm) is the
strongest supervenience relation necessary for
intertheoretic reducibility for the reasons given in the
text.
On the other hand, when relations are included in
the supervenient set, (Lwm) fails to entail (Lsm)
and it
will probably fail (as (Gwm) fails) to be sufficient for
the sort of infinite definability required for
intertheoretic reducibility. Thus, although it hasn't been
definitively proven, I think it is reasonable to claim that
(Gsm) is the strongest of our four supervenience relations
necessary for intertheoretic reducibility.
,
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set are ontically prior to, or more
natural than, the

members of the supervenient set.^^
We saw that while strong supervenience

,

(S)

is a

functional dependence or determination relation,
even
strong asymmetric supervenience is not a
sufficient

condition for the ontic priority of the base
properties.
Given that strong supervenience is as strong as any
supervenience relation,

I

agreed with Kim and Grimes that

no supervenience relation is a sufficient condition
for the

ontic dependence of the supervenient properties on the
base
properties.

I

also suggested that, nevertheless, some

supervenience relation may yet be a necessary condition for
ontic dependence/determination between sets of properties
in virtue of being equivalent to the sort of functional

dependence which is one part of the two-part analysis of
ontic dependence.

Such a relation would clearly be

metaphysically significant as part of an analysis of ontic
dependence between sets of properties (and relations)

.

I

have since shown that the functional dependence relation

provided by

(S)

is too strong to be part of an analysis of

ontic dependence among properties: witness the inability of
(S)

to capture the local supervenience of pliability on

microphysical properties and relations and many other
examples involving mereological dependence, holistic

^^For the required

qualification see (SAS3) in chapter

III.B.5.
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dependence, and dependence on relations.

These were among

the reasons for the appeal of global supervenience
and for
the subsequent development of multiple domain
supervenience
into the four relations considered in this chapter.

My

next task is to determine which of the functional

determination relations provided by these four relations is
most suited to be part of an analysis of ontic

dependence/determination between properties.
(Lwm)

and (Lsm) appear to be too strong: many

important properties are extrinsic, and if Lewis's Humean

supervenience thesis is true then such properties are

ontologically dependent (but not locally supervenient) on
the set of perfectly natural microphysical properties and

relations.

It seems,

then, that either (Gsm)

or (Gwm)

would be the supervenience relation which provides one part
of the two part analysis of ontic dependence or

determination.

I

think (Gsm)

is the most likely candidate.

Reflection on the original proofs of the non-equivalence of
(Gs)

and (Gw)

version of

,

(Gs)

and my arguments for the need for some
(see V.D.2)

suggests that the functional

determination relation provided by (Gwm) is too weak to
capture the holistic determination relations which global

supervenience was designed to capture.

On the other hand,

if the issue is which relation provides the appropriate

functional dependence relation for an analysis of ontic
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dependence among propositions (or facts)

,

then the nod

would have to go to (Gwm)

G.

Conclusion

In this chapter we saw some advantages of
our new

formulations of local supervenience
in virtue of entailing (Gsm)

,

.

For instance,

(Lsm)

is also strong enough to

satisfy the necessary condition for reducibility and
to

ensure that a relation of ontic dependence holds as long
as
the base properties are ontically prior to the supervenient
ones.
(Lsm)

More generally, before the introduction of (Lwm) and
the only way to capture local multiple-domain

dependence relations was to formulate them in terms of
global supervenience.

I

think this contributed

icially to the popularity of global supervenience.

Certainly we want a local supervenience relation which can
capture such determination relations directly.
local supervenience relations,

(Lsm)

and (Lwm)

Our new
,

can do so.

This is especially valuable because the local supervenience
of the properties of wholes on the properties of, and

relations between, their parts seems to be the paradigm
case of a metaphysically significant supervenience
relation.
In conclusion, while all four of our new supervenience

relations appear to be nonreductive dependence relations.
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of some sort, there is reason to think
that (Gsm)-

supervenience is the most philosophically
significant of
them.
It appears to be both a necessary condition
for
intertheoretic reducibility and both a necessary
condition,
and part of an analysis, of ontic dependence among

families

of properties and relations.

Another advantage of (Gsm) is

that it is a precise formulation of the leading idea
of

holistic determination

t

the idea that the base properties

and relations of an individual, its worldmates and their

base relations (and the part/whole relation) to one another
(functionally) determine the individual's supervenient

properties
But there is still the question of the overall

significance of supervenience
relation.

,

especially as a dependence

So far, my argument that (Gsm) -supervenience is

strong enough to be one part of a two-part analysis of
ontic dependence has been very abstract.
flesh on the bones of this argument if

I

could put some

could show in

I

detail why a specific supervenience thesis (such as global

psychophysical supervenience) is indeed

a

significant

necessary condition on some specific metaphysical

dependency thesis (such as materialism)

.

This will be

accomplished in the next (and final) chapter.
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CHAPTER VII

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUPERVENIENCE

——
1.

Significance of Functional Dependence

The Objection
It is time to reconsider standard criticisms
of the

metaphysical significance of supervenience
(e.g.

.

The critics

Grimes, Kim, and Charles) have usually focussed on

its reputed shortcomings as a formulation of physicalism
(see chapter III.B.)

.

These philosophers argue that

psychophysical supervenience is not equivalent to

materialism because the supervenience thesis is too weak to
capture the kind of asymmetric dependence relation that

must hold between mental and physical properties and

relations if materialism (or physicalism) is true.

Their

essential point seems to be that supervenience is not

sufficient for the ontological priority, or greater
naturalness, of the members of the base set.

Although the

critics are right that even asymmetric supervenience is not

sufficient for such a relation, they seem to have

underestimated the importance of the functional dependence
relations implied by various supervenience theses:

particularly (Lsm) and (Gsm)
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2...

A Combinatorial Defe n se of Superveni

The importance of the functional
dependence relations
provided by supervenience relations such
as (Lsm) and (Gsm)
can be seen by reflecting on a
metaphysical scheme that
takes plenitude principles such as Isolation
(see chapter
IV) seriously.
i have in mind a combinatorial
metaphysics
such as the "Tractarian Nominalism" presented
by Skyrms
(1981)

.

I

will present only the briefest outline of
this

view as it is developed by Armstrong (1989).^
The central claim of combinatorialism is that

possibility (and necessity) are to be analyzed (or at
least
understood) in terms of all combinations of certain
fundamental (or basic) entities.

According to Armstrong,

the basic entities come in three kinds; basic individuals

(Armstrong suggests point-instants^)

,

and a few basic

P^op^^ties and relations (which play the role of Lewis's

perfectly natural properties and relations^)

.

The details

•j

Other combinatorial schemes have been developed by
Cresswell (1972), and considered in some depth by Quine
and Lycan (1979)
(1969)
,

^Armstrong (1989) p. 38.
^Unlike Lewis, Armstrong ascribes to a theory according
to which properties and relations are sparse.
He holds
that, strictly speaking, the only properties or relations
are perfectly natural properties and relations. Unlike
Lewis, who is agnostic on the matter, Armstrong claims that
these natural properties and relations are universals
(entities that are "wholly present" in each of their
potentially multiple instances). Nevertheless, Armstrong
accepts Lewis's view that the natural properties and
relations (Armstrong would say the only real properties and
(continued
.
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.

.

of the view are not important to us.

The central idea is

that any basic individual can instantiate
any combination
of basic properties and stand in any
basic relations to
other basic individuals. The instantiation
of a basic
property by a basic individual or the holding
of an n-place
basic relation between n basic individuals is
an "atomic
state of affairs"^
Possibilities, then, are understood
as conjunctions of atomic states of affairs;
roughly any

conjunction of atomic states of affairs is possible, and
possible worlds are special maximal conjunctions of atomic
states of affairs.^

Given that Armstrong individuates worlds in terms of
atomic states of affairs, and atomic states of affairs
coritain basic individuals,

it simplifies our discussion to

work with global supervenience roughly as Kim originally
understood it.

Specifically,

I

will work with

(G)

on the

understanding that worlds are globally A-indiscernible iff
they have the same distribution of A-properties over basic
individuals.*^

^
continued)
relations) constitute a minimal supervenience base for all
other respects of qualitative difference.
( .

.

.

^Armstrong (1989) p. 41.
^Armstrong (1989) Chapter

3.

*^This is equivalent to working with (Gwm) or (Gsm) on
the assumption that basic individuals are never parts of one
another and that the haecceities of basic individuals are
included in both the base and supervenient sets.
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On these assumptions it is rather easy to
see why the
global supervenience of the mental on the physical
is a

necessary condition on physicalism.

On this framework,

physicalism would plausibly be formulated as the
hypothesis
that the only basic properties and relations are
physical.^

In other words, physicalism is the thesis that

the only basic properties and relations that can be

independently combined and recombined in any old way with
basic individuals are physical properties: the physical
P^op^i^ties and relations are the building blocks out of

which all other (qualitative) properties and relations are
"constructed".

So understood, the mental will have to

supervene globally (but perhaps not locally) on the set of

physical properties and relations.

To see that this is so,

suppose, for reductio, that some mental property or

relation, M, fails to supervene globally on the set of all

physical properties and relations,

P.

Then there are

possible worlds with the same distribution of physical

properties and relations in P (over the basic individuals)
but different distributions of M.

But this means that

^Those who think physicalism is a contingent thesis
should interpret all my references to "all basic (or
natural) properties and relations" in this section as
tacitly restricted to only those basic properties and
relations that are actually instantiated. For arguments
that this is the proper way to restrict the modality
involved in physicalism and materialism see Lewis (1983) and
The logic of the subsequent argument is
Chapter IV. D. 2..
restricted
and the unrestricted
both
the
sound on
interpretation
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these worlds cannot be identified as
conjunctions of atomic
states of affairs after all. Here's why:
because the
worlds have the same distributions of
physical properties
and relations and, by hypothesis, all basic
properties and
relations are physical, it follows that they
have the same
distribution of basic properties and relations over
the
basic individuals. This means that the same
atomic states
hold at both of them.

Thus, according to

Armstrong's combinatorialism, the worlds are identical.
But they are not identical worlds because they differ
with

respect to the distribution of the mental property, M.
Thus, we reject the reductio assumption, and conclude that
if physicalism is true, then the mental must globally

supervene on the physical.
We can represent the basic structure of the argument

thus

To Prove: If physicalism is true then every mental

property globally supervenes on the set of all
physical properties (and relations)

(1)

Physicalism is true.

(2)

Physicalism is the doctrine that all basic

(Conditional Assumption)

properties, relations (and individuals) are
physical.

(DFN)
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(3)

Worlds are conjunctions of atomic states of
(Armstrong)

(4)

W and

z,

have the same distributions of basic

properties and relations over basic individuals
iff the same atomic states of affairs hold at w

and at
(5)

z.

(Ass)®

Some mental property, M, fails to globally

supervene on the set of all physical properties
and relations.
(6)

(Reductio)

There are two worlds, w and

z

such that

(a)

w and

have the same distributions of physical

z

properties and relations (over individuals) and
w and

(b)

z

have different distributions of M.

(5

Dfn of global)
(V)

W =

z

(1,

(8)

VI

*

z

(6b)

(9)

P

&

-P

(7,

2,

8)

On Armstrong's combinatorial metaphysics, we can see why

the thesis that the mental (the moral, the biological, or
whatever)

is globally supervenient on the physical is

significant.

The falsehood of the thesis is tantamount to

the denial of physicalism.

It implies that one of the

®This assumption is justified, I believe, in light of
Armstrong's notion of an atomic state of affairs, and in
light of Kim's original understanding of a distribution of
properties and relations over basic individuals (which we
are working with in this argument)
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ontologically basic properties or relations is
not
physical property or relation. This is why it

a

is useful to

include a supervenience thesis as part of a
formulation of
physicalism (or materialism)
If we make use of the notion of a natural
property,

the point can be seen more quickly.

Essentially, in the

combinatorial framework, physicalism amounts to the thesis
that all perfectly natural properties and relations are

physical properties and relations.^

But,

as we have

already seen, according to Lewis and Armstrong, being

a

perfectly natural property involves being a member of

a

supervenience base for all other properties.

And in light

of our investigation into the different versions of

supervenience,

I

believe we can conclude that natural

properties (and relations) must make up a (Gsm)-

supervenience base.

So the claim that all natural

properties and relations are physical implies that the set
of mental properties and relations (as well as all other

qualities)

(Gsm) -supervenes on the set of all physical

properties and relations (in virtue of supervening on the
subset of the base set that is the set of all natural

properties and relations)
mental,

for example,

is

.

This is why the thesis that the

(Gsm) -supervenient on the physical

^If physicalism is taken to be a contingent truth (as
it often is) then it is best formulated as the claim that
all the actual perfectly natural properties and relations
(i.e., those that are actually instantiated) are physical
properties or relations. See note 7 above for more details.
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has metaphysical significance.

The falsehood of the thesis

is tantamount to the denial of physicalism.

it implies

that some perfectly natural (i.e., most
ontologically
basic) property or relation is not a physical
property or

relation. This is why many have said that the
basic issue
dividing physicalists and non-physical ists of all
stripes
is the supervenience of all gualitative properties
and

relations on the physical.
it,

Physicalists are committed to

dualists are not (although they need not embrace its

denial either^°)

.

The capacity of supervenience to

formulate theses that play such

a

central role in basic

philosophical disputes is the primary significance of
supervenience.

And it is especially important to realize

that this capacity derives from its status as

a

functional

dependence or determination relation.

3

.

A Second Look at the Literature

What Grimes, Kim and the other critics have shown is
that no supervenience relation, alone, is sufficient for

physicalism.

A serious physicalist therefore must

supplement her supervenience thesis with some other claim,

^*^An example of a kind of property (and event) dualism
that is compatible with psychophysical supervenience is
presented by Stephen Yablo (1992). Yablo argues that in
some cases mental events (on the fine-grained conception of
events) have a kind of causal priority over their physical
realizations. And the supervenience of the mental on the
physical is actually a central premise in his argument for
the causal priority of (some) mental events.
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or some of the positive aspects of
her position will be
left out.
For example, the physicalist might
formulate

physicalism as the claim that all natural
properties and
relations are physical. This not only entails
the

supervenience of mental (moral, biological, etc)
properties
on physical properties, but it also implies
the ontic
priority of (at least some) physical properties
and

relations relative to all other properties and
relations.
Alternatively, the physicalist could choose to formulate

physicalism in two steps.

First she would assert that all

qualitative properties supervene on the set of all physical

properties and relations.

Then she would supplement this

claim with an extra thesis designed to indicate that the
physical is somehow prior to the non-physical.

With this in mind it is interesting to note that in

their original work on supervenience (or "determination")

Heilman and Thompson emphasize that if physicalism is to be
formulated as a supervenience thesis it must be

supplemented by an additional principle that somehow
expresses the primacy of the physical.

H&T supplement

their principles of physical determination with a principle
of physical exhaustion according to which every entity is

either a basic physical entity of the sort directly studied
by physicists (e.g., a quark, neutrino, electron, photon,
etc)

a mereological sum of such entities,

or a set

theoretic construction of such entities and their sums.
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[TJhese determination principles ... are
separately and jointly independent of
Ontological Physicalism [i.e., the principle
of physical exhaustion] and reductionism.
Physical Determination does not require that
all attributes - properties, relations,
functions, etc. - be, modulo reduction,
physical attributes. The principles of
Ontological Physicalism and of Physical
Determination together make up Physical ist
Materialism.

In fact, materialism is often expressed as the

conjunction of a supervenience thesis and some version of
the token identity theory according to which,

for instance,

all individuals (and all events) are physical, but not all

individuals or events are mental.

Davidson (1970).

This is the position of

More recently, LePore and Loewer have

characterized materialism as the conjunction of three
theses:

(i)

a

principle of physical exhaustion according to

which every event is a physical event (although some may be
mental events as well),

a global

(ii)

psychophysical

supervenience thesis, and (iii) a principle asserting the
causal priority of the physical.

These authors find

supervenience useful precisely because it is a powerful
necessary condition on physicalism.

They didn't represent

psychophysical supervenience as sufficient for materialism.

^^Hellman and Thompson (1977) p.
^^LePore and Lower (1989)

pp.
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511.

177-178.

B.

A Response to Grimoc;

With these points established, it is time
to
reconsider Grimes' criticism of the metaphysical

significance of supervenience

^ristead of being a savior of contemporary
philosophy, the concept of supervenience
turns out to be rather uninteresting, or at
least ill-suited for the sorts of
applications it is supposed to have. For
even in its strongest form, this concept
fails to serve as a general form of
dependence.... Thus, supervenience is not
an all-purpose device for explaining how the
moral, the mental, or the macrophysical
depends in some special way upon a more
basic reality.
It's just not the right sort
of concept in this regard.”'^

Now we can see that Grimes has overstated things with his

claim that supervenience is inadequate for the sorts of

applications it is supposed by many to have.

In general.

Grimes is simply wrong that supervenience fails to be a
general form of dependency: it is a kind of functional
dependency, and different types of supervenience are

different sort of functional dependence relations.
More specifically, supervenience is supposed by many
to be a necessary (but insufficient) condition of

intertheoretic reducibility
to the task.
’^Grimes

,

and it is perfectly adequate

Also, specific supervenience theses (such as

(1988)

p.

159.
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the global supervenience of the mental on
the physical) are
explicitly and correctly treated as important
necessary but
insufficient, conditions on physicalism and other
important
philosophical positions by three of the most
influential

supervenience theorists (e.g., Davidson (1970), and
Heilman
and Thompson (1975), (1977)), and by some more recent

writers (e.g., Lepore and Lower (1989); Oddie
(1991)).
This helps dispel the incorrect impression that the

proponents of supervenience have universally expected more
of supervenience than it is capable of providing.

Finally, while Grimes is correct that "supervenience
is not an all-purpose device for explaining how the moral,

the mental, or the macrophysical depends in some special

way upon a more basic reality",''^ in the sense that it

doesn't capture everything that is important about such
relationships (e.g. ontic priority)

,

supervenience is

ideally suited for "explaining how the moral, the mental,
or the macrophysical depends in some special way upon a

more basic reality".''^

For example, the macrophysical

might be locally supervenient while the mental is only

globally supervenient on the physical.

Moreover, certain

mental properties might be locally supervenient on
intrinsic physical properties while others are not.

Were

these claims true, they would, in fact, convey pertinent
^"^Grimes

(1988)

p.

159.

’^Grimes

(1988)

p.

159.
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information concerning the dependence relations
between the
respective properties.
in a perfectly legitimate sense,
such claims would provide information
regarding how (as
opposed to why) these "realms" depend on the
physical.

C.

In chapters III,

IV,

Conclusion

VI,

and VII,

I

defended

supervenience as both a nonreductive relation and as

a

metaphysically significant dependence relation with
applications in disparate fields of philosophy.
deserves special mention for in that chapter

I

Chapter IV

defend the

significance of functional dependence relations by
focussing on the comparatively weak functional dependence

relation provided by global supervenience (really (Gw)supervenience) and showing its strength against the

backdrop of a modal ontology which respects the plenitude
of possibilities.

This discussion provided the foundation

for my defense in this chapter of the significance of

global psychophysical supervenience in general, and (Gsm)-

psychophysical supervenience in particular, as

a

necessary

condition on physicalism.
In chapters II,

IV,

V,

and VI,

I

examined the logical

and metaphysical relations between both the standard

versions and my new versions of supervenience.

All the

standard variants of supervenience extant in the literature
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have been found wanting in certain
respects; the local
supervenience relations are either too
limited (as (S) is
in virtue of being a single domain
relation which does not
allow relations in the base set) or too
weak and too
limited (as (W) is) to be substantive necessary
conditions
on the most ontologically significant
dependence

relations,

while the standard formulations of global
supervenience are
either imprecise or insufficiently general.
I believe I

corrected these deficiencies with my new formulations
of
local and global supervenience developed in chapters

V and

VI

Although there certainly is more work to be done on
supervenience, especially the supervenience of relations,

I

believe that this dissertation advances the discussion in

a

number of ways.

First,

I

think my attention to the

distinction between formal and metaphysical entailment
helps to clarify disputes concerning the entailment

relations between different versions of supervenience.
Second,

I

think that the new supervenience relations are

substantial improvements on the standard relations
(G)

,

and

(W)

.

Third,

I

believe

I

(S)

,

have illustrated the

close relationship between supervenience, especially global
supervenience, and metaphysical issues concerning the

plenitude of possibilities.

Most importantly,

I

hope that

my defense of the significance of supervenience theses as

non-trivial necessary conditions on central philosophical
254

theses such as physicalism will allow us to accept
the
critics' claim that supervenience is insufficient

for the

ontic priority or greater naturalness of the base

properties (or relations) without drawing the mistaken
conclusion that supervenience is a philosophically
insignificant dependence relation.
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